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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Congress effected a sweeping and comprehensive 
restructuring of the Nation’s health-insurance 
markets in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 109 (collectively, the “Act” or “ACA”).  In No. 
11-398, this Court is reviewing whether Congress 
exceeded its Article I authority when it enacted the 
ACA’s mandate that virtually every individual 
American obtain health insurance.  26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(a).  Here, the question presented is: 
Whether the remainder of the Act must be 
invalidated in whole or in part because it cannot be 
severed from the individual mandate. 
ii 
 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT 
Three private individuals or organizations were 
Plaintiffs-Appellees below and are Petitioners in No. 
11-393 and Respondents (by rule) in No. 11-400:  
National Federation of Independent Business 
(“NFIB”); Kaj Ahlburg; and Mary Brown.  NFIB is a 
nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that promotes 
and protects the rights of its members to own, 
operate, and grow their businesses across the fifty 
States and the District of Columbia.  NFIB is not a 
publicly traded corporation, issues no stock, and has 
no parent corporation.  There is no publicly held 
corporation with more than a 10% ownership stake 
in NFIB. 
26 States, by and through their Attorneys 
General or Governors, were Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants below and are 
Petitioners in No. 11-400 and Respondents (by rule) 
in No. 11-393: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; 
Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; 
Louisiana; Maine; Michigan; Mississippi; Nebraska; 
Nevada; North Dakota; Ohio; Pennsylvania; South 
Carolina; South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Washington; 
Wisconsin; and Wyoming. 
Six federal officers or agencies were Defendants-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees below and are 
Respondents in Nos. 11-393 & 11-400:  Kathleen 
Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of 
Health and Human Services; Timothy F. Geithner, in 
his official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; 
Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Secretary of 
Labor; and the United States Departments of Health 
and Human Services, of the Treasury, and of Labor. 
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BRIEF FOR PRIVATE PETITIONERS 
Private Petitioners respectfully submit this brief 
arguing that the individual mandate is not severable 
from the remainder of the Act.1 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet.App. 1a-
273a) is reported at 648 F.3d 1235.  The summary-
judgment opinion of the district court (Pet.App. 274a-
368a) is reported at 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256.  The 
district court’s motion-to-dismiss opinion (Pet.App. 
394a-475a) is reported at 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120. 
JURISDICTION 
The Eleventh Circuit entered judgment on 
August 12, 2011.  The petitions for writs of certiorari 
were filed on September 27 and 28, 2011.  This Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The appendix hereto reproduces selected 
provisions from the Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Act reflects an intricate deal that emerged 
from one of the most hard-fought and narrowly 
decided legislative battles in recent memory.  It 
produced a “comprehensive and complex regulatory 
scheme” (Pet.App. 22a) that proponents claimed 
would achieve near-universal health-insurance 
coverage and reduce health-insurance costs—without 
increasing the federal budget deficit. 
                                                 
1 To avoid confusion, all “Pet.App.” citations reference the 
appendix to the Government’s certiorari petition in No. 11-398. 
“RE” citations reference the Eleventh Circuit Record Excerpts. 
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A. The Act’s Passage 
1. Origins Of The Act 
Comprehensive change of the Nation’s system of 
health insurance was a central issue in the 2008 
Democratic presidential primary, with each major 
candidate outlining proposals to achieve near-
universal coverage while lowering costs.  See, e.g., 
Michael Cooper, It Was Clinton vs. Obama on Health 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A30.  Then-
Senator Hillary Clinton was the first to propose a 
mandate that every individual purchase health 
insurance—a proposal that then-Senator Barack 
Obama sharply criticized.  Id.  Clinton responded 
that universal coverage would be impossible absent 
an individual mandate.  Id. 
After taking office, President Obama’s position 
on an insurance mandate changed.  The shift began 
after the insurance industry’s two main trade 
associations offered to support comprehensive 
regulation on the condition that any bill contain “an 
enforceable mandate for individual coverage.”  
Robert Pear, Health Insurers Offer to Accept All 
Applicants, On Condition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, 
at A30.  This offer led to planning sessions between 
congressional leaders and major healthcare 
stakeholders, at which the centrality of the mandate 
became clear.  See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Care 
Industry in Talks to Shape Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 2009, at A16.  In the face of this pressure, the 
President signaled a willingness to depart from his 
campaign pronouncements.  Robert Pear, Obama 
Open to Mandate That People Own Coverage, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2009, at A17.  Likewise, the chairs of 
critical congressional committees agreed “to plow 
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ahead on the assumptions that individuals would be 
required to carry insurance” and “that most 
employers would be required to help pay for it.”  
Robert Pear, Team Effort In the House To Overhaul 
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A12. 
2. Goals Of The Legislative Effort 
For proponents of change, any legislation had to 
serve two fundamental goals: (1) ensuring nearly 
universal coverage, in particular by prohibiting what 
were described as discriminatory and abusive 
practices by insurance companies, such as the 
refusal to insure sick individuals and the pricing of 
insurance based on individual actuarial risk; and   
(2) reducing the overall cost of health insurance. 
The President made clear throughout the process 
that his core goal was to expand coverage, especially 
by eliminating the putative insurer abuses.  As he 
explained in his 2010 State of the Union address: 
I took on health care because of the stories 
I’ve heard from Americans with preexisting 
conditions whose lives depend on getting 
coverage; patients who’ve been denied 
coverage; families—even those with 
insurance—who are just one illness away 
from financial ruin. … 
The approach we’ve taken would protect 
every American from the worst practices of 
the insurance industry.  It would give small 
businesses and uninsured Americans a 
chance to choose an affordable health care 
plan in a competitive market.2 
                                                 
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
state-union-address. 
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Legislators echoed the sentiment.  E.g., 155 Cong. 
Rec. S13295, 13306 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2009) (Sen. 
Johnson) (“This legislation … puts an end to 
insurance industry abuses that have denied coverage 
to hard-working Americans ….”). 
Equally “driving” the legislative effort, though, 
was the fact that costs were “exploding.”  Robert 
Pear, Obama’s Health Plan, Ambitious in Any 
Economy, Is Tougher In This One, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
2, 2009, at A14 (quoting Melody C. Barnes, director 
of the President’s Domestic Policy Council).  Once 
again, President Obama was emphatic: 
Then there’s the problem of rising cost. … 
[This is why] so many employers–especially 
small businesses—are forcing their 
employees to pay more for insurance, or are 
dropping their coverage entirely …. 
The plan I’m announcing tonight …will slow 
the growth of health care costs for our 
families, our businesses, and our 
government.  It’s a plan that asks everyone 
to take responsibility for meeting this 
challenge—not just government, not just 
insurance companies, but everybody 
including employers and individuals. 
Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of 
Congress on Health Care, Sept. 9, 2009 (“Remarks to 
Congress”).3 
Then-Speaker Pelosi, and countless other 
legislators, echoed this refrain:   
                                                 
3  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care/ 
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We all know that the present … health insurance 
system in our country is unsustainable. We 
simply cannot afford it. … The best action that 
we can take on behalf of America’s family 
budgets and on behalf of the Federal budget is to 
pass health care reform. 
156 Cong. Rec. H1891, 1896 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010); 
see also, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S1923, 1931 (daily ed. 
Mar. 24, 2010) (Sen. Levin) (“At its heart, this bill … 
aim[s] to tackle the central problems of our health 
care system—rising costs and the insecurity many 
Americans rightly feel about the lack of 
dependability of their insurance.”). 
3. Critical Constraints 
Despite the urgency with which the President 
and congressional leaders pushed forward, they faced 
many obstacles to obtaining the necessary votes. 
Significant disagreements, even among 
proponents of comprehensive legislation, left little 
room for workable compromise.  For example, many 
supported a strong “public option,” i.e., a 
government-run insurer, which was said to “remove 
the profit motive as an obstacle to medical care”;4 
others argued that the “public option” would produce 
inefficient and unfair competition with the private 
sector; and still others offered compromise solutions 
involving more limited public plans.  See Robert 
Pear, Schumer Points to a Middle Ground on 
Government-Run Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 
                                                 
4  David M. Herszenhorn, Public Option Keeps Toehold in 
Senate Deal on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/health/policy/10health.html
?scp=32&sq=health+care+public+option&st=nyt. 
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5, 2009, at A20.  Many legislators were concerned 
about imposing the onerous taxes that would be 
necessary to fund an expansion in health-insurance 
coverage.  See David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats 
Are at Odds on Financing Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2009, at A14. 
Moreover, the Act had no hope of passing if it 
was scored by the Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) as increasing the federal deficit.  President 
Obama was emphatic that “[h]ealth care reform 
must not add to our deficits over the next 10 years—
it must be at least deficit neutral.”  Letter from 
President Obama to Senators Kennedy and Baucus 
(June 3, 2009).5  The President bluntly warned:  “I 
will not sign a plan that adds one dime to our 
deficits—either now or in the future.”  Remarks to 
Congress, supra.  The Senate Majority Leader agreed 
that any bill had to not only “lower the cost of 
staying healthy” but also “reduce the national debt.”6  
And key, centrist Senators likewise insisted on this 
constraint.  See, e.g., Robert Pear & David M. 
Herszenhorn, Democrats Are Considering Additional 
Tax on Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A19 
(“[W]e all set goals and we really, really, really 
worked hard to stay within those goals of making 
sure that it was deficit-neutral.” (quoting Sen. 
Lincoln)); Nelson: Bill Must Be Deficit Neutral, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2009, at A18. 
                                                 
5  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-
President-Obama-to-Chairmen-Edward-M-Kennedy-and-Max-
Baucus. 
6 Press Conference of Sen. Harry Reid at 0:29-0:34, Dec. 19, 
2009, available at http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/121909 
_finalbill.cfm. 
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4. Early Versions Of The Act 
The Act’s first precursor was released by the 
House Ways and Means Committee.  The draft bill: 
? Required that insurance companies provide 
insurance on a “guaranteed-issue” basis, i.e., 
that they provide coverage for all consumers, 
regardless of any pre-existing health 
conditions.  H.R.__ [Discussion Draft], §§ 111-
112 (June 19, 2009).7 
? Required “community-rated” premiums—i.e., 
premiums reflecting average costs in a 
particular region, but (with limited 
exceptions) not individual characteristics 
reflecting actuarial risk.  Id. § 113. 
? Provided that “[i]n the case of any individual 
who does not [maintain insurance] at any 
time during the taxable year, there is hereby 
imposed a tax.”  Id. § 401. 
This draft was subject to intense negotiations, 
and sharp disagreements led to three different 
committee versions.8  Ultimately, the House passed, 
by a vote of 220 to 215, a version that retained the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions, 
and imposed a tax on individuals without insurance 
(but not a direct mandate to buy it).  H.R. 3962, 
111th Cong. §§ 211-213, 501 (Nov. 7, 2009).  The bill 
also included a severability clause, providing that if 
any provision were held to be unconstitutional, the 
rest of the bill would remain in effect.  Id. § 255. 
                                                 
7 http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/hrdraft.pdf. 
8 David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, House Health Care Bill 
Criticized as Panel Votes for Public Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2009, at A11. 
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The initial bill reported from committee in the 
Senate, like the House bill, imposed guaranteed-
issue and community-rating rules on insurers.  
Affordable Health Choices Act § 101, S. 1679,  111th 
Cong. (as reported by Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., 
Labor, and Pensions Sept. 17, 2009).  In contrast to 
the House bill, however, the Senate bill did not apply 
a tax if an individual was uninsured.  Rather, to 
comport with the President’s campaign pledge not to 
raise taxes on families earning under $250,000 per 
year, it instead imposed a direct legal requirement 
that “[e]very individual shall ensure that such 
individual … is covered under qualifying coverage at 
all times during the taxable year.”  Id. § 161; see also 
Adam Nagourney & David M. Herszenhorn, 
Republicans Call Health Legislation a Tax Increase, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at A22. 
Following intense negotiation among the 
congressional leadership, a final Senate bill was 
introduced.  S. Amend. No. 2786 to H.R. 3590, 111th 
Cong. (introduced Nov. 19, 2009).  This version 
included guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
rules, like each of its predecessors, and it also 
imposed an individual insurance mandate, with 
compliance enforced by “payment of [a] penalty.”  Id. 
§§  1201, 1501.  Notably, however, the Senate 
amendment deleted the severability clause that had 
been included in the House bill.  Following further 
amendments, exactly sixty Senators—just enough 
under Senate rules, Sen. R. XXII—ended debate on 
the bill on December 23, 2009; and with the same 
sixty votes, the Senate passed the bill the next day.9 
                                                 
9  Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 3590, available at http:// 
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@X. 
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5. Final Passage And Reconciliation 
Just a few weeks later, Scott Brown won a 
special election to fill a Senate seat previously 
occupied by Paul Kirk, who had voted for the Senate 
bill.  A central plank in Brown’s campaign was that 
he had “vowed to oppose” the bill.  Michael Cooper, 
G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2010, at A1.  Thus, when he was sworn in, 
there were no longer sixty supportive Senators, so a 
filibuster could not be avoided on any future votes. 
This was critical, because no single bill had yet 
been enacted by both houses of Congress, as required 
by the Constitution.  Ordinarily, different House and 
Senate versions of a bill are reconciled by a 
conference committee into a final bill, which each 
house then must pass.  But, in this case, any bill 
remotely resembling the one passed by the Senate in 
December 2009 was sure to be filibustered in the 
reconstituted Senate.  Accordingly, the House had no 
choice, if it wanted such a bill, but to pass it in the 
exact form in which it had passed the Senate. 
The only way for Congress then to make any 
changes was to amend the bill through a procedure 
known as budget reconciliation.  By statute, budget 
reconciliation bills may be debated in the Senate for 
only twenty hours, 2 U.S.C. § 641(e)(2), which makes 
filibusters impossible.  However, such bills may 
include only provisions that have direct budgetary 
impacts.  Id. § 644(b)(1)(A).  Congress was thus 
precluded from making any non-budgetary 
amendments to the Senate bill. 
With no other option, the House adopted a rule 
providing for all-or-nothing consideration of the 
Senate bill without amendments, see H.R. Res. 1203, 
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111th Cong. (2010), and passed the Senate bill (the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) by a 
final vote of 219 to 212.  The House and Senate then 
passed, by simple majority vote, the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, a reconciliation 
bill that adopted certain budgetary amendments.  
David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final Votes in 
Congress Cap Battle over Health, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2010, at A17. 
B. Operation Of The Act 
The Act operates through nine titles (as amended 
by a tenth).  Its heart, contained in Title I, expands 
insurance coverage by simultaneously requiring 
insurers to provide broad coverage to all comers and 
imposing on individuals and employers a “shared 
responsibility” to buy it.  Title I also assists 
individuals in satisfying the mandate by subsidizing 
their purchase of insurance through newly created 
“Health Benefit Exchanges.”  Title II fills remaining 
gaps in coverage, by expanding Medicaid and other 
public insurance programs.  Titles III through VIII 
aim to increase the availability of various services 
and the efficiency of health-insurance coverage—e.g., 
by increasing preventative-care coverage, reducing 
fraud and abuse in public insurance, and expanding 
prescription-drug coverage.  Finally, Title IX imposes 
various revenue-raising measures to “offset” the 
spending measures in the Act. 
1. Insurance Regulations 
The Act comprehensively regulates various 
aspects of health insurance.  Specifically, Congress 
banned “discrimination based on health status,” by 
requiring insurance companies to provide 
“guaranteed-issue” coverage and charge “community-
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rated” premiums.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 
300gg-3(a), 300gg-4.  Relatedly, Congress limited 
insurers’ ability to restrict the scope and duration of 
covered services.  Insurers thus may not: refuse to 
pay for certain services, such as “preventative health 
services,” id. §§ 300gg-6(a), 300gg-13; impose annual 
or lifetime limits on coverage, id. § 300gg-11; rescind 
coverage absent fraud, id. § 300gg-12; impose 
“unreasonable” premium increases, id. § 300gg-
4(a)(1); or require more than a maximum level of 
“cost sharing” (e.g., deductibles) from insured 
individuals, id. § 18022(c)(3)(A).  See Pet.App. 26a-
31a (describing the Act’s restrictions on insurance). 
The Act thus effectively requires insurers to offer 
health insurance to any individual, no matter how 
sick, and to cover limitless amounts of healthcare for 
the life of the insured, at average rates that ignore 
actuarial risk.  These measures serve the Act’s goal 
of expanding health-insurance coverage and curbing 
“discriminatory” insurance practices; but by 
themselves, they severely undermine the Act’s other 
principal goal of reducing health-insurance costs.  
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  As the Eleventh 
Circuit noted, according to the CBO, by “requir[ing] 
private insurers … to cover the unhealthy,” but 
forbidding them from “pric[ing] that coverage [based] 
on actuarial risks,” the Act’s insurance regulations 
will raise insurance costs in the individual market by 
27 to 30%.  Pet.App. 126a n.107, 129a n.114.10 
                                                 
10  Citing CBO, An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, at 6 
(Nov. 30, 2009) (“CBO, Premiums”), http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf.). 
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2. Individual Mandate 
To counteract the cost-increasing effect of the 
Act’s insurance regulations, Congress heeded the 
insurance industry’s lobbying to impose a mandate 
for individuals to purchase insurance coverage.11 
The mandate provides:  
An applicable individual shall for each 
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is 
covered under minimum essential coverage 
for such month. 
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a).  This legal “requirement” to 
obtain health insurance is enforced by a monetary 
“penalty” for each month of non-compliance.  Id. 
§ 5000A(b). 
The mandate was intended to counteract the 
inflationary effects of the Act’s insurance regulations 
in two distinct ways.  First, and most significantly, 
the mandate directly subsidizes insurance companies 
by forcing healthy individuals to buy extensive 
coverage on economically disadvantageous terms, 
namely, at the same price as unhealthy persons.  
Second, Congress believed the mandate, along with 
other provisions of the Act, would reduce the costs 
imposed on doctors, patients, and insurers as a result 
of uncompensated care. 
                                                 
11  See, e.g., Addressing Insurance Market Reform: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 
111th Cong. (2009) (submission of Ronald A. Williams, 
Chairman & CEO, Aetna, Inc.) (“Since 2005, we at Aetna have 
been speaking out in support of an individual coverage 
requirement ….”). 
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a.  The most significant effect of the mandate is 
to subsidize insurers, which will in turn hold down 
the premiums paid by individuals and families.  By 
forcing “millions of new customers [in]to the health 
insurance market,” the mandate increases the 
number of customers for insurers.  42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(C).  As Senator Franken explained in 
justifying the insurance regulations, “we are giving 
these companies a huge influx of new business.”  156 
Cong. Rec. S1821, 1862 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2010).  
Moreover, this “huge influx” is highly profitable, 
because it consists of primarily healthy individuals, 
who have sensibly decided that comprehensive 
insurance is not financially worthwhile.  The 
statutory findings expressly state that the mandate’s 
“broaden[ing of] the health insurance risk pool to 
include healthy individuals … will lower health 
insurance premiums” and is therefore “essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets.”  42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I). 
The mandate does not target, and was not 
needed to capture, the sick or the poor.  Regardless of 
the mandate, unhealthy individuals will voluntarily 
purchase insurance at favorable rates, under the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.12  
And impoverished individuals will generally be 
covered either by the Act’s subsidies for participation 
in health-insurance exchanges or by the expanded 
Medicaid program.  See infra at 19-22.  Accordingly, 
the mandate targets healthy individuals who could 
                                                 
12  CBO, Premiums, 19 (“[I]n the absence of [the mandate], 
people who are older and more likely to use medical care would 
be more likely to enroll in nongroup plans” than “people who 
are younger and expect to use less medical care.”). 
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afford insurance but believe, given their infrequent 
healthcare needs, that its cost is not warranted, 
particularly given the 30% increase in premiums 
caused by the Act’s insurance regulations.13 
Conscripting these individuals into the insurance 
market will greatly reduce the average payouts 
required from insurance companies.  That is why the 
mandate lowers prices for voluntary insurance 
customers, inverting the normal economic axiom that 
increased demand increases prices.  Specifically, the 
mandate is supposed to lower premiums in the non-
group market by 15-20%, offsetting roughly two-
thirds of the increase caused by the Act’s insurance 
regulations.14  Based on CBO estimates, this subsidy 
is worth between $28 and $39 billion in 2016 alone.15  
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, Congress used this 
subsidy “to mitigate [the Act’s] regulatory costs on 
private insurers.”  Pet.App. 129a.16 
                                                 
13  CBO, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate to 
Obtain Health Insurance, at 2 (June 16, 2010) (“CBO, Effects”), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individu
al_Mandate_06_16.pdf (“[T]he elimination of the mandate 
would reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a 
greater degree than it would reduce coverage among less 
healthy people.”). 
14 CBO, Effects, 2. 
15 The average premium in the non-group market in 2016 will 
be $5,800 after the reduction, which would mean the mandate 
lowered premiums by $1,024 to $1,450 for each of the 27 million 
voluntary participants.  CBO, Premiums, 6; CBO, Effects, 2. 
16  Indeed, as the Government explained below, Congress 
believed that “the absence of a minimum coverage requirement 
[to offset] guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
requirements had undermined health care reform efforts in 
several states.”  Govt. Br. at 31 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011). 
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In addition to reducing the average payouts by 
insurance companies, Congress also believed that the 
mandate protected insurers’ incoming revenue 
stream, by preventing a type of “adverse selection” 
thought to be enabled by the Act’s guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating rules.  Namely, people now 
“would wait to purchase health insurance until they 
need[] care.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  Indeed, 
some proponents of the mandate claimed that this 
“adverse selection” phenomenon “tends to lead to a 
death spiral of individual insurance.”17  Rightly or 
wrongly, Congress thought the mandate “essential” 
to prevent such adverse selection.  Id.18 
b. In addition to directly subsidizing insurance 
companies by conscripting healthy individuals, 
                                                 
17 Statement of Uwe Reinhardt, Making Health Care Work for 
American Families, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 
2009). 
18 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Congress’ concerns about 
this kind of “adverse selection” are both highly implausible and 
completely speculative.  One “cannot literally purchase 
insurance on the way to the hospital,” because “the Act permits 
insurers to restrict enrollment to a specific open or special 
enrollment period,” and it additionally allows waiting periods 
for general coverage eligibility.  Pet.App. 178a n.139 (citing 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1(b), 300gg-7).  Thus, an individual hoping to 
game the Act’s insurance regulations would have to gamble 
that, if he contracted some catastrophic illness, he would be 
able to wait until an open enrollment period (generally one 
month out of each year) and then wait an additional period for 
coverage to kick in.  In this regard, neither Congress nor the 
CBO offered even a rough estimate, based on the States’ 
experience or otherwise, of the extent to which people might 
delay purchasing insurance because of the availability of 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating rules. 
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Congress also thought the mandate would “lower 
health insurance premiums” by reducing the alleged 
premium increase of “over $1,000 a year” 
attributable to uncompensated care provided to the 
uninsured.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  Congress 
found that the uninsured “fail to pay the full cost of 
the services they consume” and instead “shift the 
costs of their uncompensated care—totaling $43 
billion in 2008—to health care providers.”  Govt. 
Cert. Pet. 6 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A)).  
Congress believed that providers in turn “pass on the 
cost to private insurers,” which “increases family 
premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.”  42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  Congress thus thought 
that, “[b]y significantly reducing the number of the 
uninsured, the [mandate] … will lower … 
premiums.”  Id. 
In fact, the mandate will have virtually no 
impact on uncompensated care.  As the Eleventh 
Circuit explained, the data on which Congress relied 
for its $43 billion estimate of uncompensated care 
show that the vast majority of this sum is 
attributable to people not affected by the mandate.    
First, $15 billion is attributable to people who will 
become eligible for Medicaid under the Act, and are 
therefore likely to obtain insurance without the 
mandate.  Pet.App. 127a.  Another $8.7 billion is 
provided to individuals with pre-existing conditions, 
who will buy coverage voluntarily under the new 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating regulations.  
Id. 127a-28a.  An additional $8.1 billion is 
attributable to aliens not subject to the mandate.  Id. 
127a.  And another $3.3 billion is caused by the 
failure of individuals with insurance to pay out-of-
pocket expenses such as deductibles.  Id. 128a.  Thus, 
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the amount of uncompensated care even potentially 
attributable to individuals affected by the mandate is 
less than $8 billion, 0.33% of the $2.4 trillion 
healthcare market.  Id.  
Moreover, other data show that even this $8 
billion figure is substantially overstated.  As a 
threshold matter, many uninsured individuals obtain 
no healthcare in a given year, and most others 
actually pay in full.  The uninsured on average 
obtain no uncompensated care from non-emergency 
providers and actually pay more for those services 
than the insured do.19  As for emergency care, less 
than 20% of the full-year uninsured visit emergency 
rooms, which is the only place where federal law 
requires that the indigent receive limited 
“stabilizing” care.20 
Thus, as detailed by amicus curiae in the court 
below, the voluntarily uninsured obtain, on average, 
only $854 in healthcare services per year. 21   And 
when it comes to emergency-room care, “the data 
show that the targets of the mandate consume only 
$56 per year on average in total emergency-room 
care, which includes both the mandated emergency 
stabilization care (which may still be billed to 
patients) and the more routine care administered 
there.”22  Given CBO estimates that the individual 
                                                 
19  Jonathan Gruber & David Rodriquez, How Much 
Uncompensated Care Do Doctors Provide?, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 
1151, 1159-61 (2007). 
20 CDC, Health, 337; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
21See Amicus Curiae Economists Br. at 13-16 (11th Cir. May 11, 
2011). 
22 Id. 
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mandate will cause 16 million people to buy 
insurance, 23  it will only affect people consuming 
about $900 million (16 million x $56) in emergency-
room care, and an even smaller amount of 
uncompensated care.  The full $900 million equals 
approximately 2% of Congress’ inflated estimate of 
$43 billion in uncompensated care, and .038% of the 
$2.4 trillion healthcare market.  In short, the 
mandate targets individuals who are unlikely to 
obtain healthcare at all and who mostly pay when 
they do. 
In truth, Congress’s professed concern with cost-
shifting attributable to uncompensated care is 
somewhat ironic, given the extent to which the Act 
affirmatively requires cost-shifting in other respects.  
By any measure, uncompensated care attributable to 
those affected by the individual mandate is a small 
fraction of the $28 to $39 billion in costs that will be 
shifted from the new, healthier customers affected by 
the individual mandate to insurance companies and 
their voluntary, less-healthy customers. 
In addition, even after 2014, the Act does not 
allow insurers to subject those who refuse to buy 
insurance to pre-existing condition bans or higher 
premiums.  Moreover, the Act exempts millions of 
individuals from the penalty for violating the 
mandate, see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e), and the 
relatively modest penalties are not used to offset the 
costs of insuring those who purchase insurance only 
once ill.  For all of these reasons, private insurance 
customers will continue to bear the cost of millions of 
people failing to buy insurance after 2014.   
                                                 
23 CBO, Effects 2. 
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Moreover, Medicaid pays substantially lower 
rates than private insurers. 24   On Congress’ view 
that hospitals shift unrecovered costs to private 
insurers, such rates would likely shift costs to 
private insurance.  Indeed, the Act exacerbates that 
cost-shifting by expanding Medicaid while cutting 
Medicaid reimbursements.  Likewise, “[t]he current 
tax exclusion for the premiums of employment-based 
health plans provides a subsidy of about 30 percent” 
to those receiving employer-based insurance, another 
amount far greater than any subsidy for 
uncompensated care provided to the voluntarily 
uninsured.25 
3. Exchanges And Federal Subsidies 
Title I of the Act also requires the creation of  
state “Health Benefit Exchanges” by January 1, 
2014.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18031.  These are marketplaces 
through which individuals (or small businesses) can 
purchase the mandated insurance. 
To sell insurance on an exchange, an insurer 
must be certified as offering “qualified health plans,” 
id. § 18031(d)(2)(B)(I), which must pay for certain 
“essential health benefits,” id. § 18021(a)(1)(B).  
These include a wide range of services including 
substance-abuse treatment, behavioral health 
treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative 
services, and preventive services. Id. § 18022(b)(1).  
Insurers must limit “cost sharing” by insureds—i.e., 
out-of-pocket costs like deductibles.  Id. § 18022(c).  
                                                 
24  CBO, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance  
Proposals, at 114-15 (Dec. 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
99xx/doc9924/12-18-KeyIssues.pdf 
25 Id. at XVII.   
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Insurers also must calibrate their plans to pay for a 
specific percentage of the healthcare costs for all 
enrollees:  A “bronze” plan must pay for 60% of the 
healthcare costs obtained by enrollees, a “silver” plan 
must pay 70%, a “gold” plan 80%, and a “platinum” 
plan 90%.  Id. § 18022(d)(1).  Insurers may offer the 
option of a “catastrophic plan,” which provides no 
benefits until a certain level of out-of-pocket costs is 
met, but only to individuals who are under 30 or 
exempt based on economic hardship from the penalty 
for violating the mandate.  Id. § 18022(e). 
The Act provides extensive subsidies for low-
income individuals to participate in exchanges.  26 
U.S.C.A. § 36B; 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071.  Specifically, 
tax credits are available for individuals who 
purchase health insurance through an exchange and 
have income between 100% and 400% of poverty 
levels.  26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (b), (c)(1).  The credits 
are tied to the lesser of (i) the actual premiums paid 
by the individual on a plan purchased on an 
exchange, or (ii) the community-rated premiums for 
the second-cheapest “silver” plan offered through an 
exchange for the geographic “rating area” where the 
individual resides.  Id. §§  36B(b)(2), (b)(3)(C). 
The CBO has predicted that, by 2019, 24 million 
people will be insured through exchanges, and 20 
million of them will receive federal subsidies of, on 
average, $6,460 per person.26  That amounts to an 
annual federal subsidy of almost $13 billion. 
                                                 
26 CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted 
in March 2010, at 19  (Mar. 30, 2011) (“CBO, Analysis”), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCare 
Legislation.pdf. 
21 
 
 
4. Employer “Responsibility” Assessment 
Subtitle F of Title I imposes “Shared 
Responsibility for Health Care,” not just on 
individuals subject to the mandate, but on employers 
as well.  Immediately after creating the mandate 
requiring “Individual Responsibility” for insurance in 
Part I, Subtitle F creates “Employer Responsibilities” 
in Part II.  In contrast to the individual mandate, 
employers’ “responsibility” does not include a direct 
legal requirement to offer insurance to their 
employees.  Instead, it consists of an exaction that is 
triggered if at least one employee of an employer 
with at least 50 full-time employees obtains a federal 
subsidy to purchase health insurance on an 
exchange, whether because (a) the employer fails to 
offer “minimum essential coverage” in an employer-
sponsored plan, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a), or (b) the 
employer offers “minimum essential coverage,” but it 
is unaffordable or does not cover the same level of 
benefits as a “bronze” plan on an exchange, id. 
§ 4980H(b).  See also Pet.App. 45a-47a. 
5. Expansion Of Medicaid  
In keeping with the Act’s theme of “shared 
responsibility,” Title II compels the States to expand 
Medicaid coverage for many individuals who would 
likely not be able to obtain other insurance.  Starting 
in 2014, states must offer Medicaid to adults under 
age 65 with incomes up to 133% of federal poverty 
levels.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).  States 
must likewise offer Medicaid to all children whose 
families earn up to 133% of federal poverty levels.  
Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII), 1396a(l)(1)(D), 2(C).  As 
the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[t]his is a significant 
change, because previously the Medicaid Act did not 
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set a baseline income level [and] many states 
currently do not provide Medicaid to childless adults 
and cover parents only at much lower income levels.”  
Pet.App. 49a. 
6. Revenue-Raising And Deficit-Neutrality 
“Offset” Measures 
To ensure a CBO score of deficit-neutrality, the 
Act includes various tax increases and spending cuts 
necessary to fund the subsidies, Medicaid expansion, 
and other expenditures in the Act.  As the Federal 
Government itself explained below, “[w]hen Congress 
passed the ACA, it was careful to ensure that any 
increased spending … was offset by other revenue-
raising and cost-saving provisions.”  RE 1024. 
Title IX adopts a series of new healthcare-related 
taxes and fees expressly described as “Revenue 
Offset Provisions,” which fall, inter alia, on 
individuals, employers, insurance companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, and manufacturers of 
medical devices.  E.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(b)(2), 
1411, 3101(b)(2) (imposing additional Medicare taxes 
on high-income taxpayers); id. § 4980I (taxing so-
called “Cadillac” plans); id. §§ 106(f), 125(i), 
220(d)(2)(A), 223(d)(2)(A) (restricting ability to pay 
for healthcare with pre-tax dollars); id. § 213(a) 
(limiting itemized deduction for medical expenses); 
id. § 139A (eliminating deduction for employers who 
provide prescription-drug coverage for retirees); ACA 
§§ 9008-9010 (various fees). 
The Act also cuts various payments under public 
programs such as Medicare.  For example, it reduces 
“disproportionate share hospital payments,” which 
are special payments to hospitals that provide a 
disproportionate share of uncompensated care.  42 
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U.S.C.A. §§ 1396r–4(f)(7), 1395ww(r).  According to 
the President, this was a “common-sense change[]” 
because “if more Americans are insured, we can cut 
payments that help hospitals treat patients without 
health insurance.”  Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert 
Pear, Health Plan May Mean Payment Cuts, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 2009, at A20. 
7. Miscellaneous Additions 
The Act also includes hundreds of measures 
ostensibly aimed at improving the quality, efficiency, 
and availability of healthcare.  Many of these operate 
through public programs like Medicare.  E.g., ACA 
§§ 2501, 2503 (adjusting reimbursement formulas for 
prescription drugs); id. § 3401 (adjusting payments 
for inpatient hospital, home health, skilled nursing 
facility, hospice and other Medicare providers 
according to productivity); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(q) 
(reducing Medicare payments to hospitals with 
specified percentages of preventable readmissions); 
id. § 1395ww(p) (reducing Medicare payments for 
hospital-acquired conditions). 
Other measures involve direct federal spending.  
E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a (creating Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to study more 
efficient payment methods for public programs); id. 
§ 300hh–31 (establishing grants for epidemiology 
laboratories); id. § 1320e (establishing “Patient-
Centered Outcomes Research Institute” to research 
effectiveness of various medical treatments). 
And yet other provisions impose direct 
requirements on employers or individuals.  E.g., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 207(r)(1) (requiring employers to provide 
reasonable break times for nursing mothers); 21 
U.S.C.A. § 343(q)(5)(H) (requiring chain restaurants 
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to “disclose in a clear and conspicuous manner” the 
nutritional content of standard menu items). 
Many provisions of the Act, though not directly 
related to the individual mandate or the insurance 
regulations, were added as quid pro quo measures 
needed to secure the votes of specific legislators.  For 
example, legislators such as Congressman Bart 
Stupak and Senator Ben Nelson insisted that the bill 
clearly prohibit the use of federal funds to pay for 
abortions.  See ACA § 1303; David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Abortion Fight Adds to Debate on Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A1.  Other provisions in the 
Act were, even more explicitly, included to benefit 
individual legislators.  For example, § 10323 of the 
Act extends Medicare coverage to “individuals 
exposed to environmental health hazards” in an area 
“subject to an emergency  declaration made as of 
June 17, 2009.”  In fact, this “cryptic, mysterious” 
provision, demanded by Montana Senator Max 
Baucus, refers specifically to “people exposed to 
asbestos from a vermiculite mine in Libby, 
Montana.”  Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very 
Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, at 
A1.  Likewise, § 2006 increases Medicaid payments 
to certain “states recovering from a major disaster.”  
In fact, this would give hundreds of millions of 
dollars to a single state, Louisiana, and was inserted 
at the behest of wavering Louisiana Senator Mary 
Landrieu.  Brian Montopoli, Tallying the Health 
Care Bill’s Giveaways, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2009.27 
                                                 
27  http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6006838-503544. 
html. 
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Still other provisions were not identified as part 
of specific quid pro quos, but provide suspiciously 
targeted benefits.  For example, § 10502 of the Act 
grants $100 million to an unnamed “health care 
facility” affiliated with a health center at a public 
university in a state where there is only one public 
medical and dental school.  Buried in Health Bill, 
Very Specific Beneficiaries, supra (“Senators and 
their aides … were not sure who would qualify for 
this money … [but] a new school in Scranton, Pa., 
was a likely candidate.”); see also Tallying the 
Health Care Bill’s Giveaways, supra (“Also in the bill 
… is an item that increases Medicare payments to 
hospitals and doctors in states where half the 
counties are ‘frontier counties’ …. Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.”). 
The Senate Majority Leader, one of the chief 
architects of the legislative deal, candidly admitted 
doubting “if there’s a senator that doesn’t have 
something in this bill that was important to them.”28 
C. Private Petitioners’ Challenge 
Private Petitioners NFIB, Ahlburg, and Brown, 
along with 26 States, brought this action challenging 
the ACA’s facial validity.  Pet.App. 2a.  As relevant 
here, they argued that the individual mandate 
exceeds Congress’ Article I authority and cannot be 
severed from the remainder of the Act.  Id. 3a. 
The district court granted summary judgment to 
the challengers.  Holding the mandate to be 
unconstitutional and non-severable, the court 
                                                 
28 David Welna, On Health Bill, Reid Proves The Ultimate Deal 
Maker, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www. 
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121791736. 
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invalidated the Act in its entirety.  Id. 362a-364a  
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed 
in part.  In an opinion jointly authored by Chief 
Judge Dubina and Judge Hull, that court held the 
mandate unconstitutional, but concluded that it was 
severable from the remainder of the Act, including 
even the insurance regulations that the Government 
had conceded were non-severable.  Id. 186a & n.144. 
After the parties filed their certiorari petitions, 
Petitioner Brown, whose standing had been conceded 
by the Government in the Eleventh Circuit (id. 8a), 
filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.  See Letter 
from G. Katsas to D. McNerney (Dec. 7, 2011).  
Private Petitioners do not believe that Brown’s 
pending bankruptcy undermines her standing; to the 
contrary, her worsened financial state exacerbates 
the degree to which future costs from the mandate 
are “immediately and directly affect[ing]” her 
“financial strength[] and fiscal planning.”  Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 (1998).  
Moreover, Brown’s standing obviously does not affect 
the standing of Petitioners Ahlburg or NFIB, both of 
whom the courts below held had standing:  Ahlburg 
is an unrelated individual, and NFIB has additional 
members who filed declarations materially 
indistinguishable from Brown’s in support of NFIB’s 
associational standing.  See Pet.App. 8a-10a, 290a-
293a, 439a; JA 151-56.  Nevertheless, in an 
abundance of caution, on January 4, 2011, Private 
Petitioners, with the support of the Government and 
the State Petitioners, moved to add two of these 
additional NFIB members as formal parties, thereby 
eliminating any possible concerns.  That motion is 
pending as of this filing. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Severability of an unconstitutional statute turns 
on congressional intent.  By any fair measure, the 
text, structure, and operation of the ACA—not to 
mention its tortured path through the legislative 
process—make it evident that, without the 
individual mandate at its heart, no statute remotely 
resembling the Act would or could have been 
enacted.  Once the mandate is invalidated, the entire 
Act must fall with it. 
In constructing the ACA, Congress sought to 
restructure the health-insurance market to obtain 
near-universal coverage, bring down costs, and keep 
the federal deficit from growing.  Ambitious goals, 
but Congress believed it had a magic bullet to 
achieve them—the individual mandate.  By forcing 
healthy individuals to buy full-scale insurance at 
artificially inflated prices, the mandate handed an 
annual $30 billion subsidy to insurance companies.  
That subsidy allowed Congress to force the insurers, 
in turn, to sell coverage to the old and the sick at 
artificially low prices.  The Federal Government 
could then provide limited assistance to those who 
could not afford even the premiums as reduced by 
the mandate’s subsidy.  Miscellaneous taxes and 
spending cuts could balance out this new spending 
and thus maintain deficit-neutrality.  And, with 
individuals and insurance companies bearing such a 
substantial amount of the Act’s costs, employers and 
States could be co-opted into filling some residual 
gaps—by, respectively, sponsoring affordable 
insurance for employees and expanding public-
insurance programs like Medicaid. 
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Without the mandate, the remainder of the Act 
cannot operate as Congress intended.  Absent the 
mandate’s mammoth subsidy to insurance 
companies, the Act’s insurance regulations would 
dramatically drive up premiums—reversing 
Congress’ goal of reducing health-insurance costs.  
That is why Congress found the mandate “essential” 
to these provisions, and why the Government 
concedes that at least some of them cannot survive 
alone.  But without the mandate and the new 
regulations prohibiting the insurance practices that 
Congress condemned as abusive and discriminatory, 
none of the Act’s primary goals would be satisfied.  
These provisions are the heart of the Act, its central 
raison d’etre.  To remove them would be to 
fundamentally alter the legislation; this Court has 
never used severability to effect such a major change 
to such a major part of such a major bill. 
Moreover, without the mandate and insurance 
regulations, none of the Act’s major planks would 
operate as intended by Congress.  Federal subsidies 
would no longer be linked to community-rated 
premiums; instead, they would pay private insurance 
companies for the very “abusive” practices Congress 
intended to forbid.  Other actors, like healthcare 
providers and the States, would bear burdens well 
beyond those intended, as elimination of the 
mandate and insurance regulations would destroy 
the bill’s careful allocation of shared responsibility.  
And new taxes would reap revenue no longer being 
used to further the Act’s primary goals.  At best, the 
parts of the Act unaffected in operation by the 
foregoing measures would amount to a hodge-podge 
of minor, miscellaneous measures, many added only 
to secure passage of provisions no longer intact. 
29 
 
 
That is nothing like what Congress enacted, and 
it is not an Act that Congress would have enacted.  
The ACA was the fragile product of extensive 
legislative deal-making; to strip out its centerpiece 
would fundamentally alter the original legislative 
bargain.  Particularly in light of the deletion of a 
severability clause from an earlier version of the bill, 
and the House’s determination to consider the Act on 
an all-or-nothing basis, it is clear that Congress 
intended this unique legislative deal to rise or fall as 
a whole.  Invalidation of the mandate therefore 
requires that the entire Act be stricken; this Court 
should leave to Congress the complex and political 
task of revisiting comprehensive health-insurance 
reform. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAY BE 
SEVERED ONLY WHERE CONSISTENT WITH 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
When a court invalidates part of a statute, it 
faces the question of what happens to the rest.  Can 
the stricken provision be severed, so that the 
remainder of the statute survives?  Or would 
severance—the slicing of legislation into a new, 
judicial creation—be an inappropriate intrusion into 
the lawmaking process?  The answer, as this Court 
has explained, depends on legislative intent: whether 
Congress would have enacted the bill absent the 
stricken provision, or whether omission of that 
provision would have scuttled legislative bargains or 
undermined statutory objectives.  If the latter is 
true, judicial revision through severance is improper, 
particularly where it entails complex line-drawing 
that is best left to the legislature. 
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Severability questions invariably raise serious 
separation-of-powers issues.  By severing invalid 
provisions, courts may save Congress from having to 
go back to the drawing board.  On the other hand, 
severance creates a law that Congress never enacted, 
and risks having it operate differently than 
intended—e.g., by preserving a quid enacted only 
because of the now-invalidated quo.  Such partial 
invalidation of integrated statutes thus may produce 
a serious invasion of the legislative domain.  To 
respect the distinct legislative and judicial roles, 
severability analysis must recognize the separation-
of-powers concerns on both sides of the calculus. 
A. An Unconstitutional Provision Cannot Be 
Severed If The Remainder Of The Act Would 
Not Operate As Congress Intended, And So 
Would Not Have Been Enacted On Its Own 
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable 
is essentially an inquiry into legislative intent.”  
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 
526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); see also Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 
(2006) (“[T]he touchstone for any decision about 
remedy is legislative intent.”).  The ultimate question 
is whether Congress “would have been satisfied with 
what remained” after the unconstitutional provisions 
were removed.  Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n 
of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932).  Courts should 
avoid “nullify[ing] more of a legislature’s work than 
is necessary,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330, but it would 
likewise be improper for judges to “substitute, for the 
law intended by the legislature, one they may never 
have been willing by itself to enact,” Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 636 (1895). 
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If “the balance of the legislation is incapable of 
functioning independently,” then certainly “Congress 
could not have intended a constitutionally flawed 
provision to be severed from the remainder of the 
statute.”  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678, 684 (1987).  But even if the remainder of the act 
could stand alone from an operational perspective, 
the question remains whether “it is evident that the 
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
independently of that which is invalid.”  Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. 
Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (“FEF”).  Thus, “[t]he more 
relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is 
whether the statute will function in a manner 
consistent with the intent of Congress.”  Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. 
To determine whether the rest of the legislation 
would operate in the “manner” intended by Congress, 
courts look to various objective factors, including:  
“the nature” of the stricken provision, Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685; its role “in the original 
legislative bargain,” id.; the “historical context” of the 
legislation, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162; the economic 
connection between the invalidated provision and the 
remainder of the statute, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238, 314-15 (1936); and the impact of that 
provision on the “dominant aim of the whole statute,” 
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 
(1935).  If these considerations show that Congress 
“would not have been satisfied with what remains” 
after invalidation of the unconstitutional provision, 
then severance is improper.  Williams v. Standard 
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242 (1929). 
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In undertaking the analysis, courts consider 
clauses that expressly address severability—text 
that apprises the judiciary whether Congress intends 
the statute’s provisions to survive, and to operate 
independently of, any one that may be invalid.  Thus, 
inclusion of a severability clause “gives rise to a 
presumption that Congress did not intend the 
validity of the Act as a whole, or of any part of the 
Act, to depend upon whether” a particular provision 
“was invalid.”  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 
(1983).  But the absence of a severability clause is 
treated simply as silence, creating no presumption at 
all, neither “against severability,” Alaska Airlines, 
480 U.S. at 686, nor for it, see Br. of Amici Curiae 
Family Research Council et al. at 4-14 (Nos. 11-393 
& 11-400).  If, however, a severability clause was 
specifically removed from a law during the legislative 
process, that “does suggest that Congress intended to 
have the various components of the [legislative] 
package operate together or not at all.”  Gubiensio-
Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Kozinski, J.); accord United States v. 
Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 (D. Utah 2004) 
(Cassell, J.); see also Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (drawing inference of 
congressional intent from fact that Congress 
included text “in an earlier version of a bill but 
delete[d] it prior to enactment”). 
B. Severability Analysis Must Account For The 
Separation-Of-Powers Dangers Inherent In 
Both Potential Courses of Action 
This Court has observed that the refusal to sever 
unconstitutional provisions “frustrat[es] the intent of 
the elected representatives of the people.”  Regan v. 
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Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality 
opinion).  Accordingly, courts should “act cautiously” 
and “refrain from invalidating more of the statute 
than is necessary.”  Id.  Conversely, however, if the 
Court does sever part of a statute, the necessary 
result is a new law that was never enacted by the 
political branches through the required means of 
bicameral passage and presentment to the President, 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-59.  Judicial creation of 
such new laws poses obvious dangers of intrusion 
into legislative function:  “This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative 
department of the [G]overnment,” and in substance 
“make a new law, not … enforce an old one.”  United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).  Indeed such 
partial invalidation “may call for a ‘far more serious 
invasion of the legislative domain’ than [the Court] 
ought to undertake,” especially “where linedrawing 
[would be] inherently complex.”  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 
330 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479, n.26 (1996)). 
The Court has therefore repeatedly held it 
improper to rewrite a statute to solve constitutional 
flaws.  To “dissect an unconstitutional measure and 
reframe a valid one,” by “inserting limitations it does 
not contain,” would be “legislative work beyond the 
power and function of the court.”  Hill v. Wallace, 
259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922); see also FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 
3162 (courts lack “editorial discretion” to “blue-
pencil” statute).  Given the “many different possible 
ways the legislature might respond” to the law’s 
defects, courts should let Congress “rewrite those 
provisions.”  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 
(2006). 
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Partial judicial deletion of an enacted statute can 
pose similar problems of judicial usurpation.  As this 
Court noted in holding that Congress cannot 
authorize the President to delete parts of an enacted 
statute, selective deletion impermissibly amends an 
enacted law:  “In both legal and practical effect, the 
President has amended two Acts of Congress by 
repealing a portion of each.”  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 
438; cf. Hill, 259 U.S. at 71 (reiterating that 
severability “does not give the court power to amend 
the act”).  Moreover, partial judicial “repeal” leaves 
in its wake a never-enacted law based on judicial 
speculation about counter-factual congressional 
desires.  Particularly when Congress has omitted a 
severability clause—the traditional method of 
informing courts how it wants the judiciary to 
respond if part of a law is held unconstitutional—
there is a grave danger that excising only part of the 
integrated whole will be based on mere guesswork, 
which may result in judicial creation of a law that 
Congress would not have enacted. 
Indeed, such selective judicial deletion is 
virtually  indistinguishable from improper judicial 
revision where the “line-drawing is inherently 
complex,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330.  This is especially 
true here because, as discussed below and as even 
the Government concedes, some constitutional parts 
of the Act must be excised once the mandate is 
invalidated.  When some constitutional parts of a law 
must be severed, judicial selection of which parts of 
Congress’ permissible handiwork will remain is akin 
to judicial rewriting.  Selectively deleting the 
remaining parts of the statute entails the same “blue 
pencil[ing]” as judicial rewriting.  In both cases, the 
Court is not performing the straightforward judicial 
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function of striking unconstitutional statutory 
provisions, but also the quasi-legislative function of 
deciding which lawful provisions will survive, based 
on guesswork about which subset of the 
constitutional residue best serves Congress’ policy 
goals. 
Finally, these worries of judicial intrusion on 
legislative prerogative are particularly acute when 
the invalidated provision is part of a comprehensive, 
heavily negotiated package.  Where legislation is 
born of compromise, severing an invalid provision 
threatens improperly to strip one side of the deal of 
its benefits in the “original legislative bargain.”  
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.  See, e.g., Carter, 
298 U.S. at 316 (refusing to sever provisions that are 
“conditions, considerations, or compensations” for 
one another); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 
(1881) (same); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 561-62 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (courts have “no authority” to “eliminate 
a significant quid pro quo of the legislative 
compromise”).  It is no answer to say that Congress 
can simply repeal the remainder, given the inertial 
forces that check the legislative process.  Imagine, 
for example, a law including some provisions 
demanded by each house of Congress, together 
reflecting a quid pro quo.  If a court were to 
invalidate only one set of these, the result would be a 
law that never would have been enacted yet is 
unlikely to be repealed.  Further, in a comprehensive 
legislative package, removal of any provision could 
impact the severability of every other provision, 
making the task all the more difficult and all the less 
appropriate for the judiciary. 
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The lesson is that this Court, “mindful that [its] 
constitutional mandate and institutional competence 
are limited,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, must be equally 
skeptical of severing either too much or too little of a 
law.  At least absent a severability clause, severing a 
key provision from a hard-fought legislative deal 
should be viewed with special skepticism. 
II. THE ACT’S INSURANCE REGULATIONS 
OPERATE IN TANDEM WITH, AND SO MUST 
FALL WITH, THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
The Act expressly states that the mandate is 
“essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets” because it was necessary to “lower health 
insurance premiums” that would be increased by the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.  
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  That statutory 
finding—expressly linking the intended operation of 
the guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
provisions to the mandate—should be dispositive for 
severability purposes.  But, in any event, further 
examination of the interrelationship of these 
provisions eliminates any conceivable doubt. 
Even the Government agrees that the individual 
mandate is inextricably linked to the guaranteed-
issue and community-rating requirements.  The 
mandate was intended to be a direct subsidy to 
insurance companies, as compensation for requiring 
them (in the guaranteed-issue provision) to insure 
against “risks” that have already come to pass and 
forbidding them (in the community-rating provision) 
from using actuarially sound insurance premiums.  
The mandate thus works to counteract the powerful 
inflationary impacts of these other provisions, which 
would otherwise make premiums in the individual 
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insurance market prohibitively expensive, thereby 
frustrating Congress’ goal of affordable health 
insurance.  And Congress further viewed the 
mandate as necessary to prevent “adverse selection” 
to “game” the new insurance rules, which proponents 
warned would spark a “death spiral” in insurance. 
The guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
requirements thus cannot operate without the 
mandate in the manner intended by Congress.  
Rather, “their associated force—not one or the other 
but both combined—was deemed by Congress to be 
necessary to achieve the end sought.”  Carter, 298 
U.S. at 314.  To strike the mandate alone would 
impermissibly eliminate a central quid pro quo of the 
Act.  If the mandate falls, the guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating regulations must therefore fall 
with it, as the Government itself has conceded. 
A. Congress Intended The Individual Mandate 
To Offset The New Burdens Imposed On 
Insurers By The Act’s Insurance Regulations 
The Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-
rating rules, both found in Subtitle C of Title I, 
prohibit the related “discriminatory” practices of 
denying coverage for a pre-existing condition or 
charging higher premiums to people who will require 
greater health-care expenditures because of risky 
conditions or habits.  Supra at 10-11. 
As Congress recognized, the unavoidable result 
of these measures would be a dramatic rise in 
premiums.  The CBO estimated that they would 
cause a 30% increase in individual premiums.  Supra 
at 11.  Congress also believed that, because 
insurance companies would now be prohibited from 
“discriminating” against sick people, “many 
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individuals would wait to purchase health insurance 
until they needed care.”  If the prediction of this type 
of “adverse selection” were accurate, it would reduce 
insurers’ revenues, and thus force them to increase 
the premiums charged to their diminishing number 
of customers.  Supra at 15. 
Congress was equally explicit that the individual 
mandate was its solution to these dual problems 
created by the guaranteed-issue and community-
rating provisions.  As the statutory findings 
expressly state, Congress believed the mandate was 
“essential” to mitigating increased premiums from 
these effects, and thus to “creating effective health 
insurance markets.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  
This was so for two reasons. 
First, the individual mandate’s principal purpose 
and effect was to greatly offset the estimated 30% 
increase in premiums attributable to guaranteed-
issue and community-rating.  Specifically, the 
mandate was supposed to lower insurance premiums 
by 15-20%, or $28 to $39 billion annually, thus 
reducing nearly two-thirds of the premium increases 
caused by these insurance regulations.  Supra at 14.  
It would do so by, in Congress’ words, “add[ing] 
millions of new consumers to the health insurance 
market,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2), primarily 
healthy individuals whose premium payments far 
outweigh any reasonably foreseeable healthcare 
expenditures.  This is why Congress emphasized that 
the individual mandate’s “broaden[ing] [of] the 
health insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals” would “lower health insurance 
premiums.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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A statute expected to increase premiums by some 
30% would not have been acceptable to Congress, as 
it would have materially undermined the Act’s stated 
goal of reducing costs to achieve “affordable care.”  
The guaranteed-issue and community-rating rules 
would still dramatically drive up premiums, but 
without any countervailing effect.  Absent the 
mandate, then, these insurance regulations plainly 
would not “function in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 
685.  They are legislation that Congress “never 
[would] have been willing by itself to enact.”  Pollock, 
158 U.S. at 636.  Nor could Congress have, without 
the vital support of the insurance industry, which 
found the insurance requirements palatable only as 
tempered by the mandate.  See supra at 2, 12. 
In short, the mandate is so closely tied to these 
provisions that its invalidation spells their demise.  
In concluding otherwise, the Eleventh Circuit simply 
failed to consider the adverse effect on premiums—
and thus on the Act’s express purposes—that the 
insurance regulations would have, if unmitigated by 
the mandate.  See Pet.App. 180a-85a. 
Second, Congress expressly stated its belief that 
the individual mandate was “essential” to eliminate 
the “adverse selection” enabled by guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  
To be sure, as the Eleventh Circuit explained, 
Congress greatly exaggerated this problem.  See 
supra at 15, n18.  Nevertheless, second-guessing 
Congress’ judgments about how the individual 
mandate will actually operate should play no role in 
severability analysis.  For severability, the question 
is whether Congress “would … have been satisfied 
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with what remains” after the unconstitutional 
provision is invalidated, Williams, 278 U.S. at 242, 
not whether Congress should have been satisfied had 
it better understood the effect of its law. 
In sum, because Congress thought the individual 
mandate was “essential” to cure dramatic premium 
increases and market distortions caused by the 
guaranteed-issue and community-ratings provisions, 
those provisions cannot, without the mandate, 
“function in the manner” Congress intended. 
B. The Act’s Guaranteed-Issue And 
Community-Rating Provisions Are 
Indistinguishable From Its Other, Related 
Insurance Regulations 
The Government has acknowledged that the 
mandate cannot be severed from the guaranteed-
issue and community-rating provisions.  Govt. Cert. 
Resp. 31-33 & n.13.  But these provisions cannot be 
singled out from the Act’s restrictions on health-
insurance products.  All of these regulations, which 
appear together in Sections 1001 and 1201 of Title I 
of the Act, also must fall with the mandate—and for 
the same reasons. 
In addition to precluding insurers from setting 
premiums based on individualized factors, and from 
refusing to cover pre-existing conditions, the Act 
imposes closely related restrictions on insurance 
products.  Many are designed to combat the same 
assertedly abusive or unfair insurance practices 
addressed by the guaranteed-issue and community-
rating rules.  For example, the Act forbids insurers to 
set limits on coverage, to exceed certain levels of 
cost-sharing, to refuse to cover various services, or to 
freely rescind or decline to renew coverage.  Supra at 
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10-11.  Like the guaranteed-issue and community-
rating provisions, all of these are designed to protect 
health-insurance consumers—particularly unhealthy 
consumers most in need of open-ended, permanent 
coverage—from insurance practices that make 
coverage inadequate, expensive, or unavailable.  By 
forcing insurers to offer policies on economically 
unfavorable terms, all of these provisions would 
drive up premiums.  The individual mandate would 
offset many of those increased costs.  The insurance 
regulations, together, thus comprise a package of 
restrictions that work in unison and are offset by the 
mandate.  Absent the mandate, the entire set of 
insurance regulations must be invalidated. 
The Government’s position, that this Court can 
strike the guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
provisions, but nonetheless retain the other 
insurance regulations, seems to rest on a policy 
determination that eliminating the former 
provisions, but no others, would sufficiently relax the 
burdens on insurance companies to make up for 
invalidation of the mandate’s subsidy.  But that is 
precisely the type of responsive policy choice 
reserved to Congress.  See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 
262.  For example, Congress could just as easily have 
decided to remedy the problem by retaining 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating but doing 
without the prohibition on coverage limits.  For this 
Court to choose which of the Act’s insurance 
regulations to strike, in an effort to offset the effects 
of invalidating the mandate, would amount to 
nothing less than unauthorized “blue pencil[ing]” of 
the Act, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162. 
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III. WITHOUT THE MANDATE AND INSURANCE 
REGULATIONS AT ITS HEART, THE ACT 
WOULD NOT OPERATE AS CONGRESS 
INTENDED 
It is one thing to strike, from a major law, a 
minor or ancillary provision only tangentially related 
to its overarching purposes.  But it is another thing 
entirely to displace a primary pillar of the legislative 
structure.  When legislation is constructed around 
certain foundational provisions, striking them will 
almost inevitably topple the edifice as a whole. 
The Act’s pillars are the insurance regulations 
and the individual mandate.  Indeed, the Act’s full 
name is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.  By forcing insurance companies to forever 
extend equally priced coverage to all comers, the Act 
“protects patients” from market practices thought to 
be discriminatory.  By forcing unwilling Americans 
to purchase insurance, the law subsidizes everyone 
else’s premiums, ensuring “affordable care.”  These 
provisions are the heart of the legislation, and the 
foundation of the statute.  None of the Act’s other 
provisions can survive their excision; Congress would 
hardly have reached the same destination had it 
proceeded from an entirely different starting point. 
Moreover, without the mandate and insurance 
regulations, the Act’s other principal features would 
operate in dramatically different ways, shifting costs 
in unforeseen directions and allocating benefits and 
burdens inconsistent with the congressional scheme.  
Some of these provisions could perhaps continue to 
“function” without the mandate and insurance 
regulations, but not “in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. 
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A. The Mandate And Insurance Regulations Are 
So Central To The Act’s Principal Objectives 
That The Entire Act Must Be Invalidated 
1. In determining whether partial invalidation 
would produce “legislation that Congress would not 
have enacted,” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685, 
courts consider “the nature” of the stricken provision; 
its role “in the original legislative bargain,” id.; and 
the “historical context” of the legislation, FEF, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3162.  These considerations establish a basic 
divide between run-of-the-mill provisions and 
legislative centerpieces.  A statutory provision will 
likely be severable if it played only a minor role in 
the legislative debate; or if its effects are relatively 
small in the grand scheme; or if it simply added an 
additional frill to an otherwise-coherent regime.  
Conversely, if a provision was especially contentious; 
or if it constituted a core element of the legislation; 
or if it was a principal means of securing the law’s 
objects, severing it would likely  be improper. 
The caselaw bears out this distinction.  For 
example, in Alaska Airlines, the record showed that 
Congress had “paid scant attention” to the 
unconstitutional provision of the statute at issue, 
while it had regarded another provision as “an 
important feature.”  480 U.S. at 691.  During floor 
debate, “neither supporters nor opponents of the bill 
ever mentioned” the unconstitutional provision; it 
was, in fact, mentioned but once “during the entire 
deliberation on the Act”—and even then, only in 
general terms.  Id. at 691-96.  Faced with this 
history, the Court could not conclude that Congress 
“would have failed to enact” the law “if the [invalid 
provision] had not been included.”  Id. at 697. 
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Similarly, in Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the invalidation of a 
provision giving conclusive effect to railroad rates set 
by an agency did not require striking the entire 
statute, which created the agency and gave it 
regulatory authority.  Rather, “creation of a 
commission, with power to establish rules for the 
operation of railroads and to regulate rates, was the 
prime object of the legislation,” and that object could 
be “fully accomplished” regardless of “whether the 
rates shall be conclusive or simply prima facie 
evidence.”  Id. at 395-96 (emphases added); see also 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 586-91 
(1968) (invalidating death-penalty provision but 
severing it from criminal prohibition, as “elimination 
[of death penalty] in no way alters the substantive 
reach of the statute and leaves completely 
unchanged its basic operation”). 
By contrast, in Mille Lacs Band, the Court 
considered an executive order that (i) directed 
certain Indians to remove from territories they had 
ceded to the United States; and (ii) stripped those 
Indians of their treaty rights to hunt and fish on 
those  lands.  526 U.S. at 179.  After invalidating the 
former aspect of the order, the Court held it was not 
severable from the latter.  Applying the “severability 
standard for statutes,” the Court concluded that the 
order had “to stand or fall as a whole,” because it 
“embodied a single, coherent policy,” and removal of 
the Indians from the lands was its “predominant 
purpose.”  Id. at 191.  Although the other portion of 
the order admittedly “perform[ed] an integral 
function in this policy,” it could not survive on its 
own after the primary function of the executive order 
had been so undermined.  Id. at 192. 
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The severability principles applied in Mille Lacs 
Band have been settled for decades.  For example, in 
Alton, the invalidation of central features of a 
compulsory pension scheme required the entire 
statute to be scrapped, because the unconstitutional 
provisions “so affect[ed] the dominant aim of the 
whole statute as to carry it down with them.”  295 
U.S. at 361-62.  Likewise, in Williams, this Court 
invalidated the substantive provisions of price-fixing 
legislation, 278 U.S. at 239-41, and then held that 
the law’s other provisions could not stand alone 
because they were “mere appendants in aid of the 
[statute’s] main purpose” or “mere aids to their 
effective execution.”  Id. at 243-44.  Although the new 
agency designated to fix prices could, in theory, still 
collect data, issue permits, and collect fees, it would 
have been “unreasonable to suppose” that the 
legislature would have wanted these mechanisms to 
keep operating once the most basic function of the 
law had been disabled.  Id. at 244. 
These cases make clear that severance is 
improper when the stricken provision is the heart of 
the legislative scheme—the principal effort toward 
its predominant purpose.  In that context, it cannot 
fairly be surmised that Congress would have pushed 
ahead unperturbed, making no changes to the bill 
once its hallmark was stripped out.  In such cases, 
the residue simply could not function in the manner 
that Congress intended.  And it is not enough that 
Congress might have enacted “some form” of 
legislation without the invalid provision; severance is 
permissible only if Congress would have enacted “the 
same [provisions] currently found in the Act.”  
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 n.7. 
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2. The individual mandate, together with the 
insurance reforms, are the heart of the ACA, as 
demonstrated by their crucial significance in 
achieving its objectives and their central role in the 
legislative debate.  The ACA cannot survive the 
elimination of these critically important provisions. 
The overriding goals of the Act were to reduce 
premiums and the number of uninsured, without 
raising the deficit.  Supra at 2-6; 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(F).  It is no surprise, then, that both 
the mandate and the insurance regulations appear in 
the Act’s first title.  These were considered 
indispensable to meeting the Act’s core objectives.  
To expand coverage, the insurance regulations force 
insurers to provide coverage to the unhealthy on 
terms economically unfavorable to insurers.  To keep 
premiums down, the mandate forces healthy people 
to buy insurance on terms economically favorable to 
insurers.  And Congress thereby avoided the need to 
use direct spending to subsidize insurance companies 
(as well as the concomitant need to adopt a 
politically unpopular tax).  The insurance regulations 
fundamentally transform the way health insurance 
may be sold in this country, and the mandate is 
expected to force some 16 million new consumers into 
the insurance market.  By any fair measure, these 
provisions are the Act’s centerpiece, and embody its 
“predominant purposes” or “dominant aims.”  
Accordingly, once they are invalidated, the rest of the 
Act must fall.  This is true even if its other parts can 
operate independently:  Hunting and fishing rights 
in Mille Lacs Band, for example, could have been 
stripped independent of tribal removal, but because 
the latter was the “predominant purpose” of the 
executive order, its invalidity doomed the whole. 
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Further confirming this point, the mandate and 
insurance regulations were the clear focus of the 
debate surrounding the Act’s negotiation and 
enactment.  The President’s 2010 State of the Union 
address, delivered while the Act was being debated 
in Congress, highlighted his desire to “protect every 
American from the worst practices of the insurance 
industry”—through the insurance regulations—and 
to give “uninsured Americans a chance to choose an 
affordable health care plan in a competitive 
market”—through the mandate.  Supra at 3.  
Legislators emphasized that the insurance reforms 
would rein in practices condemned as odious and 
discriminatory.  Supra at 4.  Indeed, a major voting 
bloc was committed to going still further—through a 
public option designed to entirely eliminate the 
“profit motive” in insurance—but settled for the 
insurance regulations as a necessary compromise.  
See supra at 5-6.  And numerous legislators 
highlighted how the mandate, together with 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating, would 
decrease the number of uninsured individuals in the 
country.  Supra at 4-5; 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(C) 
(finding that mandate “will increase the number and 
share of Americans who are insured”).   What 
matters is not the accuracy of these claims, but that 
the Act is largely premised on them. 
The contrast to Alaska Airlines—where the 
invalid provision had been referenced only a single 
time during extensive debate, 480 U.S. at 691—could 
not be starker.  Congress’ sustained attention to the 
mandate and insurance reforms reflects their 
singular importance to the overall legislative 
bargain. 
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B. Invalidating Only The Mandate And 
Insurance Regulations Would Disturb The 
Allocation Of “Shared Responsibility” 
Intended By Congress 
Analysis of the Act’s other notable provisions 
reinforces that the mandate and insurance 
regulations were its foundational premises.  Without 
them, the operation of the Act’s other features would 
be significantly undermined.  And, if an 
unconstitutional provision “is of such import that the 
other sections without it would cause results not 
contemplated or desired by the legislature, then the 
entire statute must be held inoperative.”  Connolly v. 
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902). 
Most obviously, elimination of the mandate and 
insurance regulations would displace Congress’ effort 
to allocate the costs of the Nation’s health insurance.  
President Obama argued that “[i]mproving our 
health care system only works if everybody does 
their part.” Remarks to Congress, supra.  “Shared 
Responsibility for Health Care” (ACA Title I, Subtitle 
F) is thus the Act’s theme; Congress sought to 
distribute the costs of near-universal coverage across 
individuals, employers, insurers, participants in the 
healthcare industry, States, and the Federal 
Government itself.  As explained below, without the 
mandate and insurance regulations, individuals and 
insurers will be freed of the major burdens that the 
Act imposed on them—and other stakeholders will, 
to a degree not intended, be left to pick up the slack. 
Pollock is instructive as to the implications of 
those redistributive impacts.  In that case, this Court 
invalidated a general income tax as applied to 
income from real or personal property.  158 U.S. at 
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637.  Then, it held that the tax could not survive 
subject to those exclusions, because revenues from 
property “formed a vital part of the scheme,” and 
striking it “would leave the burden of the tax to be 
borne by professions, trades, employments, or 
vocations.”  Id. at 636-37.  Eliminating the invalid 
provisions thus would shift tax burdens “in a 
direction which could not have been contemplated.”  
Id. at 637.  “[W]hat was intended as a tax on capital 
would remain in substance a tax on occupations and 
labor,” and the scheme, “considered as a whole,” was 
not intended to function as such.  Id. 
Here, striking only the mandate and insurance 
regulations would similarly disturb the allocation of 
costs and shared responsibility under the Act. 
1. Title I of the Act includes not only the 
mandate and insurance regulations, but also 
subsidies to help individuals with lower incomes to 
buy insurance.  The subsidies grant refundable tax 
credits tied to the lesser of (i) the premiums paid by 
those individuals, or (ii) the community-rated cost of 
the second-cheapest “silver” plan for the individual’s 
geographic “rating area.”  Supra at 19-20. 
If, per the Eleventh Circuit, this Court were to 
sever only the mandate, the anticipated cost to the 
Government would skyrocket.  As explained above, 
in that circumstance, premiums in the individual 
market would rise by some 30%.  Supra at 11.  And, 
because the subsidies are calculated based on actual 
premium costs, the Government would be on the 
hook for these costs.  Congress intended for the 
Government to subsidize premiums, but on the 
assumption that they would be relatively low, given 
the mandate’s subsidy. 
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Even if the insurance regulations are properly 
invalidated along with the mandate, the subsidies 
would not operate as intended.  The subsidy amounts 
are effectively capped by the community-rated 
premiums for the applicable geographic “rating 
area,” see 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(C); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg(a)(2), which of course exist only by virtue of 
the insurance regulations.  And if that now-
inoperative cap were simply set aside, and the 
subsidies calculated by reference only to actual 
premiums paid, the effects would be unacceptable:  
Absent the insurance regulations, insurers would 
return to the individualized pricing that Congress 
found discriminatory, with higher premiums for the 
elderly and those with pre-existing conditions.  Yet 
the Government, paying subsidies tied to actual 
premiums, would simply be footing the bill for 
private insurers to charge these unrestricted prices.  
Rather than ban the insurer practices that Congress 
condemned, the Act would actually pay for them with 
federal money.  The Congress that enacted the ACA 
could not possibly have intended that result. 
Nor would Congress have been willing to pay the 
whole bill for universal coverage.  Congress required 
healthy people, through the mandate, to provide an 
annual $30 billion subsidy to defray premiums for 
the sick—Congress simply could not afford, and 
never intended, for the Government to pay the entire 
amount.  Moreover, if the Federal Government really 
wanted to shoulder the entire cost of healthcare for 
Americans who cannot afford it, it would likely have 
done so through a public program like Medicaid—not 
by simply accepting, and paying, “discriminatory” 
prices charged by private insurance companies. 
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2. A cousin to the individual mandate, the 
employer “responsibility” assessment, encourages 
certain employers to sponsor health plans for their 
employees.  Specifically, it imposes an exaction on 
covered employers if one of their employees obtains a 
federal subsidy to help pay for insurance purchased 
elsewhere.  Supra at 21. 
This assessment—labeled “shared responsibility 
for employers regarding health coverage,” 26 
U.S.C.A. § 4980H—was one plank of a multi-part 
effort to spread health-care costs across multiple 
actors.  For that reason alone, it cannot stand once 
individuals, insurers, and the Federal Government 
are all let off the hook.  Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636-37. 
Further, the exaction is inextricably intertwined 
with the subsidies described above.  Indeed, if those 
subsidies are invalidated, no employee will ever 
receive one—and so the employer exaction will never 
be triggered.  The employer exaction is thus simply 
“incapable of functioning independently” of the 
subsidies.  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684. 
3. The Act also creates new health-insurance 
“exchanges,” marketplaces where individuals and 
small businesses can buy the Act’s new insurance 
products.  The Federal Government only subsidizes 
coverage purchased within an exchange, thus giving 
insurance companies a reason to sell there despite 
the distinct regulatory burdens imposed on plans 
offered through the exchanges.  Supra at 19-20. 
The exchanges cannot be severed from the 
provisions already addressed.  Without the subsidies 
driving demand within the exchanges, insurance 
companies would have absolutely no reason to offer 
their products through exchanges, where they are 
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subject to far greater restrictions.  Premised on the 
mandate, the insurance regulations, and the 
subsidies, the insurance exchanges cannot operate as 
intended by Congress absent those provisions. 
4. Another part of the Act requires that States 
substantially relax the eligibility criteria for 
Medicaid.  Supra at 21-22.  But, as the Government 
explained below, Congress intended for the 
additional Medicaid spending required of the States 
to be “offset” by other “cost-saving provisions.”  RE 
1024.  For example, Congress believed the insurance 
regulations would prevent individuals with pre-
existing conditions from being driven onto Medicaid 
rolls, or into state-funded high-risk pools, by the 
uninsurable cost of their care.  See RE 1023; 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (finding that “62 percent of 
all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by 
medical expenses”).  Congress further believed the 
States would also, in light of the mandate and 
premium subsidies, save money on uncompensated 
care.  See RE 1023.  If the States need no longer 
worry about picking up the tab for uninsurable sick 
people (because private insurers will now be forced 
to), or for cost-shifting by the uninsured (because the 
mandate will force them to buy insurance), then they 
can devote more resources to the poor.  Absent the 
mandate, insurance regulations, and subsidies, this 
premise would no longer be true, and the States 
would be forced to bear additional costs far greater 
than those intended by Congress.29 
                                                 
29 Of course, if the Medicaid expansion is independently 
unconstitutional, as the State Petitioners contend, then the 
severability analysis must take their invalidity as a given. 
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5. Another major component of the Act is a set 
of new taxes, most of which are found in Subtitle A of 
Title IX (“Revenue Offset Provisions”), and a set of 
spending cuts to public programs like Medicare.   
Many of these affect insurance companies and 
healthcare providers but, like the insurance 
regulations, were offset by the substantial benefits 
conferred by the mandate.  Supra at 22.  Without the 
mandate’s subsidy, these taxes and cuts would 
saddle insurance companies and providers with far 
greater net burdens than did the original legislative 
bargain.  See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636-37. 
Moreover, these provisions satisfied (as the 
heading of the revenue Subtitle indicates) the Act’s 
overriding political constraint—that it not add to the 
federal deficit.  Supra at 6.  Given the new liabilities 
adopted by the Government—notably, the subsidies 
for low-income Americans—Congress had to include 
new revenues to “offset” them.  The Act’s revenue-
raising and spending cuts were thus premised on the 
funds being used to expand coverage and hold down 
the cost of health insurance. 
But, as shown, the subsidies cannot survive 
without the mandate and insurance regulations.  
And there is no reason to think that Congress would 
have imposed this hodge-podge of taxes and cuts for 
its own sake, without furthering the twin goals of the 
Act.  Accordingly, these “offset” provisions, too, must 
fall.  Williams, 278 U.S. at 244 (holding “taxes” that 
were enacted to “defra[y] the expenses” of an invalid 
provision to be non-severable).  Nor could this Court 
restore budget neutrality by “blue pencil[ing]” the 
Act, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162, in determining which of 
the new taxes to strike.  Randall, 548 U.S. at 262. 
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* * * 
In sum, Congress designed the Act to spread the 
costs of expanded insurance coverage among 
individuals (the mandate), insurers (the insurance 
regulations), employers (the “responsibility” 
assessment), the Federal Government (the premium 
subsidies), the States (the Medicaid expansion), and 
other actors (the “offset” taxes and spending cuts).  
Eliminating the mandate and insurance reforms 
would have major ripple effects, twisting Congress’ 
reticulated scheme of “shared responsibility” beyond 
repair.  Accordingly, the Act must be invalidated in 
toto. 
C. Retaining Only The Act’s Miscellaneous Tag-
Along Provisions Would Fundamentally 
Change The Statute That Congress Enacted 
To be sure, the discussion above does not address 
every provision of the 2700-page Act.  As the 
Eleventh Circuit observed, within the law’s countless 
provisions can be identified various obscure 
measures that appear independent of its major 
planks.  The Act, for example, requires employers to 
provide “reasonable break time for nursing mothers” 
and restores “funding for abstinence education.”  
Pet.App. 174a-175a.  For three reasons, however, the 
existence of these peripheral provisions does not 
affect the conclusion of wholesale non-severability. 
First, the mandate cannot be severed from the 
Act’s major components.  As explained above, a law’s 
central pillars cannot be removed without toppling 
the statute as a whole, and the mandate and 
insurance regulations together plainly qualify as 
such pillars.  Supra Part III.A.  A fortiori, so too does 
the combination of the mandate, insurance 
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regulations, subsidies, health exchanges, employer 
assessment, Medicaid expansion, and taxes.  Once all 
of these are stricken, what is left would bear no 
resemblance to the statute Congress enacted. 
Whereas severability analysis normally removes 
a small discrete part to preserve a larger coherent 
whole, the issue here is removing a large coherent 
whole to preserve small discrete parts.  We are 
aware of no precedent that has allowed severance in 
remotely similar circumstances.  And for good 
reason:  It is inconceivable that Congress, trying to 
adopt a comprehensive solution to a perceived crisis, 
would “have been satisfied” with the menagerie of 
tag-along provisions that remain after a statute’s 
pillars are removed.  Williams, 278 U.S. at 242. 
Second, if the severability analysis really must 
proceed provision-by-provision, courts would be faced 
with the impractical, unrealistic task of proceeding 
through the Act’s “hundreds of new laws about 
hundreds of different areas of health insurance and 
health care,” Pet.App. 21a, and evaluating each 
provision’s relationship to the others and to the 
whole.  There are simply too many provisions to 
engage in such granular inquiries, particularly 
because the severance of each provision could alter 
the calculus and call into question earlier decisions 
about other provisions.  Once numerous, substantial 
pieces of the legislation cannot operate as intended, 
this Court should invalidate the whole statute. 
Third, even if it were somehow practical to 
consider every provision on its own, the difficulty of 
analysis required would be far beyond the judicial 
ken.  In an act this complex and interrelated, courts 
cannot confidently deem individual provisions to be 
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operationally independent.  Once a number of major 
provisions are stricken, the only responsible course 
for a court—“mindful that [its] constitutional 
mandate and institutional competence are limited,” 
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329—is to declare the entire Act 
non-severable, and let Congress handle rebuilding. 
IV. THE ACT WOULD NOT, AND COULD NOT, 
HAVE BEEN ENACTED WITHOUT THE 
MANDATE AND INSURANCE REGULATIONS 
Another way of framing the severability inquiry 
is to ask whether the valid portions would have been 
enacted independently of the invalid ones.  FEF, 130 
S. Ct. at 3161.  Here, even apart from the centrality 
of the mandate and insurance regulations to the 
functioning of the whole, the unusual legislative 
proceedings further confirm that, absent those 
provisions, the Act would not have been enacted  in 
anything even resembling its current form.  The Act 
emerged only after extended, hard-fought, legislative 
negotiation.  Every vote was crucial to its passage, 
and the vote-trading and log-rolling that developed 
as a result make this “sweeping and comprehensive 
Act” (Pet.App. 4a) an unusually unstable grand 
bargain.  Moreover, the shift in the composition of 
the Senate that preceded the Act’s final passage 
made it certain that the bill could not have passed 
without the mandate. 
A. The Act Was A Grand Bargain, With Nearly 
Every Provision Crucial To Its Success 
In an oft-cited analysis, Chief Justice Shaw of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reasoned that, while “the same act of legislation may 
be unconstitutional in some of its provisions, and yet 
constitutional in others,” the proposition “must be 
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taken with this limitation”:  If the parts “are so 
mutually connected with and dependent on each 
other, as conditions, considerations or compensations 
for each other,” then the statute must fall as a whole.  
Warren v. Charlestown, 68 Mass. 84, 98-99 (1854) 
(emphasis added).  This Court long ago adopted that 
test, directing courts to inquire whether, if “while the 
bill was pending in Congress a motion to strike out 
the [invalid] provisions had prevailed,” Congress 
would still have enacted the bill.  Carter, 298 U.S. at 
313, 316; see also Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 
(considering role of invalid provision in “original 
legislative bargain”).  Here, the nature of the debate 
that produced the bill, and the indications from its 
drafting history, confirm that the answer is “no.” 
1. The Act ultimately passed, in both the House 
and the Senate, by the closest of margins.  In the 
Senate, every affirmative vote was necessary for 
passage, making every Senator in the majority a 
swing vote.  And the uncertain outcome of the votes 
shaped negotiations over the bill throughout the 
legislative process.  Dispositive blocs of votes 
demanded a wide-ranging set of provisions—from the 
Act’s treatment of abortion to its exclusion of the so-
called “public” option.  Yet other votes were extended 
in exchange for particular, parochial benefits, such 
as a Medicaid subsidy for Louisiana; a pilot program 
for a group of people exposed to asbestos in Montana; 
and grants to particular, but unnamed, hospitals and 
universities in other states.  See supra at 23-25. 
This historical context provides strong additional 
evidence that, if “while the bill was pending in 
Congress a motion to strike out the [mandate and 
insurance reforms] had prevailed,” Carter, 298 U.S. 
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at 313, the delicate compromises embodied in the Act 
would have blown up, and there is little chance that 
Congress would nonetheless have proceeded, 
unfazed, to enact the remainder of the law. 
Separation-of-powers concerns about the judicial 
displacement of legislative bargains are especially 
grave in this context.  Granted, every statute 
represents some compromise, but this Act’s inherent 
“conditions, considerations [and] compensations,” 
Warren, 68 Mass. at 98-99, are unusually complex 
and were unusually important to its passage.  As the 
Senate Majority Leader acknowledged, there are 
more quid pro quos in this Act than anyone even 
knows.  See supra at 25.  For this Court to slice up 
the legislation in unforeseen, uncontemplated 
ways—invalidating quids and retaining quos, likely 
without even realizing it—would raise profound 
separation-of-powers concerns regarding the judicial 
creation of a statute so substantially different, 
politically as well as operationally, from the one that 
Congress enacted. 
2. Textual confirmation that Congress intended 
the Act to operate as a package deal can be found in 
its drafting history—namely, removal of an express 
severability clause.  If a law simply omits such a 
clause, its silence “does not raise a presumption 
against severability.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 
686.  But here, Congress removed a severability 
clause that had been included in an earlier iteration 
of the bill.  H.R. 3962, § 255 (Oct. 29, 2009).  While 
not dispositive, this fact “does suggest that Congress 
intended to have the various components of the 
[legislative] package operate together or not at all.”  
Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1267. 
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The Eleventh Circuit entirely discounted this 
drafting history, pointing out that “both the Senate 
and House legislative drafting manuals state that … 
severability clauses are unnecessary.”  Pet.App. 
175a.  That may have explained a failure to include a 
severability clause at all, but it hardly explains why 
Congress went to the effort of deleting a clause it had 
earlier found important enough to include.  And, 
despite the drafting manuals, the very same 
Congress included—in its other showcase piece of 
complex legislation, enacted just weeks after the 
Act—an apparently “unnecessary” severability 
clause.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, § 3, Pub. L. No. 111-203 
(2010).  That fundamental difference between these 
two landmark statutes is highly probative of 
congressional intent. 
B. Under Congress’ Procedural Rules, The Act 
Could Not Have Been Enacted Without the 
Individual Mandate 
In many cases, determining whether Congress 
would have enacted the legislation absent its invalid 
provision may be an “elusive” inquiry.  Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 932.  Not so here.  The unique procedures by 
which the Act was passed, following an unexpected 
change in the political composition of the Senate, 
provides the plainest evidence imaginable that this 
bill not only would not, but could not have been 
enacted without the mandate. 
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed a 
health-insurance reform bill with exactly the sixty 
votes needed to overcome a filibuster the day prior.  
Supra at 8.  But when Senator Scott Brown, a 
staunch opponent of the legislative efforts, was 
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elected soon thereafter, the balance of power shifted, 
and the Act’s proponents could no longer retain its 
fundamental structure and yet avoid a filibuster.  
Supra at 9.  Accordingly, the House of 
Representatives had no choice but to pass the bill in 
the exact form in which it had already passed the 
Senate, since a different bill emerging from a 
bicameral conference committee, reconciling the two 
houses’ versions, could not then pass in the Senate.  
To satisfy the Constitution’s requirement that a bill 
pass both houses in the same form,  the House was 
bound (if it wanted any bill remotely resembling the 
pending one) to pass the Senate’s version—which 
included the mandate and insurance regulations.  Id. 
Thus, the only way for Congress to make changes 
to the bill as passed by the Senate was through the 
budget reconciliation process, but that process 
allowed only for budgetary provisions.  Id.  Congress 
therefore was precluded from making any non-
budgetary amendments to the version of the Act 
passed by the Senate.  In other words, the large 
parts of the Act that did not affect the budget—i.e., 
everything aside from the Act’s taxes, subsidies, and 
changes to public programs like Medicare—were 
unalterable, and thus essential to the Act’s 
successful enactment.  The point is further confirmed 
by the rule that the House adopted to govern its 
consideration of the Senate bill:  It allowed for no 
amendments, requiring instead an all-or-nothing 
vote on the entire package.  See supra at 9-10. 
This history confirms that the Act, without the 
mandate or insurance regulations, could not have 
been enacted.  The latter have no direct budgetary 
impact, and so any attempt to amend them out of the 
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Act through reconciliation would have failed.  The 
whole statute is thus procedurally—not just 
operationally—intertwined with the mandate and 
insurance regulations.  It therefore would be doubly 
inappropriate for this Court to substitute for the Act 
a law that Congress would not, and could not, have 
enacted. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the ACA is entirely 
non-severable from the individual mandate and 
reverse in relevant part the judgment below. 
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TITLE I—QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH 
CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS 
 
Subtitle A—Immediate Improvements in Health 
Care Coverage for All Americans  
 
SEC. 1001. AMENDMENTS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE ACT. 
Part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service 
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq.) is amended— 
(1) by striking the part heading and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘PART A—INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP 
MARKET REFORMS’’; 
(2) by redesignating sections 2704 through 2707 
as sections 2725 through 2728, respectively; 
(3) by redesignating sections 2711 through 2713 
as sections 2731 through 2733, respectively; 
(4) by redesignating sections 2721 through 2723 
as sections 2735 through 2737, respectively; and 
(5) by inserting after section 2702, the following: 
‘‘Subpart II—Improving Coverage 
‘‘SEC. 2711. NO LIFETIME OR ANNUAL LIMITS. 
‘‘(a) PROHIBITION.— 
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage may not 
establish— 
‘‘(A) lifetime limits on the dollar value of 
benefits for any participant or beneficiary; or 
‘‘(B) unreasonable annual limits (within the 
meaning of section 223 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986) on the dollar value of benefits for 
any participant or beneficiary. 
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‘‘(2) ANNUAL LIMITS PRIOR TO 2014.—With respect 
to plan years beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a 
group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage may only establish a restricted annual 
limit on the dollar value of benefits for any 
participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope 
of benefits that are essential health benefits under 
section 1302(b) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, as determined by the 
Secretary. In defining the term ‘restricted annual 
limit’ for purposes of the preceding sentence, the 
Secretary shall ensure that access to needed 
services is made available with a minimal impact 
on premiums. 
‘‘(b) PER BENEFICIARY LIMITS.—Subsection (a) shall 
not be construed to prevent a group health plan or 
health insurance coverage that is not required to 
provide essential health benefits under section 
1302(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act from placing annual or lifetime per beneficiary 
limits on specific covered benefits to the extent that 
such limits are otherwise permitted under Federal or 
State law. 
‘‘SEC. 2712. PROHIBITION ON RESCISSIONS. 
‘‘A group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage shall not rescind such plan or coverage with 
respect to an enrollee once the enrollee is covered 
under such plan or coverage involved, except that 
this section shall not apply to a covered individual 
who has performed an act or practice that constitutes 
fraud or makes an intentional misrepresentation of 
material fact as prohibited by the terms of the plan or 
coverage.  Such plan or coverage may not be 
3a 
cancelled except with prior notice to the enrollee, and 
only as permitted under section 2702(c) or 2742(b). 
‘‘SEC. 2713. COVERAGE OF PREVENTIVE HEALTH 
SERVICES. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum 
provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost 
sharing requirements for— 
‘‘(1) evidence-based items or services that have 
in effect a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the current 
recommendations of the United States Preventive 
Services Task Force;  
‘‘(2) immunizations that have in effect a 
recommendation from the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention with respect to the 
individual involved; and 
‘‘(3) with respect to infants, children, and 
adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care and 
screenings provided for in the comprehensive 
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration. 
‘‘(4) with respect to women, such additional 
preventive care and screenings not described in 
paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive 
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration for purposes of this 
paragraph. 
‘‘(5) for the purposes of this Act, and for the 
purposes of any other provision of law, the current 
recommendations of the United States Preventive 
Service Task Force regarding breast cancer 
screening, mammography, and prevention shall be 
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considered the most current other than those 
issued in or around November 2009. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
prohibit a plan or issuer from providing coverage for 
services in addition to those recommended by United 
States Preventive Services Task Force or to deny 
coverage for services that are not recommended by 
such Task Force. 
‘‘(b) Interval.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall establish 
a minimum interval between the date on which a 
recommendation described in subsection (a)(1) or 
(a)(2) or a guideline under subsection (a)(3) is 
issued and the plan year with respect to which the 
requirement described in subsection (a) is effective 
with respect to the service described in such 
recommendation or guideline. 
‘‘(2) MINIMUM.—The interval described in 
paragraph (1) shall not be less than 1 year. 
‘‘(c) Value-BASED INSURANCE DESIGN.—The 
Secretary may develop guidelines to permit a group 
health plan and a health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage to 
utilize value-based insurance designs. 
‘‘SEC. 2714. EXTENSION OF DEPENDENT COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage that provides dependent 
coverage of children shall continue to make such 
coverage available for an adult child until the child 
turns 26 years of age.  Nothing in this section shall 
require a health plan or a health insurance issuer 
described in the preceding sentence to make coverage 
available for a child of a child receiving dependent 
coverage. 
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‘‘(b) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall 
promulgate regulations to define the dependents to 
which coverage shall be made available under 
subsection (a). 
‘‘(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to modify the definition of 
‘dependent’ as used in the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 with respect to the tax treatment of the cost of 
coverage. 
‘‘SEC. 2715. DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF 
UNIFORM EXPLANATION OF COVERAGE DOCUMENTS AND 
STANDARDIZED DEFINITIONS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 12 months after 
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary shall develop 
standards for use by a group health plan and a health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage, in compiling and providing to 
applicants, enrollees, and policyholder or certificate 
holders a summary of benefits and coverage 
explanation that accurately describes the benefits 
and coverage under the applicable plan or coverage.  
In developing such standards, the Secretary shall 
consult with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (referred to in this section as the 
‘NAIC’), a working group composed of representatives 
of health insurance-related consumer advocacy 
organizations, health insurance issuers, health care 
professionals, patient advocates including those 
representing individuals with limited English 
proficiency, and other qualified individuals. 
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The standards for the 
summary of benefits and coverage developed under 
subsection (a) shall provide for the following: 
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‘‘(1) APPEARANCE.—The standards shall ensure 
that the summary of benefits and coverage is 
presented in a uniform format that does not exceed 
4 pages in length and does not include print 
smaller than 12-point font. 
‘‘(2) LANGUAGE.—The standards shall ensure 
that the summary is presented in a culturally and 
linguistically appropriate manner and utilizes 
terminology understandable by the average plan 
enrollee. 
‘‘(3) CONTENTS.—The standards shall ensure 
that the summary of benefits and coverage 
includes— 
‘‘(A) uniform definitions of standard insurance 
terms and medical terms (consistent with 
subsection (g)) so that consumers may compare 
health insurance coverage and understand the 
terms of coverage (or exception to such 
coverage); 
‘‘(B) a description of the coverage, including 
cost sharing for— 
‘‘(i) each of the categories of the essential 
health benefits described in subparagraphs (A) 
through (J) of section 1302(b)(1) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act; and 
‘‘(ii) other benefits, as identified by the 
Secretary; 
‘‘(C) the exceptions, reductions, and 
limitations on coverage; 
‘‘(D) the cost-sharing provisions, including 
deductible, coinsurance, and co-payment 
obligations; 
‘‘(E) the renewability and continuation of 
coverage provisions; 
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‘‘(F) a coverage facts label that includes 
examples to illustrate common benefits 
scenarios, including pregnancy and serious or 
chronic medical conditions and related cost 
sharing, such scenarios to be based on 
recognized clinical practice guidelines; 
‘‘(G) a statement of whether the plan or 
coverage— 
‘‘(i) provides minimum essential coverage (as 
defined under section 5000A(f) of the Internal 
Revenue Code 1986); and  
‘‘(ii) ensures that the plan or coverage share 
of the total allowed costs of benefits provided 
under the plan or coverage is not less than 60 
percent of such costs; 
‘‘(H) a statement that the outline is a 
summary of the policy or certificate and that the 
coverage document itself should be consulted to 
determine the governing contractual provisions; 
and 
‘‘(I) a contact number for the consumer to 
call with additional questions and an Internet 
web address where a copy of the actual 
individual coverage policy or group certificate 
of coverage can be reviewed and obtained. 
‘‘(c) PERIODIC REVIEW AND UPDATING.—The 
Secretary shall periodically review and update, as 
appropriate, the standards developed under this 
section. 
‘‘(d) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 24 months 
after the date of enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, each entity 
described in paragraph (3) shall provide, prior to 
any enrollment restriction, a summary of benefits 
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and coverage explanation pursuant to the 
standards developed by the Secretary under 
subsection (a) to— 
‘‘(A) an applicant at the time of application; 
‘‘(B) an enrollee prior to the time of enrollment 
or reenrollment, as applicable; and 
‘‘(C) a policyholder or certificate holder at the 
time of issuance of the policy or delivery of the 
certificate. 
‘‘(2) COMPLIANCE.—An entity described in 
paragraph (3) is deemed to be in compliance with 
this section if the summary of benefits and 
coverage described in subsection (a) is provided in 
paper or electronic form. 
‘‘(3) ENTITIES IN GENERAL.—An entity described 
in this paragraph is— 
‘‘(A) a health insurance issuer (including a 
group health plan that is not a self-insured plan) 
offering health insurance coverage within the 
United States; or 
‘‘(B) in the case of a self-insured group health 
plan, the plan sponsor or designated 
administrator of the plan (as such terms are 
defined in section 3(16) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
‘‘(4) NOTICE OF MODIFICATIONS.—If a group 
health plan or health insurance issuer makes any 
material modification in any of the terms of the 
plan or coverage involved (as defined for purposes 
of section 102 of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974) that is not reflected in the 
most recently provided summary of benefits and 
coverage, the plan or issuer shall provide notice of 
such modification to enrollees not later than 60 
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days prior to the date on which such modification 
will become effective. 
‘‘(e) PREEMPTION.—The standards developed under 
subsection (a) shall preempt any related State 
standards that require a summary of benefits and 
coverage that provides less information to consumers 
than that required to be provided under this section, 
as determined by the Secretary. 
‘‘(f) FAILURE TO PROVIDE.—An entity described in 
subsection (d)(3) that willfully fails to provide the 
information required under this section shall be 
subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 for each 
such failure.  Such failure with respect to each 
enrollee shall constitute a separate offense for 
purposes of this subsection. 
‘‘(g) DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD DEFINITIONS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall, by 
regulation, provide for the development of 
standards for the definitions of terms used in 
health insurance coverage, including the 
insurance- related terms described in paragraph 
(2) and the medical terms described in paragraph 
(3). 
‘‘(2) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.—The insurance-
related terms described in this paragraph are 
premium, deductible, co-insurance, co-payment, 
out-of-pocket limit, preferred provider, non-
preferred provider, out-of-network co-payments, 
UCR (usual, customary and reasonable) fees, 
excluded services, grievance and appeals, and such 
other terms as the Secretary determines are 
important to define so that consumers may 
compare health insurance coverage and 
understand the terms of their coverage. 
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‘‘(3) MEDICAL TERMS.—The medical terms 
described in this paragraph are hospitalization, 
hospital outpatient care, emergency room care, 
physician services, prescription drug coverage, 
durable medical equipment, home health care, 
skilled nursing care, rehabilitation services, 
hospice services, emergency medical 
transportation, and such other terms as the 
Secretary determines are important to define so 
that consumers may compare the medical benefits 
offered by health insurance and understand the 
extent of those medical benefits (or exceptions to 
those benefits). 
‘‘SEC. 2716. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
SALARY. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— A group health plan (other than 
a self-insured plan) shall satisfy the requirements of 
section 105(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (relating to prohibition on discrimination in 
favor of highly compensated individuals). 
‘‘(b) RULES AND DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this 
section— 
‘‘(1) CERTAIN RULES TO APPLY.—Rules similar to 
the rules contained in paragraphs (3), (4), and (8) 
of section 105(h) of such Code shall apply. 
‘‘(2) HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUAL.—The 
term ‘highly compensated individual’ has the 
meaning given such term by section 105(h)(5) of 
such Code. 
 ‘‘SEC. 2717. ENSURING THE QUALITY OF CARE. 
‘‘(a) QUALITY REPORTING.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 2 years after 
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary, in consultation 
with experts in health care quality and 
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stakeholders, shall develop reporting requirements 
for use by a group health plan, and a health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage, with respect to plan or 
coverage benefits and health care provider 
reimbursement structures that— 
‘‘(A) improve health outcomes through the 
implementation of activities such as quality 
reporting, effective case management, care 
coordination, chronic disease management, and 
medication and care compliance initiatives, 
including through the use of the medical homes 
model as defined for purposes of section 3602 of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
for treatment or services under the plan or 
coverage; 
‘‘(B) implement activities to prevent hospital 
readmissions through a comprehensive program 
for hospital discharge that includes patient-
centered education and counseling, 
comprehensive discharge planning, and post 
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate 
health care professional;  
‘‘(C) implement activities to improve patient 
safety and reduce medical errors through the 
appropriate use of best clinical practices, 
evidence based medicine, and health information 
technology under the plan or coverage; and 
‘‘(D) implement wellness and health promotion 
activities. 
‘‘(2) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall 
annually submit to the Secretary, and to 
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enrollees under the plan or coverage, a report on 
whether the benefits under the plan or coverage 
satisfy the elements described in subparagraphs 
(A) through (D) of paragraph (1). 
‘‘(B) TIMING OF REPORTS.—A report under 
subparagraph (A) shall be made available to an 
enrollee under the plan or coverage during each 
open enrollment period. 
‘‘(C) AVAILABILITY OF REPORTS.—The Secretary 
shall make reports submitted under 
subparagraph (A) available to the public through 
an Internet website. 
‘‘(D) PENALTIES.—In developing the reporting 
requirements under paragraph (1), the Secretary 
may develop and impose appropriate penalties 
for non-compliance with such requirements. 
‘‘(E) EXCEPTIONS.—In developing the reporting 
requirements under paragraph (1), the Secretary 
may provide for exceptions to such requirements 
for group health plans and health insurance 
issuers that substantially meet the goals of this 
section. 
‘‘(b) WELLNESS AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS.—For 
purposes of subsection (a)(1)(D), wellness and health 
promotion activities may include personalized 
wellness and prevention services, which are 
coordinated, maintained or delivered by a health care 
provider, a wellness and prevention plan manager, or 
a health, wellness or prevention services organization 
that conducts health risk assessments or offers 
ongoing face-to-face, telephonic or web-based 
intervention efforts for each of the program’s 
participants, and which may include the following 
wellness and prevention efforts: 
‘‘(1) Smoking cessation. 
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‘‘(2) Weight management. 
‘‘(3) Stress management. 
‘‘(4) Physical fitness. 
‘‘(5) Nutrition. 
‘‘(6) Heart disease prevention. 
‘‘(7) Healthy lifestyle support. 
‘‘(8) Diabetes prevention. 
‘‘(c) PROTECTION OF SECOND AMENDMENT GUN 
RIGHTS.— 
“(1) WELLNESS AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS.— A 
wellness and health promotion activity 
implemented under subsection (a)(1)(D) may not 
require the disclosure or collection of any 
information relating to— 
“(A) the presence or storage of a lawfully-
possessed firearm or ammunition in the 
residence or on the property of an individual; or 
‘‘(B) the lawful use, possession, or storage of a 
firearm or ammunition by an individual. 
“(2) LIMITATION ON DATA COLLECTION.—None of 
the authorities provided to the Secretary under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or an 
amendment made by that Act shall be construed to 
authorize or may be used for the collection of any 
information relating to— 
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a 
firearm or ammunition; 
‘‘(B) the lawful use of a firearm or 
ammunition; or 
‘‘(C) the lawful storage of a firearm or 
ammunition. 
“(3) LIMITATION ON DATABASES OR DATA BANKS.—
None of the authorities provided to the Secretary 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act or an amendment made by that Act shall be 
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construed to authorize or may be used to maintain 
records of individual ownership or possession of a 
firearm or ammunition. 
(4) LIMITATION ON DETERMINATION OF PREMIUM 
RATES OR ELIGIBILITY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE.—A 
premium rate may not be increased, health 
insurance coverage may not be denied, and a 
discount, rebate, or reward offered for participation 
in a wellness program may not be reduced or 
withheld under any health benefit plan issued 
pursuant to or in accordance with the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act or an 
amendment made by that Act on the basis of, or on 
reliance upon— 
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a 
firearm or ammunition; or  
‘‘(B) the lawful use or storage of a firearm or 
ammunition. 
(5) LIMITATION ON DATA COLLECTION 
REQUIREMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS.—No individual 
shall be required to disclose any information under 
any data collection activity authorized under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or an 
amendment made by that Act relating to— 
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a 
firearm or ammunition; or 
‘‘(B) the lawful use, possession, or storage of a 
firearm or ammunition. 
‘‘(d) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 2 years after 
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary shall promulgate 
regulations that provide criteria for determining 
whether a reimbursement structure is described in 
subsection (a). 
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“(e) STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date on which regulations are promulgated 
under subsection (c), the Government Accountability 
Office shall review such regulations and conduct a 
study and submit to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
Representatives a report regarding the impact the 
activities under this section have had on the quality 
and cost of health care. 
‘‘SEC. 2718. BRINGING DOWN THE COST OF HEALTH 
CARE COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) CLEAR ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS.—A health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage (including a grandfathered health 
plan) shall, with respect to each plan year, submit to 
the Secretary a report concerning the ratio of the 
incurred loss (or incurred claims) plus the loss 
adjustment expense (or change in contract reserves) 
to earned premiums.  Such report shall include the 
percentage of total premium revenue, after 
accounting for collections or receipts for risk 
adjustment and risk corridors and payments of 
reinsurance, that such coverage expends— 
‘‘(1) on reimbursement for clinical services 
provided to enrollees under such coverage; 
‘‘(2) for activities that improve health care 
quality; and  
‘‘(3) on all other non-claims costs, including an 
explanation of the nature of such costs, and 
excluding Federal and State taxes and licensing or 
regulatory fees. 
The Secretary shall make reports received under this 
section available to the public on the Internet website 
of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
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‘‘(b) ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS RECEIVE VALUE 
FOR THEIR PREMIUM PAYMENTS.— 
‘‘(1) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE VALUE FOR 
PREMIUM PAYMENTS.— 
“(A) REQUIREMENT.—Beginning not later than 
January 1, 2011, a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage (including a grandfathered health plan) 
shall, with respect to each plan year, provide an 
annual rebate to each enrollee under such 
coverage, on a pro rata basis, if that ratio of the 
amount that is equal to the amount by which 
premium revenue expended by the issuer on 
costs described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
subsection (a) to the total amount of premium 
revenue (excluding Federal and State taxes and 
licensing or regulatory fees and after accounting 
for payments or receipts for risk adjustment, 
risk corridors, and reinsurance under sections 
1341, 1342, and 1343 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act) for the plan year 
(except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii)), is 
less than— 
‘‘(i) with respect to a health insurance issuer 
offering coverage in the large group market, 
85 percent, or such higher percentage as a 
State may by regulation determine; or 
‘‘(ii) with respect to a health insurance 
issuer offering coverage in the small group 
market or in the individual market, 80 
percent, or such higher percentage as a State 
may by regulation determine, except that the 
Secretary may adjust such percentage with 
respect to a State if the Secretary determines 
that the application of 80 percent may 
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destabilize the individual market in such 
State. 
‘‘(B) REBATE AMOUNT.— 
‘‘(i) CALCULATION OF AMOUNT.—The total 
amount of an annual rebate required under 
this paragraph shall be in an amount equal to 
the product of— 
‘‘(I) the amount by which the percentage 
described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph 
(A) exceeds the ratio described in such 
subparagraph; and 
‘‘(II) the total amount of premium revenue 
(excluding Federal and State taxes and 
licensing or regulatory fees and after 
accounting for payments or receipts for risk 
adjustment, risk corridors, and reinsurance 
under sections 1341, 1342, and 1343 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) 
for such plan year. 
‘‘(ii) CALCULATION BASED ON AVERAGE 
RATIO.—Beginning on January 1, 2014, the 
determination made under subparagraph (A) 
for the year involved shall be based on the 
averages of the premiums expended on the 
costs described in such subparagraph and total 
premium revenue for each of the previous 3 
years for the plan. 
‘‘(2) CONSIDERATION IN SETTING PERCENTAGES.—
In determining the percentages under paragraph 
(1), a State shall seek to ensure adequate 
participation by health insurance issuers, 
competition in the health insurance market in the 
State, and value for consumers so that premiums 
are used for clinical services and quality 
improvements. 
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‘‘(3) ENFORCEMENT.—The provisions Secretary 
shall promulgate regulations for enforcing the 
provisions of this section and may provide for 
appropriate penalties. 
‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.— Not later than December 31, 
2010, and subject to the certification of the Secretary, 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
shall establish uniform definitions of the activities 
reported under subsection (a) and standardized 
methodologies for calculating measures of such 
activities, including definitions of which activities, 
and in what regard such activities, constitute 
activities described in subsection (a)(2).  Such 
methodologies shall be designed to take into account 
the special circumstances of smaller plans, different 
types of plans, and newer plans. 
“(d) ADJUSTMENTS.—The Secretary may adjust the 
rates described in subsection (b) if the Secretary 
determines appropriate on account of the volatility of 
the individual market due to the establishment of 
State Exchanges. 
“(e) STANDARD HOSPITAL CHARGES.—Each hospital 
operating within the United States shall for each 
year establish (and update) and make public (in 
accordance with guidelines developed by the 
Secretary) a list of the hospital’s standard charges for 
items and services provided by the hospital, including 
for diagnosis-related groups established under 
section 1886(d)(4) of the Social Security Act. 
‘‘SEC. 2719. APPEALS PROCESS. 
“(a) INTERNAL CLAIMS APPEALS.— 
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall 
implement an effective appeals process for appeals 
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of coverage determinations and claims, under 
which the plan or issuer shall, at a minimum— 
‘‘(A) have in effect an internal claims appeal 
process; 
‘‘(B) provide notice to enrollees, in a culturally 
and linguistically appropriate manner, of 
available internal and external appeals 
processes, and the availability of any applicable 
office of health insurance consumer assistance or 
ombudsman established under section 2793 to 
assist such enrollees with the appeals processes; 
and 
‘‘(C) allow an enrollee to review their file, to 
present evidence and testimony as part of the 
appeals process, and to receive continued 
coverage pending the outcome of the appeals 
process.  
“(2) ESTABLISHED PROCESSES.—To comply with 
paragraph (1)— 
“(A) a group health plan and a health 
insurance issuer offering group health coverage 
shall provide an internal claims and appeals 
process that initially incorporates the claims and 
appeals procedures (including urgent claims) set 
forth at section 2560.503–1 of title 29, Code of 
Federal Regulations, as published on November 
21, 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 70256), and shall update 
such process in accordance with any standards 
established by the Secretary of Labor for such 
plans and issuers; and 
“(B) a health insurance issuer offering 
individual health coverage, and any other issuer 
not subject to subparagraph (A), shall provide an 
internal claims and appeals process that initially 
incorporates the claims and appeals procedures 
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set forth under applicable law (as in existence on 
the date of enactment of this section), and shall 
update such process in accordance with any 
standards established by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services for such issuers. 
“(b) EXTERNAL REVIEW.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage— 
“(1) shall comply with the applicable State 
external review process for such plans and issuers 
that, at a minimum, includes the consumer 
protections set forth in the Uniform External 
Review Model Act promulgated by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners and is 
binding on such plans; or 
“(2) shall implement an effective external review 
process that meets minimum standards 
established by the Secretary through guidance and 
that is similar to the process described under 
paragraph (1)— 
“(A) if the applicable State has not established 
an external review process that meets the 
requirements of paragraph (1); or 
‘‘(B) if the plan is a self-insured plan that is 
not subject to State insurance regulation 
(including a State law that establishes an 
external review process described in paragraph 
(1)). 
“(c) SECRETARY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary may 
deem the external review process of a group health 
plan or health insurance issuer, in operation as of the 
date of enactment of this section, to be in compliance 
with the applicable process established under 
subsection (b), as determined appropriate by the 
Secretary. 
21a 
“SEC. 2719A PATIENT PROTECTIONS. 
“(a) CHOICE OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL.—If a 
group health plan, or a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage, requires or provides for designation by a 
participant, beneficiary, or enrollee of a participating 
primary care provider, then the plan or issuer shall 
permit each participant, beneficiary, and enrollee to 
designate any participating primary care provider 
who is available to accept such individual. 
“(b) COVERAGE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES.— 
“(1) IN GENERAL.— If a group health plan, or a 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance issuer, provides or 
covers any benefits with respect to services in an 
emergency department of a hospital, the plan or 
issuer shall cover emergency services (as defined in 
paragraph (2)(B))— 
‘‘(A) without the need for any prior 
authorization determination; 
‘‘(B) whether the health care provider 
furnishing such services is a participating 
provider with respect to such services; 
‘‘(C) in a manner so that, if such services are 
provided to a participant, beneficiary, or 
enrollee— 
‘‘(i) by a nonparticipating health care 
provider with or without prior authorization; 
or 
‘‘(ii)(I) such services will be provided 
without imposing any requirement under the 
plan for prior authorization of services or any 
limitation on coverage where the provider of 
services does not have a contractual 
relationship with the plan for the providing of 
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services that is more restrictive than the 
requirements or limitations that apply to 
emergency department services received from 
providers who do have such a contractual 
relationship with the plan; and 
‘‘(II) if such services are provided out-of-
network, the cost-sharing requirement 
(expressed as a copayment amount or 
coinsurance rate) is the same requirement 
that would apply if such services were 
provided in-network; 
‘‘(D) without regard to any other term or 
condition of such coverage (other than exclusion 
or coordination of benefits, or an affiliation or 
waiting period, permitted under section 2701 of 
this Act, section 701 of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, or section 9801 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and other 
than applicable cost-sharing). 
“(2) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
“(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION.—The 
term ‘emergency medical condition’ means a 
medical condition manifesting itself by acute 
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe 
pain) such that a prudent layperson, who 
possesses an average knowledge of health and 
medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of 
immediate medical attention to result in a 
condition described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of 
section 1867(e)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act. 
“(B) EMERGENCY SERVICES.—The term 
‘emergency services’ means, with respect to an 
emergency medical condition— 
‘‘(i) a medical screening examination (as 
required under section 1867 of the Social 
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Security Act) that is within the capability of 
the emergency department of a hospital, 
including ancillary services routinely available 
to the emergency department to evaluate such 
emergency medical condition, and  
‘‘(ii) within the capabilities of the staff and 
facilities available at the hospital, such 
further medical examination and treatment as 
are required under section 1867 of such Act to 
stabilize the patient. 
“(C) STABILIZE.—The term ‘to stabilize’, with 
respect to an emergency medical condition (as 
defined in subparagraph (A)), has the meaning 
give in section 1867(e)(3) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395dd(e)(3)). 
“(c) ACCESS TO PEDIATRIC CARE.— 
‘‘(1) PEDIATRIC CARE.—In the case of a person 
who has a child who is a participant, beneficiary, 
or enrollee under a group health plan, or health 
insurance coverage offered by a health insurance 
issuer in the group or individual market, if the 
plan or issuer requires or provides for the 
designation of a participating primary care 
provider for the child, the plan or issuer shall 
permit such person to designate a physician 
(allopathic or osteopathic) who specializes in 
pediatrics as the child’s primary care provider if 
such provider participates in the network of the 
plan or issuer. 
‘‘(2) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1) 
shall be construed to waive any exclusions of 
coverage under the terms and conditions of the 
plan or health insurance coverage with respect to 
coverage of pediatric care. 
24a 
“(d) PATIENT ACCESS TO OBSTETRICAL AND 
GYNECOLOGICAL CARE.— 
“(1) GENERAL RIGHTS.— 
“(A) DIRECT ACCESS.—A group health plan, or 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage, described 
in paragraph (2) may not require authorization 
or referral by the plan, issuer, or any person 
(including a primary care provider described in 
paragraph (2)(B)) in the case of a female 
participant, beneficiary, or enrollee who seeks 
coverage for obstetrical or gynecological care 
provided by a participating health care 
professional who specializes in obstetrics or 
gynecology.  Such professional shall agree to 
otherwise adhere to such plan’s or issuer’s 
policies and procedures, including procedures 
regarding referrals and obtaining prior 
authorization and providing services pursuant to 
a treatment plan (if any) approved by the plan or 
issuer. 
“(B) OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL 
CARE.—A group health plan or health insurance 
issuer described in paragraph (2) shall treat the 
provision of obstetrical and gynecological care, 
and the ordering of related obstetrical and 
gynecological items and services, pursuant to the 
direct access described under subparagraph (A), 
by a participating health care professional who 
specializes in obstetrics or gynecology as the 
authorization of the primary care provider. 
“(2) APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH.—A group 
health plan, or health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage, 
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described in this paragraph is a group health plan 
or coverage that— 
‘‘(A) provides coverage for obstetric or 
gynecologic care; and 
‘‘(B) requires the designation by a participant, 
beneficiary, or enrollee of a participating 
primary care provider. 
“(3) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1) 
shall be construed to— 
‘‘(A) waive any exclusions of coverage under 
the terms and conditions of the plan or health 
insurance coverage with respect to coverage of 
obstetrical or gynecological care; or 
‘‘(B) preclude the group health plan or health 
insurance issuer involved from requiring that 
the obstetrical or gynecological provider notify 
the primary care health care professional or the 
plan or issuer of treatment decisions.’’. 
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SEC. 1003 ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS GET VALUE 
FOR THEIR DOLLARS. 
Part C of title XXVII of the Public Health Service 
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg–91 et seq.), as amended by 
section 1002, is further amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 2794. ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS GET VALUE 
FOR THEIR DOLLARS. 
‘‘(a) INITIAL PREMIUM REVIEW PROCESS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in conjunction 
with States, shall establish a process for the 
annual review, beginning with the 2010 plan year 
and subject to subsection (b)(2)(A), of unreasonable 
increases in premiums for health insurance 
coverage. 
‘‘(2) JUSTIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE.—The 
process established under paragraph (1) shall 
require health insurance issuers to submit to the 
Secretary and the relevant State a justification for 
an unreasonable premium increase prior to the 
implementation of the increase.  Such issuers shall 
prominently post such information on their 
Internet websites.  The Secretary shall ensure the 
public disclosure of information on such increases 
and justifications for all health insurance issuers. 
‘‘(b) CONTINUING PREMIUM REVIEW PROCESS.— 
‘‘(1) INFORMING SECRETARY OF PREMIUM INCREASE 
PATTERNS.—As a condition of receiving a grant 
under subsection (c)(1), a State, through its 
Commissioner of Insurance, shall— 
‘‘(A) provide the Secretary with information 
about trends in premium increases in health 
insurance coverage in premium rating areas in 
the State; and  
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‘‘(B) make recommendations, as appropriate, 
to the State Exchange about whether particular 
health insurance issuers should be excluded 
from participation in the Exchange based on a 
pattern or practice of excessive or unjustified 
premium increases. 
‘‘(2) MONITORING BY SECRETARY OF PREMIUM 
INCREASES.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Beginning with plan years 
beginning in 2014, the Secretary, in conjunction 
with the States and consistent with the 
provisions of subsection (a)(2), shall monitor 
premium increases of health insurance coverage 
offered through an Exchange and outside of an 
Exchange.  
‘‘(B) CONSIDERATION IN OPENING EXCHANGE.—
In determining under section 1312(f)(2)(B) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
whether to offer qualified health plans in the 
large group market through an Exchange, the 
State shall take into account any excess of 
premium growth outside of the Exchange as 
compared to the rate of such growth inside the 
Exchange. 
‘‘(c) GRANTS IN SUPPORT OF PROCESS.— 
‘‘(1) PREMIUM REVIEW GRANTS DURING 2010 
THROUGH 2014.— 
The Secretary shall carry out a program to award 
grants to States during the 5-year period beginning 
with fiscal year 2010 to assist such States in carrying 
out subsection (a), including— 
‘‘(A) in reviewing and, if appropriate under 
State law, approving premium increases for 
health insurance coverage;  
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‘‘(B) in providing information and 
recommendations to the Secretary under 
subsection (b)(1); and 
“(C) in establishing centers (consistent with 
subsection (d)) at academic or other nonprofit 
institutions to collect medical reimbursement 
information from health insurance issuers, to 
analyze and organize such information, and to 
make such information available to such issuers, 
health care providers, health researchers, health 
care policy makers, and the general public. 
‘‘(2) FUNDING.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Out of all funds in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, there are 
appropriated to the Secretary $250,000,000, to 
be available for expenditure for grants under 
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B). 
‘‘(B) FURTHER AVAILABILITY FOR INSURANCE 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION.—If the 
amounts appropriated under subparagraph (A) 
are not fully obligated under grants under 
paragraph (1) by the end of fiscal year 2014, any 
remaining funds shall remain available to the 
Secretary for grants to States for planning and 
implementing the insurance reforms and 
consumer protections under part A. 
‘‘(C) ALLOCATION.—The Secretary shall 
establish a formula for determining the amount 
of any grant to a State under this subsection.  
Under such formula— 
‘‘(i) the Secretary shall consider the number 
of plans of health insurance coverage offered 
in each State and the population of the State; 
and 
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‘‘(ii) no State qualifying for a grant under 
paragraph (1) shall receive less than 
$1,000,000, or more than $5,000,000 for a 
grant year.’’ 
“(d) MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENT DATA CENTERS.— 
“(1) FUNCTIONS.—A center established under 
subsection (c)(1)(C) shall— 
“(A) develop fee schedules and other database 
tools that fairly and accurately reflect market 
rates for medical services and the geographic 
differences in those rates; 
“(B) use the best available statistical methods 
and data processing technology to develop such 
fee schedules and other database tools; 
‘‘(C) regularly update such fee schedules and 
other database tools to reflect changes in charges 
for medical services; 
‘‘(D) make health care cost information readily 
available to the public through an Internet 
website that allows consumers to understand the 
amounts that health care providers in their area 
charge for particular medical services; and 
‘‘(E) regularly publish information concerning 
the statistical methodologies used by the center 
to analyze health charge data and make such 
data available to researchers and policy makers. 
“(2) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—A center 
established under subsection (c)(1)(C) shall adopt 
by-laws that ensures that the center (and all 
members of the governing board of the center) is 
independent and free from all conflicts of interest.  
Such bylaws shall ensure that the center is not 
controlled or influenced by, and does not have any 
corporate relation to, any individual or entity that 
may make or receive payments for health care 
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services based on the center’s analysis of health 
care costs. 
“(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to permit a center 
established under subsection (c)(1)(C) to compel 
health insurance issuers to provide data to the 
center.’’. 
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Subtitle C—Quality Health Insurance Coverage for 
All Americans  
PART 1—HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 
REFORMS 
SEC. 1201. AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE ACT. 
Part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service 
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq.), as amended by section 
1001, is further amended— 
(1) by striking the heading for subpart 1 and 
inserting the following: 
‘‘Subpart I—General Reform’’; 
(2)(A) in section 2701 (42 U.S.C. 300gg), by 
striking the section heading and subsection (a) and 
inserting the following: 
‘‘SEC. 2704. PROHIBITION OF PREEXISTING CONDITION 
EXCLUSIONS OR OTHER DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
HEALTH STATUS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage may not impose any 
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such 
plan or coverage.’’; and 
(B) by transferring such section (as amended by 
subparagraph (A)) so as to appear after the section 
2703 added by paragraph (4); 
(3)(A) in section 2702 (42 U.S.C. 300gg–1)— 
(i) by striking the section heading and all that 
follows through subsection (a); 
(ii) in subsection (b)— 
(I) by striking ‘‘health insurance issuer 
offering health insurance coverage in 
connection with a group health plan’’ each 
place that such appears and inserting ‘‘health 
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insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage’’; and 
(II) in paragraph (2)(A)— 
(aa) by inserting ‘‘or individual’’ after 
‘‘employer’’; and  
(bb) by inserting ‘‘or individual health 
coverage, as the case may be’’ before the 
semicolon; and 
(iii) in subsection (e)— 
(I) by striking ‘‘(a)(1)(F)’’ and inserting 
‘‘(a)(6)’’; 
(II) by striking ‘‘2701’’ and inserting ‘‘2704’’; 
and  
(III) by striking ‘‘2721(a)’’ and inserting 
‘‘2735(a)’’; and 
(B) by transferring such section (as amended 
by subparagraph (A)) to appear after section 
2705(a) as added by paragraph (4); and 
(4) by inserting after the subpart heading (as 
added by paragraph (1)) the following: 
‘‘SEC. 2701. FAIR HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS. 
‘‘(a) PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATORY PREMIUM 
RATES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to the premium 
rate charged by a health insurance issuer for 
health insurance coverage offered in the individual 
or small group market— 
‘‘(A) such rate shall vary with respect to the 
particular plan or coverage involved only by— 
‘‘(i) whether such plan or coverage covers an 
individual or family; 
‘‘(ii) rating area, as established in 
accordance with paragraph (2); 
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‘‘(iii) age, except that such rate shall not 
vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults (consistent 
with section 2707(c)); and 
‘‘(iv) tobacco use, except that such rate shall 
not vary by more than 1.5 to 1; and 
‘‘(B) such rate shall not vary with respect to 
the particular plan or coverage involved by any 
other factor not described in subparagraph (A). 
‘‘(2) RATING AREA.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each State shall establish 1 
or more rating areas within that State for 
purposes of applying the requirements of this 
title. 
‘‘(B) SECRETARIAL REVIEW.—The Secretary 
shall review the rating areas established by each 
State under subparagraph (A) to ensure the 
adequacy of such areas for purposes of carrying 
out the requirements of this title.  If the 
Secretary determines a State’s rating areas are 
not adequate, or that a State does not establish 
such areas, the Secretary may establish rating 
areas for that State. 
‘‘(3) PERMISSIBLE AGE BANDS.—The Secretary, in 
consultation with the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, shall define the 
permissible age bands for rating purposes under 
paragraph (1)(A)(iii). 
‘‘(4) APPLICATION OF VARIATIONS BASED ON AGE OR 
TOBACCO USE.—With respect to family coverage 
under a group health plan or health insurance 
coverage, the rating variations permitted under 
clauses (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (1)(A) shall be 
applied based on the portion of the premium that is 
attributable to each family member covered under 
the plan or coverage. 
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‘‘(5) SPECIAL RULE FOR LARGE GROUP MARKET.—If 
a State permits health insurance issuers that offer 
coverage in the large group market in the State to 
offer such coverage through the State Exchange (as 
provided for under section 1312(f)(2)(B) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), the 
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all 
coverage offered in such market (other than self-
insured group health plans offered in such market) 
in the State. 
‘‘SEC. 2702. GUARANTEED AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) GUARANTEED ISSUANCE OF COVERAGE IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP MARKET.—Subject to 
subsections (b) through (e), each health insurance 
issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the 
individual or group market in a State must accept 
every employer and individual in the State that 
applies for such coverage. 
‘‘(b) ENROLLMENT.— 
‘‘(1) RESTRICTION.—A health insurance issuer 
described in subsection (a) may restrict enrollment 
in coverage described in such subsection to open or 
special enrollment periods. 
‘‘(2) ESTABLISHMENT.—A health insurance issuer 
described in subsection (a) shall, in accordance 
with the regulations promulgated under paragraph 
(3), establish special enrollment periods for 
qualifying events (under section 603 of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974). 
‘‘(3) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall 
promulgate regulations with respect to enrollment 
periods under paragraphs (1) and (2). 
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‘‘SEC. 2703. GUARANTEED RENEWABILITY OF 
COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this 
section, if a health insurance issuer offers health 
insurance coverage in the individual or group 
market, the issuer must renew or continue in force 
such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the 
individual, as applicable. 
‘‘SEC. 2705. PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES BASED 
ON HEALTH STATUS. 
“(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage may not establish rules for 
eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any 
individual to enroll under the terms of the plan or 
coverage based on any of the following health status-
related factors in relation to the individual or a 
dependent of the individual: 
‘‘(1) Health status. 
‘‘(2) Medical condition (including both physical 
and mental illnesses). 
‘‘(3) Claims experience. 
‘‘(4) Receipt of health care. 
‘‘(5) Medical history. 
‘‘(6) Genetic information. 
‘‘(7) Evidence of insurability (including 
conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence). 
‘‘(8) Disability. 
‘‘(9) Any other health status-related factor 
determined appropriate by the Secretary. 
‘‘(j) PROGRAMS OF HEALTH PROMOTION OR DISEASE 
PREVENTION.— 
‘‘(1) GENERAL PROVISIONS.— 
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‘‘(A) GENERAL RULE.—For purposes of 
subsection (b)(2)(B), a program of health 
promotion or disease prevention (referred to in 
this subsection as a ‘wellness program’) shall be 
a program offered by an employer that is 
designed to promote health or prevent disease 
that meets the applicable requirements of this 
subsection. 
‘‘(B) NO CONDITIONS BASED ON HEALTH STATUS 
FACTOR.—If none of the conditions for obtaining 
a premium discount or rebate or other reward 
for participation in a wellness program is based 
on an individual satisfying a standard that is 
related to a health status factor, such wellness 
program shall not violate this section if 
participation in the program is made available to 
all similarly situated individuals and the 
requirements of paragraph (2) are complied 
with. 
‘‘(C) CONDITIONS BASED ON HEALTH STATUS 
FACTOR.—If any of the conditions for obtaining a 
premium discount or rebate or other reward for 
participation in a wellness program is based on 
an individual satisfying a standard that is 
related to a health status factor, such wellness 
program shall not violate this section if the 
requirements of paragraph (3) are complied 
with. 
‘‘(2) WELLNESS PROGRAMS NOT SUBJECT TO 
REQUIREMENTS.—If none of the conditions for 
obtaining a premium discount or rebate or other 
reward under a wellness program as described in 
paragraph (1)(B) are based on an individual 
satisfying a standard that is related to a health 
status factor (or if such a wellness program does 
37a 
not provide such a reward), the wellness program 
shall not violate this section if participation in the 
program is made available to all similarly situated 
individuals.  The following programs shall not have 
to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3) if 
participation in the program is made available to 
all similarly situated individuals: 
‘‘(A) A program that reimburses all or part of 
the cost for memberships in a fitness center. 
‘‘(B) A diagnostic testing program that 
provides a reward for participation and does not 
base any part of the reward on outcomes.  
‘‘(C) A program that encourages preventive 
care related to a health condition through the 
waiver of the copayment or deductible 
requirement under group health plan for the 
costs of certain items or services related to a 
health condition (such as prenatal care or well-
baby visits). 
‘‘(D) A program that reimburses individuals 
for the costs of smoking cessation programs 
without regard to whether the individual quits 
smoking.  
‘‘(E) A program that provides a reward to 
individuals for attending a periodic health 
education seminar. 
‘‘(3) WELLNESS PROGRAMS SUBJECT TO 
REQUIREMENTS.—If any of the conditions for 
obtaining a premium discount, rebate, or reward 
under a wellness program as described in 
paragraph (1)(C) is based on an individual 
satisfying a standard that is related to a health 
status factor, the wellness program shall not 
violate this section if the following requirements 
are complied with: 
38a 
‘‘(A) The reward for the wellness program, 
together with the reward for other wellness 
programs with respect to the plan that requires 
satisfaction of a standard related to a health 
status factor, shall not exceed 30 percent of the 
cost of employee-only coverage under the plan.  
If, in addition to employees or individuals, any 
class of dependents (such as spouses or spouses 
and dependent children) may participate fully in 
the wellness program, such reward shall not 
exceed 30 percent of the cost of the coverage in 
which an employee or individual and any 
dependents are enrolled.  For purposes of this 
paragraph, the cost of coverage shall be 
determined based on the total amount of 
employer and employee contributions for the 
benefit package under which the employee is (or 
the employee and any dependents are) receiving 
coverage.  A reward may be in the form of a 
discount or rebate of a premium or contribution, 
a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing 
mechanism (such as deductibles, copayments, or 
coinsurance), the absence of a surcharge, or the 
value of a benefit that would otherwise not be 
provided under the plan.  The Secretaries of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and the 
Treasury may increase the reward available 
under this subparagraph to up to 50 percent of 
the cost of coverage if the Secretaries determine 
that such an increase is appropriate. 
‘‘(B) The wellness program shall be reasonably 
designed to promote health or prevent disease.  
A program complies with the preceding sentence 
if the program has a reasonable chance of 
improving the health of, or preventing disease 
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in, participating individuals and it is not overly 
burdensome, is not a subterfuge for 
discriminating based on a health status factor, 
and is not highly suspect in the method chosen 
to promote health or prevent disease. 
‘‘(C) The plan shall give individuals eligible for 
the program the opportunity to qualify for the 
reward under the program at least once each 
year. 
‘‘(D) The full reward under the wellness 
program shall be made available to all similarly 
situated individuals. 
For such purpose, among other things: 
‘‘(i) The reward is not available to all 
similarly situated individuals for a period 
unless the wellness program allows— 
‘‘(I) for a reasonable alternative standard 
(or waiver of the otherwise applicable 
standard) for obtaining the reward for any 
individual for whom, for that period, it is 
unreasonably difficult due to a medical 
condition to satisfy the otherwise applicable 
standard; and  
‘‘(II) for a reasonable alternative standard 
(or waiver of the otherwise applicable 
standard) for obtaining the reward for any 
individual for whom, for that period, it is 
medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy 
the otherwise applicable standard. 
‘‘(ii) If reasonable under the circumstances, 
the plan or issuer may seek verification, such 
as a statement from an individual’s physician, 
that a health status factor makes it 
unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable 
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for the individual to satisfy or attempt to 
satisfy the otherwise applicable standard. 
‘‘(E) The plan or issuer involved shall disclose 
in all plan materials describing the terms of the 
wellness program the availability of a reasonable 
alternative standard (or the possibility of waiver 
of the otherwise applicable standard) required 
under subparagraph (D).  If plan materials 
disclose that such a program is available, 
without describing its terms, the disclosure 
under this subparagraph shall not be required. 
‘‘(k) EXISTING PROGRAMS.—Nothing in this section 
shall prohibit a program of health promotion or 
disease prevention that was established prior to the 
date of enactment of this section and applied with all 
applicable regulations, and that is operating on such 
date, from continuing to be carried out for as long as 
such regulations remain in effect. 
‘‘(l) WELLNESS PROGRAM DEMONSTRATION 
PROJECT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than July 1, 2014, 
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, shall 
establish a 10-State demonstration project under 
which participating States shall apply the 
provisions of subsection (j) to programs of health 
promotion offered by a health insurance issuer that 
offers health insurance coverage in the individual 
market in such State. 
‘‘(2) EXPANSION OF DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.—If 
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, 
determines that the demonstration project 
described in paragraph (1) is effective, such 
Secretaries may, beginning on July 1, 2017 expand 
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such demonstration project to include additional 
participating States. 
‘‘(3) REQUIREMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) MAINTENANCE OF COVERAGE.—The 
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, shall 
not approve the participation of a State in the 
demonstration project under this section unless 
the Secretaries determine that the State’s 
project is designed in a manner that— 
‘‘(i) will not result in any decrease in 
coverage; and 
‘‘(ii) will not increase the cost to the Federal 
Government in providing credits under section 
36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or 
cost-sharing assistance under section 1402 of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act. 
‘‘(B) OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—States that 
participate in the demonstration project under 
this subsection— 
‘‘(i) may permit premium discounts or 
rebates or the modification of otherwise 
applicable copayments or deductibles for 
adherence to, or participation in, a reasonably 
designed program of health promotion and 
disease prevention; 
‘‘(ii) shall ensure that requirements of 
consumer protection are met in programs of 
health promotion in the individual market; 
‘‘(iii) shall require verification from health 
insurance issuers that offer health insurance 
coverage in the individual market of such 
State that premium discounts— 
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‘‘(I) do not create undue burdens for 
individuals insured in the individual 
market;  
‘‘(II) do not lead to cost shifting; and 
‘‘(III) are not a subterfuge for 
discrimination; 
‘‘(iv) shall ensure that consumer data is 
protected in accordance with the requirements 
of section 264(c) of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 
U.S.C. 1320d–2 note); and 
‘‘(v) shall ensure and demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the Secretary that the discounts 
or other rewards provided under the project 
reflect the expected level of participation in the 
wellness program involved and the anticipated 
effect the program will have on utilization or 
medical claim costs. 
‘‘(m) REPORT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 3 years after 
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary, in consultation 
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of Labor, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate committees of Congress concerning— 
‘‘(A) the effectiveness of wellness programs (as 
defined in subsection (j)) in promoting health 
and preventing disease; 
‘‘(B) the impact of such wellness programs on 
the access to care and affordability of coverage 
for participants and non-participants of such 
programs; 
‘‘(C) the impact of premium-based and cost-
sharing incentives on participant behavior and 
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the role of such programs in changing behavior; 
and 
‘‘(D) the effectiveness of different types of 
rewards. 
‘‘(2) DATA COLLECTION.—In preparing the report 
described in paragraph (1), the Secretaries shall 
gather relevant information from employers who 
provide employees with access to wellness 
programs, including State and Federal agencies. 
‘‘(n) REGULATIONS.—Nothing in this section shall 
be construed as prohibiting the Secretaries of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, or the Treasury from 
promulgating regulations in connection with this 
section. 
‘‘SEC. 2706. NON-DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH CARE. 
‘‘(a) PROVIDERS.—A group health plan and a health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage shall not discriminate with 
respect to participation under the plan or coverage 
against any health care provider who is acting within 
the scope of that provider’s license or certification 
under applicable State law.  This section shall not 
require that a group health plan or health insurance 
issuer contract with any health care provider willing 
to abide by the terms and conditions for participation 
established by the plan or issuer.  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed as preventing a group 
health plan, a health insurance issuer, or the 
Secretary from establishing varying reimbursement 
rates based on quality or performance measures. 
‘‘(b) INDIVIDUALS.—The provisions of section 1558 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(relating to non-discrimination) shall apply with 
respect to a group health plan or health insurance 
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issuer offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage. 
‘‘SEC. 2707. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) COVERAGE FOR ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS 
PACKAGE.—A health insurance issuer that offers 
health insurance coverage in the individual or small 
group market shall ensure that such coverage 
includes the essential health benefits package 
required under section 1302(a) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
‘‘(b) COST-SHARING UNDER GROUP HEALTH PLANS.—
A group health plan shall ensure that any annual 
cost-sharing imposed under the plan does not exceed 
the limitations provided for under paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of section 1302(c). 
‘‘(c) CHILD-ONLY PLANS.—If a health insurance 
issuer offers health insurance coverage in any level of 
coverage specified under section 1302(d) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the 
issuer shall also offer such coverage in that level as a 
plan in which the only enrollees are individuals who, 
as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained 
the age of 21. 
‘‘(d) DENTAL ONLY.—This section shall not apply to 
a plan described in section 1302(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I). 
‘‘SEC. 2708. PROHIBITION ON EXCESSIVE WAITING 
PERIODS. 
‘‘A group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group health insurance coverage shall not 
apply any waiting period (as defined in section 
2704(b)(4)) that exceeds 90 days.’ 
‘‘SEC. 2709 COVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATING 
IN APPROVED CLINICAL TRIALS. 
‘‘(a) COVERAGE.— 
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‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If a group health plan or a 
health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage provides 
coverage to a qualified individual, then such plan 
or issuer— 
‘‘(A) may not deny the individual participation 
in the clinical trial referred to in subsection 
(b)(2); 
‘‘(B) subject to subsection (c), may not deny (or 
limit or impose additional conditions on) the 
coverage of routine patient costs for items and 
services furnished in connection with 
participation in the trial; and 
‘‘(C) may not discriminate against the 
individual on the basis of the individual’s 
participation in such trial. 
‘‘(2) ROUTINE PATIENT COSTS.— 
‘‘(A) INCLUSION.—For purposes of paragraph 
(1)(B), subject to subparagraph (B), routine 
patient costs include all items and services 
consistent with the coverage provided in the plan 
(or coverage) that is typically covered for a 
qualified individual who is not enrolled in a 
clinical trial. 
‘‘(B) EXCLUSION.—For purposes of paragraph 
(1)(B), routine patient costs does not include— 
‘‘(i) the investigational item, device, or 
service, 
itself; 
‘‘(ii) items and services that are provided 
solely to satisfy data collection and analysis 
needs and that are not used in the direct 
clinical management of the patient; or 
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‘‘(iii) a service that is clearly inconsistent 
with widely accepted and established 
standards of care for a particular diagnosis. 
‘‘(3) USE OF IN-NETWORK PROVIDERS.—If one or 
more participating providers is participating in a 
clinical trial, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be 
construed as preventing a plan or issuer from 
requiring that a qualified individual participate in 
the trial through such a participating provider if 
the provider will accept the individual as a 
participant in the trial. 
‘‘(4) USE OF OUT-OF-NETWORK.—Notwithstanding 
paragraph (3), paragraph (1) shall apply to a 
qualified individual participating in an approved 
clinical trial that is conducted outside the State in 
which the qualified individual resides. 
‘‘(b) QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL DEFINED.—For 
purposes of subsection (a), the term ‘qualified 
individual’ means an individual who is a participant 
or beneficiary in a health plan or with coverage 
described in subsection (a)(1) and who meets the 
following conditions: 
‘‘(1) The individual is eligible to participate in an 
approved clinical trial according to the trial 
protocol with respect to treatment of cancer or 
other life-threatening disease or condition. 
‘‘(2) Either— 
‘‘(A) the referring health care professional is a 
participating health care provider and has 
concluded that the individual’s participation in 
such trial would be appropriate based upon the 
individual meeting the conditions described in 
paragraph (1); or 
‘‘(B) the participant or beneficiary provides 
medical and scientific information establishing 
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that the individual’s participation in such trial 
would be appropriate based upon the individual 
meeting the conditions described in paragraph 
(1). 
‘‘(c) LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE.—This section shall 
not be construed to require a group health plan, or a 
health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage, to provide benefits for 
routine patient care services provided outside of the 
plan’s (or coverage’s) health care provider network 
unless out-of-network benefits are otherwise provided 
under the plan (or coverage). 
‘‘(d) APPROVED CLINICAL TRIAL DEFINED.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section, the term 
‘approved clinical trial’ means a phase I, phase II, 
phase III, or phase IV clinical trial that is 
conducted in relation to the prevention, detection, 
or treatment of cancer or other life-threatening 
disease or condition and is described in any of the 
following subparagraphs: 
‘‘(A) FEDERALLY FUNDED TRIALS.—The 
study or investigation is approved or funded 
(which may include funding through in-kind 
contributions) by one or more of the following: 
‘‘(i) The National Institutes of Health. 
‘‘(ii) The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. 
‘‘(iii) The Agency for Health Care Research 
and 
Quality. 
‘‘(iv) The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services. 
‘‘(v) cooperative group or center of any of the 
entities described in clauses (i) through (iv) or 
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the Department of Defense or the Department 
of Veterans Affairs. 
‘‘(vi) A qualified non-governmental research 
entity 
identified in the guidelines issued by the 
National Institutes of Health for center 
support grants. 
‘‘(vii) Any of the following if the conditions 
described in paragraph (2) are met: 
‘‘(I) The Department of Veterans Affairs. 
‘‘(II) The Department of Defense. 
‘‘(III) The Department of Energy. 
‘‘(B) The study or investigation is conducted 
under an investigational new drug application 
reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration. 
‘‘(C) The study or investigation is a drug trial 
that is exempt from having such an 
investigational new drug application. 
‘‘(2) CONDITIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS.—The 
conditions described in this paragraph, for a study 
or investigation conducted by a Department, are 
that the study or investigation has been reviewed 
and approved through a system of peer review that 
the Secretary determines— 
‘‘(A) to be comparable to the system of peer 
review of studies and investigations used by the 
National Institutes of Health, and 
‘‘(B) assures unbiased review of the highest 
scientific standards by qualified individuals who 
have no interest in the outcome of the review. 
‘‘(e) LIFE-THREATENING CONDITION DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘life-threatening condition’ 
means any disease or condition from which the 
likelihood of death is probable unless the course of 
the disease or condition is interrupted. 
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‘‘(f) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to limit a plan’s or issuer’s coverage 
with respect to clinical trials. 
‘‘(g) APPLICATION TO FEHBP.—Notwithstanding 
any provision of chapter 89 of title 5, United States 
Code, this section shall apply to health plans offered 
under the program under such chapter. 
‘‘(h) PREEMPTION.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Act, nothing in this section shall 
preempt State laws that require a clinical trials 
policy for State regulated health insurance plans that 
is in addition to the policy required under this 
section.’’. 
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Subtitle D—Available Coverage Choices for All 
Americans  
PART 1—ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALIFIED 
HEALTH PLANS 
 
SEC. 1301. QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN DEFINED. 
(a) QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.—In this title: 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘qualified health 
plan’’ means a health plan that— 
(A) has in effect a certification (which may 
include a seal or other indication of approval) 
that such plan meets the criteria for certification 
described in section 1311(c) issued or recognized 
by each Exchange through which such plan is 
offered; 
(B) provides the essential health benefits 
package described in section 1302(a); and 
(C) is offered by a health insurance issuer 
that— 
(i) is licensed and in good standing to offer 
health insurance coverage in each State in 
which such issuer offers health insurance 
coverage under this title; 
(ii) agrees to offer at least one qualified 
health plan in the silver level and at least one 
plan in the gold level in each such Exchange;  
(iii) agrees to charge the same premium rate 
for each qualified health plan of the issuer 
without regard to whether the plan is offered 
through an Exchange or whether the plan is 
offered directly from the issuer or through an 
agent; and 
(iv) complies with the regulations developed 
by the Secretary under section 1311(d) and 
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such other requirements as an applicable 
Exchange may establish. 
(2) INCLUSION OF CO-OP PLANS AND COMMUNITY 
HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION.—Any reference in this 
title to a qualified health plan shall be deemed to 
include a qualified health plan offered through the 
CO-OP program under section 1322, and a multi-
State plan under section 1334, unless specifically 
provided for otherwise. 
(3) TREATMENT OF QUALIFIED DIRECT PRIMARY 
CARE MEDICAL HOME PLANS.—The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall permit a 
qualified health plan to provide coverage through a 
qualified direct primary care medical home plan 
that meets criteria established by the Secretary, so 
long as the qualified health plan meets all 
requirements that are otherwise applicable and the 
services covered by the medical home plan are 
coordinated with the entity offering the qualified 
health plan. 
(4) VARIATION BASED ON RATING AREA.—A 
qualified health plan, including a multi-State 
qualified health plan, may as appropriate vary 
premiums by rating area (as defined in section 
2701(a)(2) of the Public Health Service Act). 
(b) TERMS RELATING TO HEALTH PLANS.—In this 
title: 
(1) HEALTH PLAN.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘health plan’’ 
means health insurance coverage and a group 
health plan. 
(B) EXCEPTION FOR SELF-INSURED PLANS AND 
MEWAS.—Except to the extent specifically 
provided by this title, the term ‘‘health plan’’ 
shall not include a group health plan or multiple 
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employer welfare arrangement to the extent the 
plan or arrangement is not subject to State 
insurance regulation under section 514 of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974. 
(2) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ISSUER.—
The terms ‘‘health insurance coverage’’ and ‘‘health 
insurance issuer’’ have the meanings given such 
terms by section 2791(b) of the Public Health 
Service Act. 
(3) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.—The term ‘‘group 
health plan’’ has the meaning given such term by 
section 2791(a) of the Public Health Service Act. 
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SEC. 1302. ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS 
REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PACKAGE.—In this 
title, the term ‘‘essential health benefits package’’ 
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage 
that— 
(1) provides for the essential health benefits 
defined by the Secretary under subsection (b); 
(2) limits cost-sharing for such coverage in 
accordance with subsection (c); and 
(3) subject to subsection (e), provides either the 
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of coverage 
described in subsection (d). 
(b) ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the 
Secretary shall define the essential health benefits, 
except that such benefits shall include at least the 
following general categories and the items and 
services covered within the categories: 
(A) Ambulatory patient services. 
(B) Emergency services. 
(C) Hospitalization. 
(D) Maternity and newborn care. 
(E) Mental health and substance use disorder 
services, including behavioral health treatment. 
(F) Prescription drugs.  
(G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services 
and devices. 
(H) Laboratory services. 
(I) Preventive and wellness services and 
chronic disease management. 
(J) Pediatric services, including oral and 
vision care. 
(2) LIMITATION.— 
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(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall ensure 
that the scope of the essential health benefits 
under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of 
benefits provided under a typical employer plan, 
as determined by the Secretary.  To inform this 
determination, the Secretary of Labor shall 
conduct a survey of employer-sponsored coverage 
to determine the benefits typically covered by 
employers, including multiemployer plans, and 
provide a report on such survey to the Secretary. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—In defining the essential 
health benefits described in paragraph (1), and 
in revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H), 
the Secretary shall submit a report to the 
appropriate committees of Congress containing a 
certification from the Chief Actuary of the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that 
such essential health benefits meet the 
limitation described in paragraph (2). 
(3) NOTICE AND HEARING.—In defining the 
essential health benefits described in paragraph 
(1), and in revising the benefits under paragraph 
(4)(H), the Secretary shall provide notice and an 
opportunity for public comment. 
(4) REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In 
defining the essential health benefits under 
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall— 
(A) ensure that such essential health benefits 
reflect an appropriate balance among the 
categories described in such subsection, so that 
benefits are not unduly weighted toward any 
category; 
(B) not make coverage decisions, determine 
reimbursement rates, establish incentive 
programs, or design benefits in ways that 
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discriminate against individuals because of their 
age, disability, or expected length of life; 
(C) take into account the health care needs of 
diverse segments of the population, including 
women, children, persons with disabilities, and 
other groups; 
(D) ensure that health benefits established as 
essential not be subject to denial to individuals 
against their wishes on the basis of the 
individuals’ age or expected length of life or of 
the individuals’ present or predicted disability, 
degree of medical dependency, or quality of life; 
(E) provide that a qualified health plan shall 
not be treated as providing coverage for the 
essential health benefits described in paragraph 
(1) unless the plan provides that— 
(i) coverage for emergency department 
services will be provided without imposing any 
requirement under the plan for prior 
authorization of services or any limitation on 
coverage where the provider of services does 
not have a contractual relationship with the 
plan for the providing of services that is more 
restrictive than the requirements or 
limitations that apply to emergency 
department services received from providers 
who do have such a contractual relationship 
with the plan; and 
(ii) if such services are provided out-of-
network, the cost-sharing requirement 
(expressed as a copayment amount or 
coinsurance rate) is the same requirement that 
would apply if such services were provided in-
network; 
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(F) provide that if a plan described in section 
1311(b)(2)(B)(ii) (relating to stand-alone dental 
benefits plans) is offered through an Exchange, 
another health plan offered through such 
Exchange shall not fail to be treated as a 
qualified health plan solely because the plan 
does not offer coverage of benefits offered 
through the stand-alone plan that are otherwise 
required under paragraph (1)(J); and 
(G) periodically review the essential health 
benefits under paragraph (1), and provide a 
report to Congress and the public that 
contains— 
(i) an assessment of whether enrollees are 
facing any difficulty accessing needed services 
for reasons of coverage or cost;  
(ii) an assessment of whether the essential 
health benefits needs to be modified or 
updated to account for changes in medical 
evidence or scientific advancement;  
(iii) information on how the essential health 
benefits will be modified to address any such 
gaps in access or changes in the evidence base; 
(iv) an assessment of the potential of 
additional or expanded benefits to increase 
costs and the interactions between the addition 
or expansion of benefits and reductions in 
existing benefits to meet actuarial limitations 
described in paragraph (2); and 
(H) periodically update the essential health 
benefits under paragraph (1) to address any gaps 
in access to coverage or changes in the evidence 
base the Secretary identifies in the review 
conducted under subparagraph (G). 
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(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 
title shall be construed to prohibit a health plan 
from providing benefits in excess of the essential 
health benefits described in this subsection. 
(c) REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO COST-SHARING.— 
(1) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON COST-SHARING.— 
(A) 2014.—The cost-sharing incurred under a 
health plan with respect to self-only coverage or 
coverage other than self-only coverage for a plan 
year beginning in 2014 shall not exceed the 
dollar amounts in effect under section 
223(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 for self-only and family coverage, 
respectively, for taxable years beginning in 2014. 
(B) 2015 AND LATER.—In the case of any plan 
year beginning in a calendar year after 2014, the 
limitation under this paragraph shall— 
(i) in the case of self-only coverage, be equal 
to the dollar amount under subparagraph (A) 
for self-only coverage for plan years beginning 
in 2014, increased by an amount equal to the 
product of that amount and the premium 
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for 
the calendar year; and 
(ii) in the case of other coverage, twice the 
amount in effect under clause (i). 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is 
not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be 
rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50. 
(2) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIBLES FOR 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a health plan 
offered in the small group market, the deductible 
under the plan shall not exceed— 
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(i) $2,000 in the case of a plan covering a 
single individual; and 
(ii) $4,000 in the case of any other plan. 
The amounts under clauses (i) and (ii) may be 
increased by the maximum amount of reimbursement 
which is reasonably available to a participant under 
a flexible spending arrangement described in section 
106(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(determined without regard to any salary reduction 
arrangement). 
(B) INDEXING OF LIMITS.—In the case of any 
plan year beginning in a calendar year after 
2014— 
(i) the dollar amount under subparagraph 
(A)(i) shall be increased by an amount equal to 
the product of that amount and the premium 
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for 
the calendar year; and 
(ii) the dollar amount under subparagraph 
(A)(ii) shall be increased to an amount equal to 
twice the amount in effect under subparagraph 
(A)(i) for plan years beginning in the calendar 
year, determined after application of clause (i). 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a 
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the 
next lowest multiple of $50. 
(C) ACTUARIAL VALUE.—The limitation under 
this paragraph shall be applied in such a 
manner so as to not affect the actuarial value of 
any health plan, including a plan in the bronze 
level. 
(D) COORDINATION WITH PREVENTIVE LIMITS.—
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
allow a plan to have a deductible under the plan 
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apply to benefits described in section 2713 of the 
Public Health Service Act. 
(3) COST-SHARING.—In this title— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘cost-sharing’’ 
includes— 
(i) deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or 
similar charges; and  
(ii) any other expenditure required of an 
insured individual which is a qualified medical 
expense (within the meaning of section 
223(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986) with respect to essential health benefits 
covered under the plan. 
 (B) EXCEPTIONS.—Such term does not include 
premiums, balance billing amounts for non-
network providers, or spending for non-covered 
services. 
(4) PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT PERCENTAGE.—For 
purposes of paragraphs (1)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(i), the 
premium adjustment percentage for any calendar 
year is the percentage (if any) by which the 
average per capita premium for health insurance 
coverage in the United States for the preceding 
calendar year (as estimated by the Secretary no 
later than October 1 of such preceding calendar 
year) exceeds such average per capita premium for 
2013 (as determined by the Secretary). 
(d) LEVELS OF COVERAGE.— 
(1) LEVELS OF COVERAGE DEFINED.—The levels of 
coverage described in this subsection are as 
follows: 
(A) BRONZE LEVEL.—A plan in the bronze level 
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed 
to provide benefits that are actuarially 
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equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial 
value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
(B) SILVER LEVEL.—A plan in the silver level 
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed 
to provide benefits that are actuarially 
equivalent to 70 percent of the full actuarial 
value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
(C) GOLD LEVEL.—A plan in the gold level 
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed 
to provide benefits that are actuarially 
equivalent to 80 percent of the full actuarial 
value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
(D) PLATINUM LEVEL.—A plan in the platinum 
level shall provide a level of coverage that is 
designed to provide benefits that are actuarially 
equivalent to 90 percent of the full actuarial 
value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
(2) ACTUARIAL VALUE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Under regulations issued by 
the Secretary, the level of coverage of a plan 
shall be determined on the basis that the 
essential health benefits described in subsection 
(b) shall be provided to a standard population 
(and without regard to the population the plan 
may actually provide benefits to). 
(B) EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.—The Secretary 
shall issue regulations under which employer 
contributions to a health savings account (within 
the meaning of section 223 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986) may be taken into 
account in determining the level of coverage for a 
plan of the employer. 
(C) APPLICATION.—In determining under this 
title, the Public Health Service Act, or the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 the percentage of 
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the total allowed costs of benefits provided under 
a group health plan or health insurance coverage 
that are provided by such plan or coverage, the 
rules contained in the regulations under this 
paragraph shall apply. 
(3) ALLOWABLE VARIANCE.—The Secretary shall 
develop guidelines to provide for a de minimis 
variation in the actuarial valuations used in 
determining the level of coverage of a plan to 
account for differences in actuarial estimates. 
(4) PLAN REFERENCE.—In this title, any reference 
to a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum plan shall be 
treated as a reference to a qualified health plan 
providing a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of 
coverage, as the case may be. 
(e) CATASTROPHIC PLAN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A health plan not providing a 
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of coverage 
shall be treated as meeting the requirements of 
subsection (d) with respect to any plan year if— 
(A) the only individuals who are eligible to 
enroll in the plan are individuals described in 
paragraph (2); and 
(B) the plan provides— 
(i) except as provided in clause (ii), the 
essential health benefits determined under 
subsection (b), except that the plan provides no 
benefits for any plan year until the individual 
has incurred cost-sharing expenses in an 
amount equal to the annual limitation in effect 
under subsection (c)(1) for the plan year 
(except as provided for in section 2713); and 
(ii) coverage for at least three primary care 
visits. 
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(2) INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE FOR ENROLLMENT.—An 
individual is described in this paragraph for any 
plan year if the individual— 
(A) has not attained the age of 30 before the 
beginning of the plan year; or 
(B) has a certification in effect for any plan 
year under this title that the individual is 
exempt from the requirement under section 
5000A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by 
reason of— 
(i) section 5000A(e)(1) of such Code (relating 
to individuals without affordable coverage); or 
(ii) section 5000A(e)(5) of such Code (relating 
to individuals with hardships). 
(3) RESTRICTION TO INDIVIDUAL MARKET.—If a 
health insurance issuer offers a health plan 
described in this subsection, the issuer may only 
offer the plan in the individual market. 
(f) CHILD-ONLY PLANS.—If a qualified health plan is 
offered through the Exchange in any level of coverage 
specified under subsection (d), the issuer shall also 
offer that plan through the Exchange in that level as 
a plan in which the only enrollees are individuals 
who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not 
attained the age of 21, and such plan shall be treated 
as a qualified health plan. 
(g) PAYMENTS TO FEDERALLY-QUALIFIED HEALTH 
CENTERS. .—If any item or service covered by a 
qualified health plan is provided by a Federally-
qualified health center (as defined in section 
1905(l)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1396d(l)(2)(B)) to an enrollee of the plan, the offeror 
of the plan shall pay to the center for the item or 
service an amount that is not less than the amount of 
payment that would have been paid to the center 
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under section 1902(bb) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
1396a(bb)) for such item or service. 
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Subtitle E—Affordable Coverage Choices for All 
Americans  
PART I—PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND COST-
SHARING REDUCTIONS 
Subpart A—Premium Tax Credits and Cost-sharing 
Reductions 
SEC. 1401. REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT PROVIDING 
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE FOR COVERAGE UNDER A 
QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart C of part IV of subchapter 
A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to refundable credits) is amended by 
inserting after section 36A the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 36B. REFUNDABLE CREDIT FOR COVERAGE 
UNDER A QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an applicable 
taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against 
the tax imposed by this subtitle for any taxable year 
an amount equal to the premium assistance credit 
amount of the taxpayer for the taxable year. 
‘‘(b) PREMIUM ASSISTANCE CREDIT AMOUNT.—For 
purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘premium assistance 
credit amount’ means, with respect to any taxable 
year, the sum of the premium assistance amounts 
determined under paragraph (2) with respect to all 
coverage months of the taxpayer occurring during 
the taxable year. 
‘‘(2) PREMIUM ASSISTANCE AMOUNT.—The 
premium assistance amount determined under this 
subsection with respect to any coverage month is 
the amount equal to the lesser of— 
‘‘(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 
1 or more qualified health plans offered in the 
individual market within a State which cover 
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the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any 
dependent (as defined in section 152) of the 
taxpayer and which were enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under 1311 of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
or 
‘‘(B) the excess (if any) of— 
‘‘(i) the adjusted monthly premium for such 
month for the applicable second lowest cost 
silver plan with respect to the taxpayer, over 
‘‘(ii) an amount equal to 1/12 of the product 
of the applicable percentage and the taxpayer’s 
household income for the taxable year. 
‘‘(3) OTHER TERMS AND RULES RELATING TO 
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE AMOUNTS.—For purposes of 
paragraph (2)— 
‘‘(A) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
clause (ii), the applicable percentage for any 
taxable year shall be the percentage such that 
the applicable percentage for any taxpayer 
whose household income is within an income 
tier specified in the following table shall 
increase, on a sliding scale in a linear manner, 
from the initial premium percentage to the 
final premium percentage specified in such 
table for such income tier: 
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‘‘In the case of 
household income 
(expressed as a 
percent of poverty 
line) with the 
following income tier 
 
The initial 
premium 
percentage is— 
The final 
premium 
percentage 
is— 
Up to 133% 2.0% 2.0% 
133% up to 150% 3.0%  4.0% 
150% up to 200% 4.0%  6.3% 
200% up to 250% 6.3%  8.05% 
250% up to 300% 8.05%  9.5% 
300% up to 400%  9.5%  9.5% 
 
“(ii) INDEXING.— 
‘‘(I) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subclause 
(II), in the case of taxable years beginning in 
any calendar year after 2014, the initial and 
final applicable percentages under clause (i) 
(as in effect for the preceding calendar year 
after application of this clause) shall be 
adjusted to reflect the excess of the rate of 
premium growth for the preceding calendar 
year over the rate of income growth for the 
preceding calendar year. 
“(II) ADDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT.—Except as 
provided in subclause (III), in the case of any 
calendar year after 2018, the percentages 
described in subclause (I) shall, in addition 
to the adjustment under subclause (I), be 
adjusted to reflect the excess (if any) of the 
rate of premium growth estimated under 
subclause (I) for the preceding calendar year 
over the rate of growth in the consumer 
price index for the preceding calendar year. 
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“(III) FAILSAFE.—Subclause (II) shall 
apply for any calendar year only if the 
aggregate amount of premium tax credits 
under this section and costsharing 
reductions under section 1402 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act for the 
preceding calendar year exceeds an amount 
equal to 0.504 percent of the gross domestic 
product for the preceding calendar year. 
‘‘(B) APPLICABLE SECOND LOWEST COST SILVER 
PLAN.—The applicable second lowest cost silver 
plan with respect to any applicable taxpayer is 
the second lowest cost silver plan of the 
individual market in the rating area in which 
the taxpayer resides which— 
‘‘(i) is offered through the same Exchange 
through which the qualified health plans taken 
into account under paragraph (2)(A) were 
offered, and 
‘‘(ii) provides— 
‘‘(I) self-only coverage in the case of an 
applicable taxpayer— 
‘‘(aa) whose tax for the taxable year is 
determined under section 1(c) (relating to 
unmarried individuals other than 
surviving spouses and heads of 
households) and who is not allowed a 
deduction under section 151 for the 
taxable year with respect to a dependent, 
or 
‘‘(bb) who is not described in item (aa) 
but who purchases only self-only coverage, 
and 
‘‘(II) family coverage in the case of any 
other applicable taxpayer. 
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If a taxpayer files a joint return and no credit is 
allowed under this section with respect to 1 of the 
spouses by reason of subsection (e), the taxpayer 
shall be treated as described in clause (ii)(I) unless a 
deduction is allowed under section 151 for the taxable 
year with respect to a dependent other than either 
spouse and subsection (e) does not apply to the 
dependent. 
‘‘(C) ADJUSTED MONTHLY PREMIUM.—The 
adjusted monthly premium for an applicable 
second lowest cost silver plan is the monthly 
premium which would have been charged (for 
the rating area with respect to which the 
premiums under paragraph (2)(A) were 
determined) for the plan if each individual 
covered under a qualified health plan taken into 
account under paragraph (2)(A) were covered by 
such silver plan and the premium was adjusted 
only for the age of each such individual in the 
manner allowed under section 2701 of the Public 
Health Service Act.  In the case of a State 
participating in the wellness discount 
demonstration project under section 2705(d) of 
the Public Health Service Act, the adjusted 
monthly premium shall be determined without 
regard to any premium discount or rebate under 
such project. 
‘‘(D) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.—If— 
‘‘(i) a qualified health plan under section 
1302(b)(5) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act offers benefits in addition 
to the essential health benefits required to be 
provided by the plan, or 
‘‘(ii) a State requires a qualified health plan 
under section 1311(d)(3)(B) of such Act to cover 
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benefits in addition to the essential health 
benefits required to be provided by the plan,  
the portion of the premium for the plan properly 
allocable (under rules prescribed by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services) to such additional 
benefits shall not be taken into account in 
determining either the monthly premium or the 
adjusted monthly premium under paragraph (2). 
‘‘(E) SPECIAL RULE FOR PEDIATRIC DENTAL 
COVERAGE.—For purposes of determining the 
amount of any monthly premium, if an 
individual enrolls in both a qualified health plan 
and a plan described in section 
1311(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act for any plan year, the 
portion of the premium for the plan described in 
such section that (under regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary) is properly allocable to 
pediatric dental benefits which are included in 
the essential health benefits required to be 
provided by a qualified health plan under section 
1302(b)(1)(J) of such Act shall be treated as a 
premium payable for a qualified health plan. 
‘‘(c) DEFINITION AND RULES RELATING TO APPLICABLE 
TAXPAYERS, COVERAGE MONTHS, AND QUALIFIED 
HEALTH PLAN.—For purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) APPLICABLE TAXPAYER.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable 
taxpayer’ means, with respect to any taxable 
year, a taxpayer whose household income for the 
taxable year equals or exceeds 100 percent but 
does not exceed 400 percent of an amount equal 
to the poverty line for a family of the size 
involved. 
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‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS 
LAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES.—If— 
‘‘(i) a taxpayer has a household income 
which is not greater than 100 percent of an 
amount equal to the poverty line for a family of 
the size involved, and 
‘‘(ii) the taxpayer is an alien lawfully present 
in the United States, but is not eligible for the 
Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social 
Security Act by reason of such alien status, the 
taxpayer shall, for purposes of the credit under 
this section, be treated as an applicable 
taxpayer with a household income which is 
equal to 100 percent of the poverty line for a 
family of the size involved. 
‘‘(C) MARRIED COUPLES MUST FILE JOINT 
RETURN.—If the taxpayer is married (within the 
meaning of section 7703) at the close of the 
taxable year, the taxpayer shall be treated as an 
applicable taxpayer only if the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer’s spouse file a joint return for the 
taxable year. 
‘‘(D) DENIAL OF CREDIT TO DEPENDENTS.—No 
credit shall be allowed under this section to any 
individual with respect to whom a deduction 
under section 151 is allowable to another 
taxpayer for a taxable year beginning in the 
calendar year in which such individual’s taxable 
year begins. 
‘‘(2) COVERAGE MONTH.—For purposes of this 
subsection— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘coverage month’ 
means, with respect to an applicable taxpayer, 
any month if— 
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‘‘(i) as of the first day of such month the 
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any 
dependent of the taxpayer is covered by a 
qualified health plan described in subsection 
(b)(2)(A) that was enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under 
section 1311 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, and 
‘‘(ii) the premium for coverage under such 
plan for such month is paid by the taxpayer (or 
through advance payment of the credit under 
subsection (a) under section 1412 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
‘‘(B) EXCEPTION FOR MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 
COVERAGE.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘coverage month’ 
shall not include any month with respect to an 
individual if for such month the individual is 
eligible for minimum essential coverage other 
than eligibility for coverage described in 
section 5000A(f)(1)(C) (relating to coverage in 
the individual market). 
‘‘(ii) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—The 
term ‘minimum essential coverage’ has the 
meaning given such term by section 5000A(f). 
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—For purposes of 
subparagraph (B)— 
‘‘(i) COVERAGE MUST BE AFFORDABLE.—Except 
as provided in clause (iii), an employee shall 
not be treated as eligible for minimum 
essential coverage if such coverage— 
‘‘(I) consists of an eligible employer-
sponsored plan (as defined in section 
5000A(f)(2)), and 
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‘‘(II) the employee’s required contribution 
(within the meaning of section 
5000A(e)(1)(B)) with respect to the plan 
exceeds 9.5 percent of the applicable 
taxpayer’s household income. 
This clause shall also apply to an individual who is 
eligible to enroll in the plan by reason of a 
relationship the individual bears to the employee. 
‘‘(ii) COVERAGE MUST PROVIDE MINIMUM 
VALUE.—Except as provided in clause (iii), an 
employee shall not be treated as eligible for 
minimum essential coverage if such coverage 
consists of an eligible employer-sponsored plan 
(as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) and the 
plan’s share of the total allowed costs of 
benefits provided under the plan is less than 
60 percent of such costs. 
‘‘(iii) EMPLOYEE OR FAMILY MUST NOT BE 
COVERED UNDER EMPLOYER PLAN.—Clauses (i) 
and (ii) shall not apply if the employee (or any 
individual described in the last sentence of 
clause (i)) is covered under the eligible 
employer-sponsored plan or the grandfathered 
health plan. 
‘‘(iv) INDEXING.—In the case of plan years 
beginning in any calendar year after 2014, the 
Secretary shall adjust the 9.5 percent under 
clause (i)(II) in the same manner as the 
percentages are adjusted under subsection 
(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
(D) EXCEPTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING 
FREE CHOICE VOUCHERS.—The term ‘coverage 
month’ shall not include any month in which 
such individual has a free choice voucher 
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provided under section 10108 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS AND OTHER RULES.— 
‘‘(A) QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.—The term 
‘qualified health plan’ has the meaning given 
such term by section 1301(a) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, except that 
such term shall not include a qualified health 
plan which is a catastrophic plan described in 
section 1302(e) of such Act. 
‘‘(B) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.—The term 
‘grandfathered health plan’ has the meaning 
given such term by section 1251 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
‘‘(d) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.—For 
purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) FAMILY SIZE.—The family size involved with 
respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the 
number of individuals for whom the taxpayer is 
allowed a deduction under section 151 (relating to 
allowance of deduction for personal exemptions) for 
the taxable year. 
‘‘(2) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.— 
‘‘(A) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.—The term 
‘household income’ means, with respect to any 
taxpayer, an amount equal to the sum of— 
‘‘(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the 
taxpayer, plus 
‘‘(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross 
incomes of all other individuals who— 
‘‘(I) were taken into account in 
determining the taxpayer’s family size under 
paragraph (1), and 
‘‘(II) were required to file a return of tax 
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year. 
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‘‘(B) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.—The 
term ‘modified adjusted gross income’ means 
adjusted gross income increased by— 
‘‘(i) any amount excluded from gross income 
under section 911, and 
‘‘(ii) any amount of interest received or 
accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable 
year which is exempt from tax. 
‘‘(3) POVERTY LINE.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘poverty line’ has 
the meaning given that term in section 
2110(c)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1397jj(c)(5)). 
‘‘(B) POVERTY LINE USED.—In the case of any 
qualified health plan offered through an 
Exchange for coverage during a taxable year 
beginning in a calendar year, the poverty line 
used shall be the most recently published 
poverty line as of the 1st day of the regular 
enrollment period for coverage during such 
calendar year. 
‘‘(e) RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY 
PRESENT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If 1 or more individuals for 
whom a taxpayer is allowed a deduction under 
section 151 (relating to allowance of deduction for 
personal exemptions) for the taxable year 
(including the taxpayer or his spouse) are 
individuals who are not lawfully present— 
‘‘(A) the aggregate amount of premiums 
otherwise taken into account under clauses (i) 
and (ii) of subsection (b)(2)(A) shall be reduced 
by the portion (if any) of such premiums which is 
attributable to such individuals, and 
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‘‘(B) for purposes of applying this section, the 
determination as to what percentage a 
taxpayer’s household income bears to the 
poverty level for a family of the size involved 
shall be made under one of the following 
methods: 
‘‘(i) A method under which— 
‘‘(I) the taxpayer’s family size is 
determined by not taking such individuals 
into account, and 
‘‘(II) the taxpayer’s household income is 
equal to the product of the taxpayer’s 
household income (determined without 
regard to this subsection) and a fraction— 
‘‘(aa) the numerator of which is the 
poverty line for the taxpayer’s family size 
determined after application of subclause 
(I), and 
‘‘(bb) the denominator of which is the 
poverty line for the taxpayer’s family size 
determined without regard to subclause 
(I). 
‘‘(ii) A comparable method reaching the same 
result as the method under clause (i). 
‘‘(2) LAWFULLY PRESENT.—For purposes of this 
section, an individual shall be treated as lawfully 
present only if the individual is, and is reasonably 
expected to be for the entire period of enrollment 
for which the credit under this section is being 
claimed, a citizen or national of the United States 
or an alien lawfully present in the United States. 
‘‘(3) SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
the Secretary, shall prescribe rules setting forth 
the methods by which calculations of family size 
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and household income are made for purposes of 
this subsection.  Such rules shall be designed to 
ensure that the least burden is placed on 
individuals enrolling in qualified health plans 
through an Exchange and taxpayers eligible for the 
credit allowable under this section. 
‘‘(f) RECONCILIATION OF CREDIT AND ADVANCE 
CREDIT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The amount of the credit 
allowed under this section for any taxable year 
shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the 
amount of any advance payment of such credit 
under section 1412 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. 
‘‘(2) EXCESS ADVANCE PAYMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the advance payments to 
a taxpayer under section 1412 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act for a taxable 
year exceed the credit allowed by this section 
(determined without regard to paragraph (1)), 
the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable 
year shall be increased by the amount of such 
excess. 
‘‘(B) LIMITATION ON INCREASE WHERE INCOME 
LESS THAN 400 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an 
applicable taxpayer whose household income is 
less than 400 percent of the poverty line for the 
size of the family involved for the taxable year, 
the amount of the increase under 
subparagraph (A) shall in no event exceed 
$400 ($250 in the case of a taxpayer whose tax 
is determined under section 1(c) for the taxable 
year). 
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‘‘(ii) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.—In the case of 
any calendar year beginning after 2014, each 
of the dollar amounts under clause (i) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to— 
‘‘(I) such dollar amount, multiplied by 
‘‘(II) the cost-of-living adjustment 
determined under section 1(f)(3) for the 
calendar year, determined by substituting 
‘calendar year 2013’ for ‘calendar year 1992’ 
in subparagraph (B) thereof. 
(3) INFORMATION REQUIREMENT.—Each 
Exchange (or any person carrying out 1 or more 
responsibilities of an Exchange under section 
1311(f)(3) or 1321(c) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act) shall provide the following 
information to the Secretary and to the taxpayer 
with respect to any health plan provided through 
the Exchange: 
‘‘(A) The level of coverage described in section 
1302(d) of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and the period such coverage was in 
effect. 
‘‘(B) The total premium for the coverage 
without regard to the credit under this section or 
cost-sharing reductions under section 1402 of 
such Act. 
‘‘(C) The aggregate amount of any advance 
payment of such credit or reductions under 
section 1412 of such Act. 
‘‘(D) The name, address, and TIN of the 
primary insured and the name and TIN of each 
other individual obtaining coverage under the 
policy. 
‘‘(E) Any information provided to the 
Exchange, including any change of 
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circumstances, necessary to determine eligibility 
for, and the amount of, such credit. 
‘‘(F) Information necessary to determine 
whether a taxpayer has received excess advance 
payments. 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a 
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the 
next lowest multiple of $50. 
‘‘(g) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this section, including regulations which 
provide for— 
‘‘(1) the coordination of the credit allowed under 
this section with the program for advance payment 
of the credit under section 1412 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, and 
‘‘(2) the application of subsection (f) where the 
filing status of the taxpayer for a taxable year is 
different from such status used for determining the 
advance payment of the credit.’’. 
(b) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—Section 280C of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(g) CREDIT FOR HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS.—No 
deduction shall be allowed for the portion of the 
premiums paid by the taxpayer for coverage of 1 or 
more individuals under a qualified health plan which 
is equal to the amount of the credit determined for 
the taxable year under section 36B(a) with respect to 
such premiums.’’. 
(c) STUDY ON AFFORDABLE COVERAGE.— 
(1) STUDY AND REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 5 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Comptroller General shall conduct a study on 
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the affordability of health insurance coverage, 
including— 
(i) the impact of the tax credit for qualified 
health insurance coverage of individuals under 
section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 and the tax credit for employee health 
insurance expenses of small employers under 
section 45R of such Code on maintaining and 
expanding the health insurance coverage of 
individuals; 
(ii) the availability of affordable health 
benefits plans, including a study of whether 
the percentage of household income used for 
purposes of section 36B(c)(2)(C) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this 
section) is the appropriate level for 
determining whether employer-provided 
coverage is affordable for an employee and 
whether such level may be lowered without 
significantly increasing the costs to the 
Federal Government and reducing employer-
provided coverage; and 
(iii) the ability of individuals to maintain 
essential health benefits coverage (as defined 
in section 5000A(f) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986). 
(B) REPORT.—The Comptroller General shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report on the study conducted under 
subparagraph (A), together with legislative 
recommendations relating to the matters studied 
under such subparagraph. 
(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In 
this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means the Committee on Ways and 
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Means, the Committee on Education and Labor, 
and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Finance and the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate. 
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 
(1) Paragraph (2) of section 1324(b) of title 31, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting 
‘‘36B,’’ after ‘‘36A,’’. 
(2) The table of sections for subpart C of part IV 
of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 36A the following 
new item: 
‘‘Sec. 36B. Refundable credit for coverage under a 
qualified health plan.’’. 
(3) Section 6211(b)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 is amended by inserting ‘‘36B,’’ after 
‘‘36A,’’. 
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to taxable years ending after 
December 31, 2013. 
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Subtitle F—Shared Responsibility for Health Care  
PART I—INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
SEC. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The individual responsibility 
requirement provided for in this section (in this 
subsection referred to as the ‘‘requirement’’) is 
commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a 
result of the effects described in paragraph (2). 
(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—The effects described in 
this paragraph are the following: 
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is 
commercial and economic in nature: economic 
and financial decisions about how and when 
health care is paid for, and when health 
insurance is purchased.  In the absence of the 
requirement, some individuals would make an 
economic and financial decision to forego health 
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, 
which increases financial risks to households 
and medical providers. 
(B) Health insurance and health care services 
are a significant part of the national economy.  
National health spending is projected to increase 
from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the 
economy, in 2009 to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019.  
Private health insurance spending is projected to 
be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and pays for 
medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are 
shipped in interstate commerce.  Since most 
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health insurance is sold by national or regional 
health insurance companies, health insurance is 
sold in interstate commerce and claims 
payments flow through interstate commerce. 
(C) The requirement, together with the other 
provisions of this Act, will add millions of new 
consumers to the health insurance market, 
increasing the supply of, and demand for, health 
care services and will increase the number and 
share of Americans who are insured.  
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal 
coverage by building upon and strengthening the 
private employer-based health insurance system, 
which covers 176,000,000 Americans nationwide.  
In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has 
strengthened private employer-based coverage:  
despite the economic downturn, the number of 
workers offered employer-based coverage has 
actually increased. 
(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 
a year because of the poorer health and shorter 
lifespan of the uninsured.  By significantly 
reducing the number of the uninsured, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions 
of this Act, will significantly reduce this 
economic cost. 
(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care 
to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.  
To pay for this cost, health care providers pass 
on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the 
cost to families.  This cost-shifting increases 
family premiums by on average over $1,000 a 
year.  By significantly reducing the number of 
the uninsured, the requirement, together with 
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the other provisions of this Act, will lower health 
insurance premiums. 
(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are 
caused in part by medical expenses.  By 
significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage, the requirement, together with the 
other provisions of this Act, will improve 
financial security for families. 
(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), 
and this Act, the Federal Government has a 
significant role in regulating health insurance.  
The requirement is an essential part of this 
larger regulation of economic activity, and the 
absence of the requirement would undercut 
Federal regulation of the health insurance 
market. 
(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public 
Health Service Act (as added by section 1201 of 
this Act), if there were no requirement, many 
individuals would wait to purchase health 
insurance until they needed care.  By 
significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage, the requirement, together with the 
other provisions of this Act, will minimize this 
adverse selection and broaden the health 
insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, which will lower health insurance 
premiums.  The requirement is essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets in 
which improved health insurance products that 
are guaranteed issue and do not exclude 
coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. 
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(J) Administrative costs for private health 
insurance, which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, 
are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current 
individual and small group markets.  By 
significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which 
will increase economies of scale, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions 
of this Act, will significantly reduce 
administrative costs and lower health insurance 
premiums.  The requirement is essential to 
creating effective health insurance markets that 
do not require underwriting and eliminate its 
associated administrative costs. 
(3) SUPREME COURT RULING.—In United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 
533 (1944)), the Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled that insurance is interstate commerce 
subject to Federal regulation. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle D of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the 
end the following new chapter: 
‘‘CHAPTER 48—MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE 
‘‘Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum 
essential coverage. 
‘‘SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM 
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An applicable individual 
shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure 
that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered 
under minimum essential coverage for such month. 
‘‘(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.— 
85a 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If a taxpayer who is an 
applicable individual, or an applicable individual 
for whom the taxpayers is liable under paragraph 
(3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) 
for 1 or more months, then, except as provided in 
subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the 
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in 
the amount determined under subsection (c). 
‘‘(2) INCLUSION WITH RETURN.—Any penalty 
imposed by this section with respect to any month 
shall be included with a taxpayer’s return under 
chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes such 
month. 
‘‘(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.—If an individual with 
respect to whom a penalty is imposed by this 
section for any month— 
‘‘(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) 
of another taxpayer for the other taxpayer’s 
taxable year including such month, such other 
taxpayer shall be liable for such penalty, or 
‘‘(B) files a joint return for the taxable year 
including such month, such individual and the 
spouse of such individual shall be jointly liable 
for such penalty. 
‘‘(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The amount of the penalty 
imposed by this section on any taxpayer for any 
taxable year with respect to failures described in 
subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the lesser of— 
“(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts 
determined under paragraph (2) for months in 
the taxable year during which 1 or more such 
failures occurred, or  
“(B) an amount equal to the national average 
premium for qualified health plans which have a 
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bronze level of coverage, provide coverage for the 
applicable family size involved, and are offered 
through Exchanges for plan years beginning in 
the calendar year with or within which the 
taxable year ends. 
“(2) MONTHLY PENALTY AMOUNTS.—For purposes 
of paragraph (1)(A), the monthly penalty amount 
with respect to any taxpayer for any month during 
which any failure described in subsection (b)(1) 
occurred is an amount equal to 1Ú12 of the greater 
of the following amounts: 
“(A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT. .—AN AMOUNT 
EQUAL TO THE LESSER OF— 
“(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts 
for all individuals with respect to whom such 
failure occurred during such month, or 
“(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar 
amount (determined without regard to 
paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or 
within which the taxable year ends. 
‘‘(B) PERCENTAGE OF INCOME.— An amount 
equal to the following percentage of the excess of 
the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable 
year over the amount of gross income specified in 
section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer 
for the taxable year: 
“(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning 
in 2014. 
‘‘(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning 
in 2015. 
‘‘(iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning 
after 2015. 
“(3) APPLICABLE DOLLAR AMOUNT.—For purposes 
of paragraph (1)— 
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‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar 
amount is $750. 
‘‘(B) PHASE IN.—The applicable dollar amount 
is $95 for 2014 and $325 for 2015. 
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER AGE 
18.—If an applicable individual has not attained 
the age of 18 as of the beginning of a month, the 
applicable dollar amount with respect to such 
individual for the month shall be equal to one-
half of the applicable dollar amount for the 
calendar year in which the month occurs. 
‘‘(D) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.—In the case of any 
calendar year beginning after 2016, the 
applicable dollar amount shall be equal to $695, 
increased by an amount equal to— 
‘‘(i) $695, multiplied by 
‘‘(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined 
under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, 
determined by substituting ‘calendar year 
2015’ for ‘calendar year 1992’ in subparagraph 
(B) thereof. 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a 
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the 
next lowest multiple of $50. 
‘‘(4) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.—
For purposes of this section— 
‘‘(A) FAMILY SIZE.—The family size involved 
with respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to 
the number of individuals for whom the taxpayer 
is allowed a deduction under section 151 
(relating to allowance of deduction for personal 
exemptions) for the taxable year. 
‘‘(B) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.—The term 
‘household income’ means, with respect to any 
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taxpayer for any taxable year, an amount equal 
to the sum of— 
‘‘(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the 
taxpayer, plus 
‘‘(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross 
incomes of all other individuals who— 
‘‘(I) were taken into account in 
determining the taxpayer’s family size under 
paragraph (1),and 
‘‘(II) were required to file a return of tax 
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year. 
‘‘(C) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.—The 
term ‘modified adjusted gross income’ means 
adjusted gross income increased by— 
‘‘(i) any amount excluded from gross 
income— under section 911, and, 
‘‘(ii) any amount of interest received or 
accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable 
year which is exempt from tax. 
‘‘(d) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.—For purposes of this 
section— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable 
individual’ means, with respect to any month, an 
individual other than an individual described in 
paragraph (2), (3), or (4). 
‘‘(2) RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.— 
‘‘(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION.—Such 
term shall not include any individual for any 
month if such individual has in effect an 
exemption under section 1311(d)(4)(H) of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
which certifies that such individual is  
“(i) a member of a recognized religious sect 
or division thereof which is described in section 
1402(g)(1), and  
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“(ii) an adherent of established tenets or 
teachings of such sect or division as described 
in such section. 
‘‘(B) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Such term shall not 
include any individual for any month if such 
individual is a member of a health care 
sharing ministry for the month. 
‘‘(ii) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.—The 
term ‘health care sharing ministry’ means an 
organization— 
‘‘(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) 
and is exempt from taxation under section 
501(a), 
‘‘(II) members of which share a common 
set of ethical or religious beliefs and share 
medical expenses among members in 
accordance with those beliefs and without 
regard to the State in which a member 
resides or is employed, 
‘‘(III) members of which retain 
membership even after they develop a 
medical condition, 
‘‘(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has 
been in existence at all times since 
December 31, 1999, and medical expenses of 
its members have been shared continuously 
and without interruption since at least 
December 31, 1999, and 
‘‘(V) which conducts an annual audit 
which is performed by an independent 
certified public accounting firm in 
accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and which is made 
available to the public upon request. 
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‘‘(3) INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY PRESENT.—Such 
term shall not include an individual for any month 
if for the month the individual is not a citizen or 
national of the United States or an alien lawfully 
present in the United States. 
‘‘(4) INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS.—Such term 
shall not include an individual for any month if for 
the month the individual is incarcerated, other 
than incarceration pending the disposition of 
charges. 
‘‘(e) EXEMPTIONS.—No penalty shall be imposed 
under subsection (a) with respect to— 
‘‘(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO CANNOT AFFORD 
COVERAGE.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any applicable individual for 
any month if the applicable individual’s required 
contribution (determined on an annual basis) for 
coverage for the month exceeds 8 percent of such 
individual’s household income for the taxable year 
described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.  For purposes 
of applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer’s 
household income shall be increased by any 
exclusion from gross income for any portion of the 
required contribution made through a salary 
reduction arrangement. 
‘‘(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.—For purposes of 
this paragraph, the term ‘required contribution’ 
means— 
‘‘(i) in the case of an individual eligible to 
purchase minimum essential coverage 
consisting of coverage through an eligible-
employer-sponsored plan, the portion of the 
annual premium which would be paid by the 
individual (without regard to whether paid 
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through salary reduction or otherwise) for self-
only coverage, or 
‘‘(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only 
to purchase minimum essential coverage 
described in subsection (f)(1)(C), the annual 
premium for the lowest cost bronze plan 
available in the individual market through the 
Exchange in the State in the rating area in 
which the individual resides (without regard to 
whether the individual purchased a qualified 
health plan through the Exchange), reduced by 
the amount of the credit allowable under 
section 36B for the taxable year (determined as 
if the individual was covered by a qualified 
health plan offered through the Exchange for 
the entire taxable year). 
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO 
EMPLOYEES.—For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), 
if an applicable individual is eligible for minimum 
essential coverage through an employer by reason 
of a relationship to an employee, the determination 
under subparagraph (A) shall be made by reference 
to required contribution of the employee. 
‘‘(D) INDEXING.—In the case of plan years 
beginning in any calendar year after 2014, 
subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting 
for ‘8 percent’ the percentage the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services determines reflects 
the excess of the rate of premium growth between 
the preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate 
of income growth for such period. 
‘‘(2) TAXPAYERS WITH INCOME BELOW FILING 
THRESHOLD.—Any applicable individual for any 
month during a calendar year if the individual’s 
household income for the taxable year described in 
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section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is less than the amount of 
gross income specified in section 6102(a)(1) with 
respect to the taxpayer. 
‘‘(3) MEMBERS OF INDIAN TRIBES.—Any applicable 
individual for any month during which the 
individual is a member of an Indian tribe (as 
defined in section 45A(c)(6)). 
‘‘(4) MONTHS DURING SHORT COVERAGE GAPS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any month the last day of 
which occurred during a period in which the 
applicable individual was not covered by 
minimum essential coverage for a continuous 
period of less than 3 months. 
‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULES.—For purposes of applying 
this paragraph— 
‘‘(i) the length of a continuous period shall be 
determined without regard to the calendar 
years in which months in such period occur,  
‘‘(ii) if a continuous period is greater than 
the period allowed under subparagraph (A), no 
exception shall be provided under this 
paragraph for any month in the period, and 
‘‘(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous 
period described in subparagraph (A) covering 
months in a calendar year, the exception 
provided by this paragraph shall only apply to 
months in the first of such periods. 
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection 
of the penalty imposed by this section in cases where 
continuous periods include months in more than 1 
taxable year. 
‘‘(5) HARDSHIPS.—Any applicable individual who 
for any month is determined by the Secretary of 
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Health and Human Services under section 
1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship. 
‘‘(f) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—For purposes 
of this section— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘minimum essential 
coverage’ means any of the following: 
‘‘(A) GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS.—
Coverage under— 
‘‘(i) the Medicare program under part A of 
title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 
‘‘(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of 
the Social Security Act, 
‘‘(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of 
the Social Security Act, 
‘‘(iv) the TRICARE for Life program, 
‘‘(v) the veteran’s health care program under 
chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or 
‘‘(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of 
title 22, United States Code (relating to Peace 
Corps volunteers). 
‘‘(B) EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.—Coverage 
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan. 
‘‘(C) PLANS IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET.—
Coverage under a health plan offered in the 
individual market within a State. 
‘‘(D) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.—
Coverage under a grandfathered health plan. 
‘‘(E) OTHER COVERAGE.—Such other health 
benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits 
risk pool, as the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in coordination with the Secretary, 
recognizes for purposes of this subsection. 
‘‘(2) ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.—The 
term ‘eligible employer-sponsored plan’ means, 
with respect to any employee, a group health plan 
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or group health insurance coverage offered by an 
employer to the employee which is— 
‘‘(A) a GOVERNMENTAL plan (within the 
meaning of section 2791(d)(8) of the Public 
Health Service Act), or 
‘‘(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the 
small or large group market within a State. 
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan 
described in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group 
market. 
‘‘(3) EXCEPTED BENEFITS NOT TREATED AS 
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—The term 
‘minimum essential coverage’ shall not include 
health insurance coverage which consists of 
coverage of excepted benefits— 
‘‘(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection 
(c) of section 2791 of the Public Health Service 
Act; or 
‘‘(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of 
such subsection if the benefits are provided 
under a separate policy, certificate, or contract of 
insurance. 
‘‘(4) INDIVIDUALS RESIDING OUTSIDE UNITED 
STATES OR RESIDENTS OF TERRITORIES.—Any 
applicable individual shall be treated as having 
minimum essential coverage for any month— 
‘‘(A) if such month occurs during any period 
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 
911(d)(1) which is applicable to the individual, or 
‘‘(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident 
of any possession of the United States (as 
determined under section 937(a)) for such 
month. 
‘‘(5) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.—Any term used 
in this section which is also used in title I of the 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shall 
have the same meaning as when used in such title. 
‘‘(g) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The penalty provided by this 
section shall be paid upon notice and demand by 
the Secretary, and except as provided in paragraph 
(2), shall be assessed and collected in the same 
manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter 
B of chapter 68. 
‘‘(2) SPECIAL RULES.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law— 
‘‘(A) WAIVER OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—In the 
case of any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay 
any penalty imposed by this section, such 
taxpayer shall not be subject to any criminal 
prosecution or penalty with respect to such 
failure. 
‘‘(B) LIMITATIONS ON LIENS AND LEVIES.—The 
Secretary shall not— 
‘‘(i) file notice of lien with respect to any 
property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure 
to pay the penalty imposed by this section, or 
‘‘(ii) levy on any such property with respect 
to such failure.’’. 
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of chapters 
for subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to 
chapter 47 the following new item: 
‘‘CHAPTER 48—MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 
COVERAGE.”. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years ending after 
December 31, 2013. 
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SEC. 1513. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 43 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 4980H. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYERS 
REGARDING HEALTH COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) LARGE EMPLOYERS NOT OFFERING HEALTH 
COVERAGE.—If— 
‘‘(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer 
to its full-time employees (and their dependents) 
the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential 
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored 
plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any 
month, and 
‘‘(2) at least one full-time employee of the 
applicable large employer has been certified to the 
employer under section 1411 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act as having 
enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan 
with respect to which an applicable premium tax 
credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid 
with respect to the employee,  
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an 
assessable payment equal to the product of the 
applicable payment amount and the number of 
individuals employed by the employer as full-time 
employees during such month. 
‘‘(b) LARGE EMPLOYERS OFFERING COVERAGE WITH 
EMPLOYEES WHO QUALIFY FOR PREMIUM TAX CREDITS 
OR COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If— 
‘‘(A) an applicable large employer offers to its 
full-time employees (and their dependents) the 
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential 
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored 
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plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any 
month, and 
‘‘(B) 1 or more full-time employees of the 
applicable large employer has been certified to 
the employer under section 1411 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act as having 
enrolled for such month in a qualified health 
plan with respect to which an applicable 
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is 
allowed or paid with respect to the employee, 
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an 
assessable payment equal to the product of the 
number of full-time employees of the applicable large 
employer described in subparagraph (B) for such 
month and an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000. 
‘‘(2) OVERALL LIMITATION.—The aggregate 
amount of tax determined under paragraph (1) 
with respect to all employees of an applicable large 
employer for any month shall not exceed the 
product of the applicable payment amount and the 
number of individuals employed by the employer 
as full-time employees during such month. 
“(3) SPECIAL RULES FOR EMPLOYERS PROVIDING 
FREE CHOICE VOUCHERS. .— No assessable payment 
shall be imposed under paragraph (1) for any 
month with respect to any employee to whom the 
employer provides a free choice voucher under 
section 10108 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act for such month. 
‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For 
purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) APPLICABLE PAYMENT AMOUNT.—The term 
‘applicable payment amount’ means, with respect 
to any month, 1Ú12 of $2000. 
‘‘(2) APPLICABLE LARGE EMPLOYER.— 
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‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable large 
employer’ means, with respect to a calendar 
year, an employer who employed an average of 
at least 50 full-time employees on business days 
during the preceding calendar year. 
‘‘(B) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYERS.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—An employer shall not be 
considered to employ more than 50 full-time 
employees if— 
‘‘(I) the employer’s workforce exceeds 50 
fulltime employees for 120 days or fewer 
during the calendar year, and 
‘‘(II) the employees in excess of 50 
employed during such 120-day period were 
seasonal workers. 
‘‘(ii) DEFINITION OF SEASONAL WORKERS.—
The term ‘seasonal worker’ means a worker 
who performs labor or services on a seasonal 
basis as defined by the Secretary of Labor, 
including workers covered by section 
500.20(s)(1) of title 29, Code of Federal 
Regulations and retail workers employed 
exclusively during holiday seasons. 
‘‘(C) RULES FOR DETERMINING EMPLOYER SIZE.—
For purposes of this paragraph— 
‘‘(i) APPLICATION OF AGGREGATION RULE FOR 
EMPLOYERS.—All persons treated as a single 
employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), or (o) of 
section 414 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 shall be treated as 1 employer. 
‘‘(ii) EMPLOYERS NOT IN EXISTENCE IN 
PRECEDING YEAR.—In the case of an employer 
which was not in existence throughout the 
preceding calendar year, the determination of 
whether such employer is an applicable large 
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employer shall be based on the average 
number of employees that it is reasonably 
expected such employer will employ on 
business days in the current calendar year. 
‘‘(iii) PREDECESSORS.—Any reference in this 
subsection to an employer shall include a 
reference to any predecessor of such employer. 
“(D) APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER SIZE TO 
ASSESSABLE PENALTIES.— 
“(i) IN GENERAL. .—The number of 
individuals employed by an APPLICABLE large 
employer as full-time employees during any 
month shall be reduced by 30 solely for 
purposes of calculating— 
‘‘(I) the assessable payment under 
subsection (a), or 
‘‘(II) the overall limitation under 
subsection (b)(2). 
‘‘(ii) AGGREGATION.—In the case of 
persons treated as 1 employer under 
subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduction under 
subclause (I) or (II) shall be allowed with 
respect to such persons and such reduction 
shall be allocated among such persons ratably 
on the basis of the number of full-time 
employees employed by each such person. 
“(E) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS TREATED AS FULL-
TIME EMPLOYEES.— Solely for purposes of 
determining whether an employer is an 
applicable large employer under this paragraph, 
an employer shall, in addition to the number of 
full-time employees for any month otherwise 
determined, include for such month a number of 
full-time employees determined by dividing the 
aggregate number of hours of service of 
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employees who are not full-time employees for 
the month by 120. 
‘‘(3) APPLICABLE PREMIUM TAX CREDIT AND COST-
SHARING REDUCTION.—The term ‘applicable 
premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction’ 
means— 
‘‘(A) any premium tax credit allowed under 
section 36B, 
‘‘(B) any cost-sharing reduction under section 
1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, and 
‘‘(C) any advance payment of such credit or 
reduction under section 1412 of such Act. 
‘‘(4) FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘full-time 
employee’ means, with respect to any month, an 
employee who is employed on average at least 30 
hours of service per week. 
‘‘(B) HOURS OF SERVICE.—The Secretary, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Labor, shall 
prescribe such regulations, rules, and guidance 
as may be necessary to determine the hours of 
service of an employee, including rules for the 
application of this paragraph to employees who 
are not compensated on an hourly basis. 
‘‘(5) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any calendar 
year after 2014, each of the dollar amounts in 
subsection (b) and paragraph (1) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to the product 
of— 
‘‘(i) such dollar amount, and  
‘‘(ii) the premium adjustment percentage (as 
defined in section 1302(c)(4) of the Patient 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act) for the 
calendar year. 
‘‘(B) ROUNDING.—If the amount of any 
increase under subparagraph (A) is not a 
multiple of $10, such increase shall be rounded 
to the next lowest multiple of $10. 
‘‘(6) OTHER DEFINITIONS.—Any term used in this 
section which is also used in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act shall have the same 
meaning as when used in such Act. 
‘‘(7) TAX NONDEDUCTIBLE.—For denial of 
deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see 
section 275(a)(6). 
‘‘(e) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Any assessable payment 
provided by this section shall be paid upon notice 
and demand by the Secretary, and shall be 
assessed and collected in the same manner as an 
assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 
68. 
‘‘(2) TIME FOR PAYMENT.—The Secretary may 
provide for the payment of any assessable payment 
provided by this section on an annual, monthly, or 
other periodic basis as the Secretary may 
prescribe. 
‘‘(3) COORDINATION WITH CREDITS, ETC..—The 
Secretary shall prescribe rules, regulations, or 
guidance for the repayment of any assessable 
payment (including interest) if such payment is 
based on the allowance or payment of an applicable 
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction with 
respect to an employee, such allowance or payment 
is subsequently disallowed, and the assessable 
payment would not have been required to be made 
but for such allowance or payment.’’. 
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(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 
for chapter 43 of such Code is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 4980H. Shared responsibility for employers 
regarding health coverage.’’. 
(c) STUDY AND REPORT OF EFFECT OF TAX ON 
WORKERS’ WAGES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Labor shall 
conduct a study to determine whether employees’ 
wages are reduced by reason of the application of 
the assessable payments under section 4980H of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by 
the amendments made by this section).  The 
Secretary shall make such determination on the 
basis of the National Compensation Survey 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(2) REPORT.—The Secretary shall report the 
results of the study under paragraph (1) to the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives and to the Committee on Finance 
of the Senate. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to months beginning after 
December 31, 2013. 
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TITLE IX—REVENUE PROVISIONS 
 
Subtitle A—Revenue Offset Provisions 
 
SEC. 9001- EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 43 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended by section 1513, 
is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 4980I. EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE. 
‘‘(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX.—If— 
‘‘(1) an employee is covered under any applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage of an employer at any 
time during a taxable period, and 
‘‘(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to 
the coverage, there is hereby imposed a tax equal 
to 40 percent of the excess benefit. 
‘‘(b) EXCESS BENEFIT.—For purposes of this 
section— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘excess benefit’ 
means, with respect to any applicable employer-
sponsored coverage made available by an employer 
to an employee during any taxable period, the sum 
of the excess amounts determined under paragraph 
(2) for months during the taxable period. 
‘‘(2) MONTHLY EXCESS AMOUNT.—The excess 
amount determined under this paragraph for any 
month is the excess (if any) of— 
‘‘(A) the aggregate cost of the applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage of the employee for 
the month, over 
‘‘(B) an amount equal to 1Ú12 of the annual 
limitation under paragraph (3) for the calendar 
year in which the month occurs. 
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‘‘(3) ANNUAL LIMITATION.—For purposes of this 
subsection— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The annual limitation 
under this paragraph for any calendar year is 
the dollar limit determined under subparagraph 
(C) for the calendar year. 
‘‘(B) APPLICABLE ANNUAL LIMITATION.— 
“(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
clause (ii) the annual limitation which applies 
for any month shall be determined on the basis 
of the type of coverage (as determined under 
subsection (f)(1)) provided to the employee by 
the employer as of the beginning of the month. 
“(ii) MULTIMEMPLOYER PLAN COVERAGE.—
Any coverage provided under a multiemployer 
plan (as defined in section 414(f)) shall be 
treated as coverage other than self-only 
coverage. 
‘‘(C) APPLICABLE DOLLAR LIMIT—Except as 
provided in subparagraph (D)— 
‘‘(i) 2018.—In the case of 2018, the dollar 
limit under this subparagraph is— 
‘‘(I) in the case of an employee with self-
only coverage, $10,200 multiplied by the 
health cost adjustment percentage 
(determined by only taking into account self-
only coverage), and 
‘‘(II) in the case of an employee with 
coverage other than self-only coverage, 
$27,500 multiplied by the health cost 
adjustment percentage (determined by only 
taking into account coverage other than self-
only coverage). 
‘‘(ii) HEALTH COST ADJUSTMENT 
PERCENTAGE.—For purposes of clause (i), the 
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health cost adjustment percentage is equal to 
100 percent plus the excess (if any) of— 
“(I) the percentage by which the per 
employee cost for providing coverage under 
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit 
option under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Plan for plan year 2018 
(determined by using the benefit package for 
such coverage in 2010) exceeds such cost for 
plan year 2010, over 
‘‘(II) 55 percent. 
“(iii) AGE AND GENDER ADJUSTMENT. — 
“(I) IN GENERAL.— The amount 
determined under subclause (I) or (II) of 
clause (i), whichever is applicable, for any 
taxable period shall be increased by the 
amount determined under subclause (II). 
“(II) AMOUNT DETERMINED.—The amount 
determined under this subclause is an 
amount equal to the excess (if any) of— 
‘‘(aa) the premium cost of the Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit option 
under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Plan for the type of coverage 
provided such individual in such taxable 
period if priced for the age and gender 
characteristics of all employees of the 
individual’s employer, over 
‘‘(bb) that premium cost for the 
provision of such coverage under such 
option in such taxable period if priced for 
the age and gender characteristics of the 
national workforce. 
“(iv) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.—
In the case of an individual who is a qualified 
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retiree or who participates in a plan sponsored 
by an employer the majority of whose 
employees covered by the plan are engaged in 
a high-risk profession or employed to repair or 
install electrical or telecommunications lines— 
‘‘(I) the dollar amount in clause (i)(I) shall 
be increased by $1,650, and 
‘‘(II) the dollar amount in clause (i)(II) 
shall be increased by $3,450. 
‘‘(iii) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.—In the case of any 
calendar year after 2018, each of the dollar 
amounts under clauses (i) (after the 
application of clause (ii)) and (iv) shall be 
increased to the amount equal to such amount 
as in effect for the calendar year preceding 
such year, increased by an amount equal to the 
product of— 
‘‘(I) such amount as so in effect, multiplied 
by 
‘‘(II) the cost-of-living adjustment 
determined under section 1(f)(3) for such 
year (determined by substituting the 
calendar year that is 2 years before such 
year for ‘1992’ in subparagraph (B) thereof), 
increased by 1 percentage point in the case 
of determinations for calendar years 
beginning before 2020. 
If any amount determined under this clause is not a 
multiple of $50, such amount shall be rounded to the 
nearest multiple of $50. 
“(c) LIABILITY TO PAY TAX.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each coverage provider shall 
pay the tax imposed by subsection (a) on its 
applicable share of the excess benefit with respect 
to an employee for any taxable period. 
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‘‘(2) COVERAGE PROVIDER.—For purposes of this 
subsection, the term ‘coverage provider’ means 
each of the following: 
‘‘(A) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE.—If the 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage consists 
of coverage under a group health plan which 
provides health insurance coverage, the health 
insurance issuer. 
‘‘(B) HSA AND MSA CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage consists 
of coverage under an arrangement under which 
the employer makes contributions described in 
subsection (b) or (d) of section 106, the employer. 
‘‘(C) OTHER COVERAGE.—In the case of any 
other applicable employer-sponsored coverage, 
the person that administers the plan benefits. 
‘‘(3) APPLICABLE SHARE.—For purposes of this 
subsection, a coverage provider’s applicable share 
of an excess benefit for any taxable period is the 
amount which bears the same ratio to the amount 
of such excess benefit as— 
‘‘(A) the cost of the applicable employer-
sponsored coverage provided by the provider to 
the employee during such period, bears to 
‘‘(B) the aggregate cost of all applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage provided to the 
employee by all coverage providers during such 
period. 
‘‘(4) RESPONSIBILITY TO CALCULATE TAX AND 
APPLICABLE SHARES.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each employer shall— 
‘‘(i) calculate for each taxable period the 
amount of the excess benefit subject to the tax 
imposed by subsection (a) and the applicable 
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share of such excess benefit for each coverage 
provider, and 
‘‘(ii) notify, at such time and in such manner 
as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary 
and each coverage provider of the amount so 
determined for the provider. 
‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER 
PLANS.—In the case of applicable employer-
sponsored coverage made available to employees 
through a multiemployer plan (as defined in 
section 414(f)), the plan sponsor shall make the 
calculations, and provide the notice, required 
under subparagraph (A). 
‘‘(d) APPLICABLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED COVERAGE; 
COST.—For purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) APPLICABLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
COVERAGE.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage’ means, with 
respect to any employee, coverage under any 
group health plan made available to the 
employee by an employer which is excludable 
from the employee’s gross income under section 
106, or would be so excludable if it were 
employer-provided coverage (within the meaning 
of such section 106). 
‘‘(B) EXCEPTIONS.—The term ‘applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage’ shall not include— 
‘‘(i) any coverage (whether through 
insurance or otherwise) described in section 
9832(c)(1) (other than subparagraph (G) 
thereof) or for long-term care, or 
“(ii) any policy under a separate policy, 
certificate, or contract of insurance which 
provides benefits substantially all of which are 
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for treatment of the mouth (including any 
organ or structure within the mouth) or for 
treatment of the eye, or 
‘‘(iii) any coverage described in section 
9832(c)(3) the payment for which is not 
excludable from gross income and for which a 
deduction under section 162(l) is not allowable. 
‘‘(C) COVERAGE INCLUDES EMPLOYEE PAID 
PORTION.—Coverage shall be treated as 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage without 
regard to whether the employer or employee 
pays for the coverage. 
‘‘(D) SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUAL.—In the case 
of an individual who is an employee within the 
meaning of section 401(c)(1), coverage under any 
group health plan providing health insurance 
coverage shall be treated as applicable employer-
sponsored coverage if a deduction is allowable 
under section 162(l) with respect to all or any 
portion of the cost of the coverage. 
‘‘(E) GOVERNMENTAL PLANS INCLUDED.—
Applicable employer-sponsored coverage shall 
include coverage under any group health plan 
established and maintained primarily for its 
civilian employees by the Government of the 
United States, by the government of any State or 
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or 
instrumentality of any such government. 
‘‘(2) DETERMINATION OF COST.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The cost of applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage shall be 
determined under rules similar to the rules of 
section 4980B(f)(4), except that in determining 
such cost, any portion of the cost of such 
coverage which is attributable to the tax 
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imposed under this section shall not be taken 
into account and the amount of such cost shall be 
calculated separately for self-only coverage and 
other coverage.  In the case of applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage which provides 
coverage to retired employees, the plan may 
elect to treat a retired employee who has not 
attained the age of 65 and a retired employee 
who has attained the age of 65 as similarly 
situated beneficiaries. 
‘‘(B) HEALTH FSAS.—In the case of applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage consisting of 
coverage under a flexible spending arrangement 
(as defined in section 106(c)(2)), the cost of the 
coverage shall be equal to the sum of— 
‘‘(i) the amount of employer contributions 
under any salary reduction election under the 
arrangement, plus 
‘‘(ii) the amount determined under 
subparagraph (A) with respect to any 
reimbursement under the arrangement in 
excess of the contributions described in clause 
(i). 
‘‘(C) ARCHER MSAS AND HSAS.—In the case of 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage 
consisting of coverage under an arrangement 
under which the employer makes contributions 
described in subsection (b) or (d) of section 106, 
the cost of the coverage shall be equal to the 
amount of employer contributions under the 
arrangement. 
‘‘(D) ALLOCATION ON A MONTHLY BASIS.—If cost 
is determined on other than a monthly basis, the 
cost shall be allocated to months in a taxable 
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period on such basis as the Secretary may 
prescribe. 
“3) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’ includes 
any former employee, surviving spouse, or other 
primary insured individual. 
‘‘(e) PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO PROPERLY CALCULATE 
EXCESS BENEFIT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If, for any taxable period, the 
tax imposed by subsection (a) exceeds the tax 
determined under such subsection with respect to 
the total excess benefit calculated by the employer 
or plan sponsor under subsection (c)(4)— 
‘‘(A) each coverage provider shall pay the tax 
on its applicable share (determined in the same 
manner as under subsection (c)(4)) of the excess, 
but no penalty shall be imposed on the provider 
with respect to such amount, and 
‘‘(B) the employer or plan sponsor shall, in 
addition to any tax imposed by subsection (a), 
pay a penalty in an amount equal to such excess, 
plus interest at the underpayment rate 
determined under section 6621 for the period 
beginning on the due date for the payment of tax 
imposed by subsection (a) to which the excess 
relates and ending on the date of payment of the 
penalty. 
‘‘(2) LIMITATIONS ON PENALTY.— 
‘‘(A) PENALTY NOT TO APPLY WHERE FAULURE 
NOT DISCOVERED EXERCISING REASONABLE 
DILIGENCE.—No penalty shall be imposed by 
paragraph (1)(B) on any failure to properly 
calculate the excess benefit during any period for 
which it is established to the satisfaction of the 
Secretary that the employer or plan sponsor 
neither knew, nor exercising reasonable 
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diligence would have known, that such failure 
existed. 
‘‘(B) PENALTY NOT TO APPLY TO FAILURES 
CORRECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS.—No penalty shall be 
imposed by paragraph (1)(B) on any such failure 
if— 
‘‘(i) such failure was due to reasonable cause 
and not to willful neglect, and 
‘‘(ii) such failure is corrected during the 30-
day period beginning on the 1st date that the 
employer knew, or exercising reasonable 
diligence would have known, that such failure 
existed. 
‘‘(C) WAIVER BY SECRETARY.—In the case of any 
such failure which is due to reasonable cause 
and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may 
waive part or all of the penalty imposed by 
paragraph (1), to the extent that the payment of 
such penalty would be excessive or otherwise 
inequitable relative to the failure involved. 
‘‘(f) OTHER DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For 
purposes of this section— 
‘‘(1) COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), an employee shall be treated 
as having self-only coverage with respect to any 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage of an 
employer. 
‘‘(B) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An 
employee shall be treated as having coverage 
other than self-only coverage only if the 
employee is enrolled in coverage other than self-
only coverage in a group health plan which 
provides minimum essential coverage (as defined 
in section 5000A(f)) to the employee and at least 
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one other beneficiary, and the benefits provided 
under such minimum essential coverage do not 
vary based on whether any individual covered 
under such coverage is the employee or another 
beneficiary. 
‘‘(2) QUALIFIED RETIREE.—The term ‘qualified 
retiree’ means any individual who— 
‘‘(A) is receiving coverage by reason of being a 
retiree, 
‘‘(B) has attained age 55, and 
‘‘(C) is not entitled to benefits or eligible for 
enrollment under the Medicare program under 
title XVIII of the Social Security Act. 
‘‘(3) EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN HIGH-RISK 
PROFESSION.—The term ‘employees engaged in a 
high-risk profession’ means law enforcement 
officers (as such term is defined in section 1204 of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968), employees in fire protection activities (as 
such term is defined in section 3(y) of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938), individuals who 
provide out-of-hospital emergency medical care 
(including emergency medical technicians, 
paramedics, and first-responders), individuals 
whose primary work is longshore work (as defined 
in section 258(b) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1288(b)), determined 
without regard to paragraph (2) thereof), and 
individuals engaged in the construction, mining, 
agriculture (not including food processing), 
forestry, and fishing industries.  Such term 
includes an employee who is retired from a high-
risk profession described in the preceding sentence, 
if such employee satisfied the requirements of such 
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sentence for a period of not less than 20 years 
during the employee’s employment. 
‘‘(4) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.—The term ‘group 
health plan’ has the meaning given such term by 
section 5000(b)(1). 
‘‘(5) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE; HEALTH 
INSURANCE ISSUER.— 
‘‘(A) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE.—The term 
‘health insurance coverage’ has the meaning 
given such term by section 9832(b)(1) (applied 
without regard to subparagraph (B) thereof, 
except as provided by the Secretary in 
regulations). 
‘‘(B) HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUER.—The term 
‘health insurance issuer’ has the meaning given 
such term by section 9832(b)(2). 
‘‘(6) PERSON THAT ADMINISTERS THE PLAN 
BENEFITS.—The term ‘person that administers the 
plan benefits’ shall include the plan sponsor if the 
plan sponsor administers benefits under the plan. 
‘‘(7) PLAN SPONSOR.—The term ‘plan sponsor’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 3(16)(B) of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974. 
‘‘(8) TAXABLE PERIOD.—The term ‘taxable period’ 
means the calendar year or such shorter period as 
the Secretary may prescribe.  The Secretary may 
have different taxable periods for employers of 
varying sizes. 
‘‘(9) AGGREGATION RULES.—All employers treated 
as a single employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), 
or (o) of section 414 shall be treated as a single 
employer. 
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‘‘(10) DENIAL OF DEDUCTION.—For denial of a 
deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see 
section 275(a)(6). 
‘‘(g) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
this section.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 
for chapter 43 of such Code, as amended by section 
1513, is amended by adding at the end the following 
new item: 
‘‘Sec. 4980I. Excise tax on high cost employer-
sponsored health coverage.’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2017. 
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SEC. 9002. INCLUSION OF COST OF EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE ON W-2. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6051(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to receipts for 
employees) is amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of 
paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end of 
paragraph (13) and inserting ‘‘, and’’, and by adding 
after paragraph (13) the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(14) the aggregate cost (determined under rules 
similar to the rules of section 4980B(f)(4)) of 
applicable employer-sponsored coverage (as defined 
in section 4980I(d)(1)), except that this paragraph 
shall not apply to— 
‘‘(A) coverage to which paragraphs (11) and 
(12) apply, or 
‘‘(B) the amount of any salary reduction 
contributions to a flexible spending 
arrangement (within the meaning of section 
125).’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2010. 
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SEC. 9003. DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MEDICINE QUALIFIED 
ONLY IF FOR PRESCRIBED DRUG OR INSULIN. 
(a) HSAS.—Subparagraph (A) of section 223(d)(2) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
adding at the end the following:  ‘‘Such term shall 
include an amount paid for medicine or a drug only if 
such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug 
(determined without regard to whether such drug is 
available without a prescription) or is insulin.’’. 
(b) ARCHER MSAS.—Subparagraph (A) of section 
220(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Such 
term shall include an amount paid for medicine or a 
drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed 
drug (determined without regard to whether such 
drug is available without a prescription) or is 
insulin.’’. 
(c) HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS 
AND HEALTH REIMBURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.—
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection: 
‘‘(f) REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICINE RESTRICTED TO 
PRESCRIBED DRUGS AND INSULIN.—For purposes of 
this section and section 105, reimbursement for 
expenses incurred for a medicine or a drug shall be 
treated as a reimbursement for medical expenses 
only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug 
(determined without regard to whether such drug is 
available without a prescription) or is insulin.’’. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.— 
(1) DISTRIBUTIONS FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.—
The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) 
shall apply to amounts paid with respect to taxable 
years beginning after December 31, 2010. 
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(2) REIMBURSEMENTS.—The amendment made by 
subsection (c) shall apply to expenses incurred with 
respect to taxable years beginning after December 
31, 2010. 
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SEC. 9004. INCREASE IN ADDITIONAL TAX ON 
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM HSAS AND ARCHER MSAS NOT 
USED FOR QUALIFIED MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
(a) HSAS.—Section 223(f)(4)(A) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘10 
percent’’ and inserting ‘’20 percent’’. 
(b) ARCHER MSAS.—Section 220(f)(4)(A) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
striking ‘‘15 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘20 percent’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to distributions made after 
December 31, 2010. 
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SEC. 9005. LIMITATIONS ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE 
SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER CAFETERIA PLANS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 125 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as 
subsections (j) and (k), respectively, and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following 
new subsection: 
‘‘(i) LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING 
ARRANGEMENTS.— 
“(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section, if 
a benefit is provided under a cafeteria plan 
through employer contributions to a health flexible 
spending arrangement, such benefit shall not be 
treated as a qualified benefit unless the cafeteria 
plan provides that an employee may not elect for 
any taxable year to have salary reduction 
contributions in excess of $2,500 made to such 
arrangement. 
“(2) ADJUSTMENT FOR INFLATION.— In the case of 
any taxable year beginning after December 31, 
2013, the dollar amount in paragraph (1) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to— 
‘‘(A) such amount, multiplied by 
‘‘(B) the cost-of-living adjustment determined 
under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in 
which such taxable year begins by substituting 
‘calendar year 2012’ for ‘calendar year 1992’ in 
subparagraph (B) thereof. 
If any increase determined under this paragraph is 
not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be 
rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2010.  
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SEC. 9006. EXPANSION OF INFORMATION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6041 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subsections: 
‘‘(h) APPLICATION TO CORPORATIONS.—
Notwithstanding any regulation prescribed by the 
Secretary before the date of the enactment of this 
subsection, for purposes of this section the term 
‘person’ includes any corporation that is not an 
organization exempt from tax under section 501(a). 
‘‘(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary may prescribe 
such regulations and other guidance as may be 
appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of 
this section, including rules to prevent duplicative 
reporting of transactions.’’. 
(b) PAYMENTS FOR PROPERTY AND OTHER GROSS 
PROCEEDS.—Subsection (a) of section 6041 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 
(1) by inserting ‘‘amounts in consideration for 
property,’’ after ‘‘wages,’’, 
(2) by inserting ‘‘gross proceeds,’’ after 
‘‘emoluments, or other’’, and 
(3) by inserting ‘‘gross proceeds,’’ after ‘‘setting 
forth the amount of such’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to payments made after 
December 31, 2011. 
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SEC. 9007. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CHARITABLE HOSPITALS. 
(a) REQUIREMENTS TO QUALIFY AS SECTION 
501(C)(3) CHARITABLE HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION.—
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to exemption from tax on corporations, 
certain trusts, etc.) is amended by redesignating 
subsection (r) as subsection (s) and by inserting after 
subsection (q) the following new subsection: 
‘‘(r) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN 
HOSPITALS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A hospital organization to 
which this subsection applies shall not be treated 
as described in subsection (c)(3) unless the 
organization— 
‘‘(A) meets the community health needs 
assessment requirements described in 
paragraph (3), 
‘‘(B) meets the financial assistance policy 
requirements described in paragraph (4), 
‘‘(C) meets the requirements on charges 
described in paragraph (5), and 
‘‘(D) meets the billing and collection 
requirement described in paragraph (6). 
‘‘(2) HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH 
SUBSECTION APPLIES.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—This subsection shall apply 
to— 
‘‘(i) an organization which operates a facility 
which is required by a State to be licensed, 
registered, or similarly recognized as a 
hospital, and  
‘‘(ii) any other organization which the 
Secretary determines has the provision of 
hospital care as its principal function or 
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purpose constituting the basis for its 
exemption under subsection (c)(3) (determined 
without regard to this subsection). 
‘‘(B) ORGANIZATIONS WITH MORE THAN 1 
HOSPITAL FACILITY.—If a hospital organization 
operates more than 1 hospital facility— 
‘‘(i) the organization shall meet the 
requirements of this subsection separately 
with respect to each such facility, and 
‘‘(ii) the organization shall not be treated as 
described in subsection (c)(3) with respect to 
any such facility for which such requirements 
are not separately met. 
‘‘(3) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—An organization meets the 
requirements of this paragraph with respect to 
any taxable year only if the organization— 
‘‘(i) has conducted a community health needs 
assessment which meets the requirements of 
subparagraph (B) in such taxable year or in 
either of the 2 taxable years immediately 
preceding such taxable year, and 
‘‘(ii) has adopted an implementation strategy 
to meet the community health needs identified 
through such assessment. 
‘‘(B) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT.—
A community health needs assessment meets 
the requirements of this paragraph if such 
community health needs assessment— 
‘‘(i) takes into account input from persons 
who represent the broad interests of the 
community served by the hospital facility, 
including those with special knowledge of or 
expertise in public health, and 
‘‘(ii) is made widely available to the public. 
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‘‘(4) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POLICY.—An 
organization meets the requirements of this 
paragraph if the organization establishes the 
following policies: 
‘‘(A) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POLICY.—A written 
financial assistance policy which includes— 
‘‘(i) eligibility criteria for financial 
assistance, and whether such assistance 
includes free or discounted care, 
‘‘(ii) the basis for calculating amounts 
charged to patients, 
‘‘(iii) the method for applying for financial 
assistance, 
‘‘(iv) in the case of an organization which 
does not have a separate billing and collections 
policy, the actions the organization may take 
in the event of nonpayment, including 
collections action and reporting to credit 
agencies, and 
‘‘(v) measures to widely publicize the policy 
within the community to be served by the 
organization. 
‘‘(B) POLICY RELATING TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL 
CARE.—A written policy requiring the 
organization to provide, without discrimination, 
care for emergency medical conditions (within 
the meaning of section 1867 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395dd)) to individuals 
regardless of their eligibility under the financial 
assistance policy described in subparagraph (A). 
‘‘(5) LIMITATION ON CHARGES.—An organization 
meets the requirements of this paragraph if the 
organization— 
‘‘(A) limits amounts charged for emergency or 
other medically necessary care provided to 
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individuals eligible for assistance under the 
financial assistance policy described in 
paragraph (4)(A) to not more than the amounts 
generally billed to individuals who have 
insurance covering such care, and 
‘‘(B) prohibits the use of gross charges. 
‘‘(6) BILLING AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.—
An organization meets the requirement of this 
paragraph only if the organization does not engage 
in extraordinary collection actions before the 
organization has made reasonable efforts to 
determine whether the individual is eligible for 
assistance under the financial assistance policy 
described in paragraph (4)(A). 
‘‘(7) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary 
shall issue such regulations and guidance as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
subsection, including guidance relating to what 
constitutes reasonable efforts to determine the 
eligibility of a patient under a financial assistance 
policy for purposes of paragraph (6).’’. 
(b) EXCISE TAX FOR FAILURES TO MEET HOSPITAL 
EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter D of chapter 42 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
failure by certain charitable organizations to meet 
certain qualification requirements) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 4959. TAXES ON FAILURES BY HOSPITAL 
ORGANIZATIONS. 
‘‘If a hospital organization to which section 501(r) 
applies fails to meet the requirement of section 
501(r)(3) for any taxable year, there is imposed on the 
organization a tax equal to $50,000.’’. 
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(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of 
sections for subchapter D of chapter 42 of such 
Code is amended by adding at the end the 
following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 4959. Taxes on failures by hospital 
organizations.’’. 
(c) MANDATORY REVIEW OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
HOSPITALS.—The Secretary of the Treasury or the 
Secretary’s delegate shall review at least once every 3 
years the community benefit activities of each 
hospital organization to which section 501(r) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this 
section) applies. 
(d) ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND 
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.—Section 6033(b) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
certain organizations described in section 501(c)(3)) 
is amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of 
paragraph (14), by redesignating paragraph (15) as 
paragraph (16), and by inserting after paragraph 
(14) the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(15) in the case of an organization to which the 
requirements of section 501(r) apply for the taxable 
year— 
‘‘(A) a description of how the organization is 
addressing the needs identified in each 
community health needs assessment conducted 
under section 501(r)(3) and a description of any 
such needs that are not being addressed together 
with the reasons why such needs are not being 
addressed, and 
‘‘(B) the audited financial statements of such 
organization (or, in the case of an organization 
the financial statements of which are included in 
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a consolidated financial statement with other 
organizations, such consolidated financial 
statement).’’. 
(2) TAXES.—Section 6033(b)(10) of such Code is 
amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of 
subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘and’’ at the end of 
subparagraph (C), and by adding at the end the 
following new subparagraph: 
‘‘(D) section 4959 (relating to taxes on failures 
by hospital organizations),’’. 
(e) REPORTS.— 
(1) REPORT ON LEVELS OF CHARITY CARE.—The 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall 
submit to the Committees on Ways and Means, 
Education and Labor, and Energy and Commerce 
of the House of Representatives and to the 
Committees on Finance and Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate an annual 
report on the following: 
(A) Information with respect to private tax-
exempt, taxable, and government-owned 
hospitals regarding— 
(i) levels of charity care provided, 
(ii) bad debt expenses, 
(iii) unreimbursed costs for services provided 
with respect to means-tested government 
programs, and 
(iv) unreimbursed costs for services provided 
with respect to non-means tested government 
programs. 
(B) Information with respect to private tax-
exempt hospitals regarding costs incurred for 
community benefit activities. 
(2) REPORT ON TRENDS.— 
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(A) STUDY.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, shall conduct a study on trends 
in the information required to be reported under 
paragraph (1). 
(B) REPORT.—Not later than 5 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall 
submit a report on the study conducted under 
subparagraph (A) to the Committees on Ways 
and Means, Education and Labor, and Energy 
and Commerce of the House of Representatives 
and to the Committees on Finance and Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate. 
(f) EFFECTIVE DATES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
paragraphs (2) and (3), the amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT.—
The requirements of section 501(r)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by 
subsection (a), shall apply to taxable years 
beginning after the date which is 2 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(3) EXCISE TAX.—The amendments made by 
subsection (b) shall apply to failures occurring 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
  
129a 
SEC. 9008. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON BRANDED 
PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS AND 
IMPORTERS. 
(a) IMPOSITION OF FEE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each covered entity engaged in 
the business of manufacturing or importing 
branded prescription drugs shall pay to the 
Secretary of the Treasury not later than the 
annual payment date of each calendar year 
beginning after 2009 a fee in an amount 
determined under subsection (b). 
(2) ANNUAL PAYMENT DATE.—For purposes of this 
section, the term ‘‘annual payment date’’ means 
with respect to any calendar year the date 
determined by the Secretary, but in no event later 
than September 30 of such calendar year. 
(b) DETERMINATION OF FEE AMOUNT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each covered 
entity, the fee under this section for any calendar 
year shall be equal to an amount that bears the 
same ratio to the applicable amount as— 
(A) the covered entity’s branded prescription 
drug sales taken into account during the 
preceding calendar year, bear to 
(B) the aggregate branded prescription drug 
sales of all covered entities taken into account 
during such preceding calendar year. 
(2) SALES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.—For purposes of 
paragraph (1), the branded prescription drug sales 
taken into account during any calendar year with 
respect to any covered entity shall be determined 
in accordance with the following table: 
With respect to a covered 
entity’s aggregate 
branded prescription 
The percentage of such 
sales taken into account 
is: 
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drug sales during the 
calendar year that are: 
Not more than 
$5,000,000 ...................... 
 
0 percent 
More than $5,000,000 but 
not more than 
$125,000,000. 
 
 
10 percent 
More than $125,000,000 
but not more than 
$225,000,000. 
 
 
40 percent 
More than $225,000,000 
but not more than 
$400,000,000. 
 
 
75 percent 
More than 
$400,000,000.....................
 
100 percent. 
 
(3) SECRETARIAL DETERMINATION.—The 
Secretary of the Treasury shall calculate the 
amount of each covered entity’s fee for any 
calendar year under paragraph (1).  In calculating 
such amount, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
determine such covered entity’s branded 
prescription drug sales on the basis of reports 
submitted under subsection (g) and through the 
use of any other source of information available to 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 
(4) APPLICABLE AMOUNT.—For purposes of 
paragraph (1), the applicable amount shall be 
determined in accordance with the following table: 
Calendar year Applicable amount 
2011......................................... $2,500,000,000 
2012......................................... $2,800,000,000 
2013......................................... $2,800,000,000 
2014......................................... $3,000,000,000 
2015......................................... $3,000,000,000 
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2016......................................... $3,000,000,000 
2017......................................... $4,000,000,000 
2018......................................... $4,100,000,000 
2019 and thereafter................ $2,800,000,000 
 
(c) TRANSFER OF FEES TO MEDICARE PART B TRUST 
FUND.—There is hereby appropriated to the Federal 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund 
established under section 1841 of the Social Security 
Act an amount equal to the fees received by the 
Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a). 
(d) COVERED ENTITY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section, 
the term ‘‘covered entity’’ means any manufacturer 
or importer with gross receipts from branded 
prescription drug sales. 
(2) CONTROLLED GROUPS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this 
subsection, all persons treated as a single 
employer under subsection (a) or (b) of section 52 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or 
subsection (m) or (o) of section 414 of such Code 
shall be treated as a single covered entity. 
(B) INCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.—
For purposes of subparagraph (A), in applying 
subsections (a) and (b) of section 52 of such Code 
to this section, section 1563 of such Code shall be 
applied without regard to subsection (b)(2)(C) 
thereof. 
(3) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.—If more than 
one person is liable for payment of the fee under 
subsection (a) with respect to a single covered 
entity by reason of the application of paragraph (2), 
all such persons shall be jointly and severally 
liable for payment of such fee. 
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(e) BRANDED PRESCRIPTION DRUG SALES.—For 
purposes of this section— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘branded 
prescription drug sales’’ means sales of branded 
prescription drugs to any specified government 
program or pursuant to coverage under any such 
program. 
(2) BRANDED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘branded 
prescription drug’’ means— 
(i) any prescription drug the application for 
which was submitted under section 505(b) of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
U.S.C. 355(b)), or 
(ii) any biological product the license for 
which was submitted under section 351(a) of 
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
262(a)). 
(B) PRESCRIPTION DRUG.—For purposes of 
subparagraph (A)(i), the term ‘‘prescription 
drug’’ means any drug which is subject to section 
503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (21 U.S.C. 353(b)). 
(3) EXCLUSION OF ORPHAN DRUG SALES.—The 
term ‘‘branded prescription drug sales’’ shall not 
include sales of any drug or biological product with 
respect to which a credit was allowed for any 
taxable year under section 45C of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.  The preceding sentence 
shall not apply with respect to any such drug or 
biological product after the date on which such 
drug or biological product is approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration for marketing for any 
indication other than the treatment of the rare 
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disease or condition with respect to which such 
credit was allowed. 
(4) SPECIFIED GOVERNMENT PROGRAM.—The term 
‘‘specified government program’’ means— 
(A) the Medicare Part D program under part D 
of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 
(B) the Medicare Part B program under part B 
of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 
(C) the Medicaid program under title XIX of 
the Social Security Act, 
(D) any program under which branded 
prescription drugs are procured by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 
(E) any program under which branded 
prescription drugs are procured by the 
Department of Defense, or 
(F) the TRICARE retail pharmacy program 
under section 1074g of title 10, United States 
Code. 
(f) TAX TREATMENTS OF FEES.—The fees imposed by 
this section— 
(1) for purposes of subtitle F of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, shall be treated as excise 
taxes with respect to which only civil actions for 
refund under procedures of such subtitle shall 
apply, and 
(2) for purposes of section 275 of such Code, shall 
be considered to be a tax described in section 
275(a)(6). 
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than the 
date determined by the Secretary of the Treasury 
following the end of any calendar year, the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Defense shall 
report to the Secretary of the Treasury, in such 
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manner as the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes, 
the total branded prescription drug sales for each 
covered entity with respect to each specified 
government program under such Secretary’s 
jurisdiction using the following methodology: 
(1) MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM.—The Secretary 
of Health and Human Services shall report, for 
each covered entity and for each branded 
prescription drug of the covered entity covered by 
the Medicare Part D program, the product of— 
(A) the per-unit ingredient cost, as reported to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services by 
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage 
prescription drug plans, minus any per-unit 
rebate, discount, or other price concession 
provided by the covered entity, as reported to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services by the 
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage 
prescription drug plans, and 
(B) the number of units of the branded 
prescription drug paid for under the Medicare 
Part D program. 
(2) MEDICARE PART B PROGRAM.—The Secretary 
of Health and Human Services shall report, for 
each covered entity and for each branded 
prescription drug of the covered entity covered by 
the Medicare Part B program under section 
1862(a) of the Social Security Act, the product of— 
(A) the per-unit average sales price (as defined 
in section 1847A(c) of the Social Security Act) or 
the per-unit Part B payment rate for a 
separately paid branded prescription drug 
without a reported average sales price, and 
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(B) the number of units of the branded 
prescription drug paid for under the Medicare 
Part B program. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
shall establish a process for determining the units 
and the allocated price for purposes of this section for 
those branded prescription drugs that are not 
separately payable or for which National Drug Codes 
are not reported. 
(3) MEDICAID PROGRAM.—The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall report, for each 
covered entity and for each branded prescription 
drug of the covered entity covered under the 
Medicaid program, the product of— 
(A) the per-unit ingredient cost paid to 
pharmacies by States for the branded 
prescription drug dispensed to Medicaid 
beneficiaries, minus any per-unit rebate paid by 
the covered entity under section 1927 of the 
Social Security Act and any State supplemental 
rebate, and 
(B) the number of units of the branded 
prescription drug paid for under the Medicaid 
program. 
(4) DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
PROGRAMS.—The Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
shall report, for each covered entity and for each 
branded prescription drug of the covered entity the 
total amount paid for each such branded 
prescription drug procured by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs for its beneficiaries. 
(5) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND 
TRICARE.—The Secretary of Defense shall report, 
for each covered entity and for each branded 
136a 
prescription drug of the covered entity, the sum 
of— 
(A) the total amount paid for each such 
branded prescription drug procured by the 
Department of Defense for its beneficiaries, and 
(B) for each such branded prescription drug 
dispensed under the TRICARE retail pharmacy 
program, the product of— 
(i) the per-unit ingredient cost, minus any 
per-unit rebate paid by the covered entity, and 
(ii) the number of units of the branded 
prescription drug dispensed under such 
program. 
(h) SECRETARY.—For purposes of this section, the 
term ‘‘Secretary’’ includes the Secretary’s delegate. 
(i) GUIDANCE.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
publish guidance necessary to carry out the purposes 
of this section. 
(j) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply to 
calendar years beginning after December 31, 2010. 
(k) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1841(a) of 
the Social Security Act is amended by inserting ‘‘or 
section 9008(c) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2009’’ after ‘‘this part’’. 
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SEC. 9009. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON MEDICAL 
DEVICE MANUFACTURERS AND IMPORTERS. 
Subchapter E—Medical Devices 
‘‘Sec. 4191. Medical devices. 
‘‘SEC. 4191. MEDICAL DEVICES. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby imposed on the 
sale of any taxable medical device by the 
manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equal to 
2.3 percent of the price for which so sold.  
‘‘(b) TAXABLE MEDICAL DEVICE.—For purposes of 
this section— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘taxable medical 
device’ means any device (as defined in section 
201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act) intended for humans. 
‘‘(2) EXEMPTIONS.—Such term shall not include— ‘ 
‘(A) eyeglasses, 
‘‘(B) contact lenses, 
‘‘(C) hearing aids, and 
‘‘(D) any other medical device determined by 
the Secretary to be of a type which is generally 
purchased by the general public at retail for 
individual use.’’, and 
(2) by INSERTING after the item relating to 
subchapter D in the table of subchapters for such 
chapter the following new item: 
‘‘SUBCHAPTER E. MEDICAL DEVICES’’. 
(b) Certain Exemptions Not to Apply.— 
 (1) Section 4221(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 
following new sentence: ‘‘In the case of the tax 
imposed by section 4191, paragraphs (3), (4), (5), 
and (6) shall not apply.’’. 
(2) Section 6416(b)(2) of such Code is amended by 
adding at the end the following: ‘‘In the case of the 
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tax imposed by section 4191, subparagraphs (B), 
(C), (D), and (E) shall not apply.’’. 
(c) Effective Date.—The amendments  made by this 
section shall apply to sales after December 31, 2012. 
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SEC. 9010. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE PROVIDERS 
(a) IMPOSITION OF FEE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each covered entity engaged in 
the business of providing health insurance shall 
pay to the Secretary not later than the annual 
payment date of each calendar year beginning after 
2013 a fee in an amount determined under 
subsection (b). 
(2) ANNUAL PAYMENT DATE.—For purposes of this 
section, the term ‘‘annual payment date’’ means 
with respect to any calendar year the date 
determined by the Secretary, but in no event later 
than September 30 of such calendar year. 
(b) DETERMINATION OF FEE AMOUNT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each covered 
entity under this section for any calendar year 
shall be equal to an amount that bears the same 
ratio to the applicable amount as— 
(A) the covered entity’s net premiums written 
with respect to health insurance for any United 
States health risk that are taken into account 
during the preceding calendar year, bears to 
(B) the aggregate net premiums written with 
respect to such health insurance of all covered 
entities that are taken into account during such 
preceding calendar year. 
(2) AMOUNTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.—For 
purposes of paragraph (1),  
(A) IN GENERAL. .—The net premiums written 
with respect to health insurance for any United 
States health risk that are taken into account 
during any calendar year with respect to any 
covered entity shall be determined in accordance 
with the following table: 
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With respect to a covered 
entity’s net premiums 
written during the 
calendar year are: 
The percentage of net 
premiums written that 
are taken into account 
is: 
Not more than 
$25,000,000 ......................
 
0 percent 
More than $25,000,000 
but not more than 
$50,000,000. 
 
 
50 percent 
More than 
$50,000,000.......................
 
100 percent. 
(B) PARTIAL EXCLUSION FOR CERTAIN EXEMPT 
ACTIVITIES.—After the application of 
subparagraph (A), only 50 percent of the 
remaining net premiums written with respect to 
health insurance for any United States health 
risk that are attributable to the activities (other 
than activities of an unrelated trade or business 
as defined in section 513 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986) of any covered entity qualifying 
under paragraph (3), (4), (26), or (29) of section 
501(c) of such Code and exempt from tax under 
section 501(a) of such Code shall be taken into 
account. 
(3) SECRETARIAL DETERMINATION.—The 
Secretary shall calculate the amount of each 
covered entity’s fee for any calendar year under 
paragraph (1).  In calculating such amount, the 
Secretary shall determine such covered entity’s net 
premiums written with respect to any United 
States health risk on the basis of reports submitted 
by the covered entity under subsection (g) and 
through the use of any other source of information 
available to the Secretary. 
(c) COVERED ENTITY.— 
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(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section, 
the term ‘‘covered entity’’ means any entity which 
provides health insurance for any United States 
health risk during the calendar year in which the 
fee under this section is due. 
(2) EXCLUSION.—Such term does not include— 
(A) any employer to the extent that such 
employer self-insures its employees’ health risks,  
(B) any governmental entity (except to the 
extent such an entity provides health insurance 
coverage through the community health 
insurance option under section 1323). 
(C) any entity—  
(i) which is incorporated as a nonprofit 
corporation under a State law, 
(ii) no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, 
or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation (except to the extentas otherwise 
provided in section 501(h) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986), and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office, 
and (iii) more than 80 percent of the gross 
revenues of which is received from government 
programs that target low-income, elderly, or 
disabled populations under titles XVIII, XIX, 
and XXI of the Social Security Act, and 
(D) any entity which is described in section 
501(c)(9) of such Code and which is established 
by an entity provides(other than by an employer 
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or employers) for purposes of providing health 
insurance coverage through the community 
health insurance option under section 1323).care 
benefits. 
(3) CONTROLLED GROUPS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this 
subsection, all persons treated as a single 
employer under subsection (a) or (b) of section 52 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or 
subsection (m) or (o) of section 414 of such Code 
shall be treated as a single covered entity (or 
employer for purposes of paragraph (2)). 
(B) INCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.—
For purposes of subparagraph (A), in applying 
subsections (a) and (b) of section 52 of such Code 
to this section, section 1563 of such Code shall be 
applied without regard to subsection (b)(2)(C) 
thereof. 
If any entity described in subparagraph (C) or 
(D) of paragraph (2) is treated as a covered 
entity by reason of the application of the 
preceding sentence, the net premiums written 
with respect to health insurance for any United 
States health risk of such entity shall not be 
taken into account for purposes of this section. 
(4) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.— If more than 
one person is liable for payment of the fee under 
subsection (a) with respect to a single covered 
entity by reason of the application of paragraph (3), 
all such persons shall be jointly and severally 
liable for payment of such fee. 
(d) UNITED STATES HEALTH RISK.—For purposes of 
this section, the term ‘‘United States health risk’’ 
means the health risk of any individual who is— 
(1) a United States citizen, 
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(2) a resident of the United States (within the 
meaning of section 7701(b)(1)(A) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986), or 
(3) located in the United States, with respect to 
the period such individual is so located. 
(e) APPLICABLE AMOUNT.—For purposes of 
subsection (b)(1)— 
(1) YEARS BEFORE 2019.—In the case of calendar 
years beginning before 2019, the applicable 
amount shall be determined in accordance with the 
following table: 
Calendar year Applicable amount 
2014......................................... $8,000,000,000 
2015......................................... $11,300,000,000 
2016......................................... $11,300,000,000 
2017......................................... $13,900,000,000 
2018......................................... $14,300,000,000 
(2) Years after 2018.—In the case of any 
calendar year beginning after 2018, the applicable 
amount shall be the applicable amount for the 
preceding calendar year increased by the rate of 
premium growth (within the meaning of section 
36B(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986) for such preceding calendar year. 
(f) TAX TREATMENT OF FEES.—The fees imposed by 
this section— 
(1) for purposes of subtitle F of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, shall be treated as excise 
taxes with respect to which only civil actions for 
refund under procedures of such subtitle shall 
apply, and 
(2) for purposes of section 275 of such Code shall 
be considered to be a tax described in section 
275(a)(6). 
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than the date 
determined by the Secretary following the end of 
any calendar year, each covered entity shall report 
to the Secretary, in such manner as the Secretary 
prescribes, the covered entity’s net premiums 
written with respect to health insurance for any 
United States health risk for such calendar year. 
(2) PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any failure to 
make a report containing the information 
required by paragraph (1) on the date prescribed 
therefor (determined with regard to any 
extension of time for filing), unless it is shown 
that such failure is due to reasonable cause, 
there shall be paid by the covered entity failing 
to file such report, an amount equal to— 
(i) $10,000, plus 
(ii) the lesser of— 
(I) an amount equal to $1,000, multiplied 
by the number of days during which such 
failure continues, or 
(II) the amount of the fee imposed by this 
section for which such report was required. 
(B) TREATMENT OF PENALTY.—The penalty 
imposed under subparagraph (A)— 
(i) shall be treated as a penalty for purposes 
of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, 
(ii) shall be paid on notice and demand by 
the Secretary and in the same manner as tax 
under such Code, and  
(iii) with respect to which only civil actions 
for refund under procedures of such subtitle F 
shall apply. 
(3) ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTY.— 
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(A) IN GENERAL.— In the case of any 
understatement of a covered entity’s net premiums 
written with respect to health insurance for any 
United States health risk for any calendar year, 
there shall be paid by the covered entity making 
such understatement, an amount equal to the 
excess of— 
(i) the amount of the covered entity’s fee under 
this section for the calendar year the Secretary 
determines should have been paid in the absence 
of any such understatement, over 
 (ii) the amount of such fee the Secretary 
determined based on such understatement. 
(B) UNDERSTATEMENT.—For purposes of this 
paragraph, an understatement of a covered entity’s 
net premiums written with respect to health 
insurance for any United States health risk for any 
calendar year is the difference between the amount 
of such net premiums written as reported on the 
return filed by the covered entity under paragraph 
(1) and the amount of such net premiums written 
that should have been reported on such return. 
(C) TREATMENT OF PENALTY.—The penalty 
imposed under subparagraph (A) shall be subject 
to the provisions of subtitle F of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 that apply to assessable 
penalties imposed under chapter 68 of such Code. 
(4) TREATMENT OF INFORMATION.— Section 6103 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall not 
apply to any information reported under this 
subsection. 
(h) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this 
section— 
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(1) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary’s 
delegate. 
(2) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’ 
means the several States, the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the 
possessions of the United States.  
(3) HEALTH INSURANCE.—The term ‘‘health 
insurance’’ shall not include— 
(A) any insurance coverage described in 
paragraph (1)(A) or (3) of section 9832(c) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
(B) any insurance for long-term care, or  
(C) any medicare supplemental health 
insurance (as defined in section 1882(g)(1) of the 
Social Security Act). 
(i) GUIDANCE.—The Secretary shall publish 
guidance necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
section and shall prescribe such regulations as are 
necessary or appropriate to prevent avoidance of the 
purposes of this section, including inappropriate 
actions taken to qualify as an exempt entity under 
subsection (c)(2). 
(j) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply to 
calendar year beginning after December 31, 2013. 
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SEC. 9012. ELIMINATION OF DEDUCTION FOR EXPENSES 
ALLOCABLE TO MEDICARE PART D SUBSIDY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 139A of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking the 
second sentence. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2012. 
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SEC. 9013. MODIFICATION OF ITEMIZED DEDUCTION FOR 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 213 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
striking ‘‘7.5 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘10 percent’’. 
(b) TEMPORARY WAIVER OF INCREASE FOR CERTAIN 
SENIORS.—Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection: 
‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULE FOR 2013, 2014, 2015, AND 
2016.—In the case of any taxable year beginning 
after December 31, 2012, and ending before January 
1, 2017, subsection (a) shall be applied with respect 
to a taxpayer by substituting ‘7.5 percent’ for ‘10 
percent’ if such taxpayer or such taxpayer’s spouse 
has attained age 65 before the close of such taxable 
year.’’. 
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 56(b)(1)(B) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
striking ‘‘by substituting ‘10 percent’ for ‘7.5 percent’ 
’’ and inserting ‘‘without regard to subsection (f) of 
such section’’. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2012. 
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SEC. 9014. LIMITATION ON EXCESSIVE REMUNERATION 
PAID BY CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subparagraph: 
‘‘(6) SPECIAL RULE FOR APPLICATION TO CERTAIN 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDERS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—No deduction shall be 
allowed under this chapter— 
‘‘(i) in the case of applicable individual 
remuneration which is for any disqualified 
taxable year beginning after December 31, 
2012, and which is attributable to services 
performed by an applicable individual during 
such taxable year, to the extent that the 
amount of such remuneration exceeds 
$500,000, or 
‘‘(ii) in the case of deferred deduction 
remuneration for any taxable year beginning 
after December 31, 2012, which is attributable 
to services performed by an applicable 
individual during any disqualified taxable year 
beginning after December 31, 2009, to the 
extent that the amount of such remuneration 
exceeds $500,000 reduced (but not below zero) 
by the sum of— 
‘‘(I) the applicable individual 
remuneration for such disqualified taxable 
year, plus 
‘‘(II) the portion of the deferred deduction 
remuneration for such services which was 
taken into account under this clause in a 
preceding taxable year (or which would have 
been taken into account under this clause in 
a preceding taxable year if this clause were 
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applied by substituting ‘December 31, 2009’ 
for ‘December 31, 2012’ in the matter 
preceding subclause (I)). 
‘‘(B) DISQUALIFIED TAXABLE YEAR.—For 
purposes of this paragraph, the term 
‘disqualified taxable year’ means, with respect to 
any employer, any taxable year for which such 
employer is a covered health insurance provider. 
‘‘(C) COVERED HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDER.—
For purposes of this paragraph— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘covered health 
insurance provider’ means— 
‘‘(I) with respect to taxable years 
beginning after December 31, 2009, and 
before January 1, 2013, any employer which 
is a health insurance issuer (as defined in 
section 9832(b)(2)) and which receives 
premiums from providing health insurance 
coverage (as defined in section 9832(b)(1)), 
and  
‘‘(II) with respect to taxable years 
beginning after December 31, 2012, any 
employer which is a health insurance issuer 
(as defined in section 9832(b)(2)) and with 
respect to which not less than 25 percent of 
the gross premiums received from providing 
health insurance coverage (as defined in 
section 9832(b)(1)) is from minimum 
essential coverage (as defined in section 
5000A(f)). 
‘‘(ii) AGGREGATION RULES.—Two or more 
persons who are treated as a single employer 
under subsection (b), (c), (m), or (o) of section 
414 shall be treated as a single employer, 
except that in applying section 1563(a) for 
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purposes of any such subsection, paragraphs 
(2) and (3) thereof shall be disregarded. 
‘‘(D) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION.—
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
‘applicable individual remuneration’ means, with 
respect to any applicable individual for any 
disqualified taxable year, the aggregate amount 
allowable as a deduction under this chapter for 
such taxable year (determined without regard to 
this subsection) for remuneration (as defined in 
paragraph (4) without regard to subparagraphs 
(B), (C), and (D) thereof) for services performed 
by such individual (whether or not during the 
taxable year).  Such term shall not include any 
deferred deduction remuneration with respect to 
services performed during the disqualified 
taxable year. 
‘‘(E) DEFERRED DEDUCTION REMUNERATION.—
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
‘deferred deduction remuneration’ means 
remuneration which would be applicable 
individual remuneration for services performed 
in a disqualified taxable year but for the fact 
that the deduction under this chapter 
(determined without regard to this paragraph) 
for such remuneration is allowable in a 
subsequent taxable year. 
‘‘(F) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.—For purposes of 
this paragraph, the term ‘applicable individual’ 
means, with respect to any covered health 
insurance provider for any disqualified taxable 
year, any individual— 
‘‘(i) who is an officer, director, or employee in 
such taxable year, or 
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‘‘(ii) who provides services for or on behalf of 
such covered health insurance provider during 
such taxable year. 
‘‘(G) COORDINATION.—Rules similar to the 
rules of subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph 
(4) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph. 
‘‘(H) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary 
may prescribe such guidance, rules, or 
regulations as are necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this paragraph.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2009, with respect to services 
performed after such date. 
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SEC. 9015. ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TAX ON 
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS. 
(a) FICA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 3101(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 
(A) by striking ‘‘In addition’’ and inserting the 
following: 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition’’, 
(B) by striking ‘‘the following percentages of 
the’’ and inserting ‘‘1.45 percent of the’’, 
(C) by striking ‘‘(as defined in section 
3121(b))—’’ and all that follows and inserting 
‘‘(as defined in section 3121(b)).’’, and 
(D) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.—In addition to the tax 
imposed by paragraph (1) and the preceding 
subsection, there is hereby imposed on every 
taxpayer (other than a corporation, estate, or trust) 
a tax equal to 0.9 percent of wages which are 
received with respect to employment (as defined in 
section 3121(b)) during any taxable year beginning 
after December 31, 2012, and which are in excess 
of— 
‘‘(A) in the case of a joint return, $250,000,  
‘‘(B) in the case of a married taxpayer (as 
defined in section 7703) filing a separate return, 
1Ú2 of the dollar amount determined under 
subparagraph (A), and 
“(C) in any other case, $200,000.’’. 
(2) COLLECTION OF TAX.—Section 3102 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.— 
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‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any tax imposed 
by section 3101(b)(2), subsection (a) shall only 
apply to the extent to which the taxpayer receives 
wages from the employer in excess of $200,000, 
and the employer may disregard the amount of 
wages received by such taxpayer’s spouse. 
‘‘(2) COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS NOT WITHHELD.—To 
the extent that the amount of any tax imposed by 
section 3101(b)(2) is not collected by the employer, 
such tax shall be paid by the employee. 
‘‘(3) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT.—If an employer, in 
violation of this chapter, fails to deduct and 
withhold the tax imposed by section 3101(b)(2) and 
thereafter the tax is paid by the employee, the tax 
so required to be deducted and withheld shall not 
be collected from the employer, but this paragraph 
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability 
for any penalties or additions to tax otherwise 
applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and 
withhold.’’. 
(b) SECA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1401(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 
(A) by striking ‘‘In addition’’ and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition’’, and 
(B) by adding at the end the following 
new paragraph: 
‘‘(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the tax 
imposed by paragraph (1) and the 
preceding subsection, there is hereby 
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a 
corporation, estate, or trust) for each 
taxable year beginning after December 31, 
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2012, a tax equal to 0.9 percent of the self-
employment income for such taxable year 
which is in excess of—  
‘‘(i) in the case of a joint return, 
$250,000,  
“(ii) in the case of a married taxpayer 
(as defined in section 7703) filing a 
separate return, 1Ú2 of the dollar amount 
determined under clause (i), and 
‘‘(iii) in any other case, $200,000. 
‘‘(B) COORDINATION WITH FICA.—The 
amounts under clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) 
(whichever is applicable) of subparagraph 
(A) shall be reduced (but not below zero) 
by the amount of wages taken into 
account in determining the tax imposed 
under section 3121(b)(2) with respect to 
the taxpayer.’’. 
(2) NO DEDUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 164(f) of such 
Code is amended by inserting ‘‘(other than 
the taxes imposed by section 1401(b)(2))’’ 
after ‘‘section 1401)’’. 
(B) DEDUCTION FOR NET EARNINGS FROM 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT.—Subparagraph (B) of 
section 1402(a)(12) is amended by 
inserting ‘‘(determined without regard to 
the rate imposed under paragraph (2) of 
section 1401(b))’’ after ‘‘for such year’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply with respect to remuneration 
received, and taxable years beginning, after 
December 31, 2012. 
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SEC. 9016. MODIFICATION OF SECTION 833 TREATMENT 
OF CERTAIN HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 833 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(5) NONAPPLICATION OF SECTION IN CASE OF LOW 
MEDICAL LOSS RATIO.—Notwithstanding the 
preceding paragraphs, this section shall not apply 
to any organization unless such organization’s 
percentage of total premium revenue expended on 
reimbursement for clinical services provided to 
enrollees under its policies during such taxable 
year (as reported under section 2718 of the Public 
Health Service Act) is not less than 85 percent.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2009. 
